Roginskii cites no evidence that "Kommunarka" was designated as a place for the burial of executed NKVD men. Nor does he claim to know this as a fact. Instead he calls it an "assumption" -- he writes "let us assume", or "we assume" (polagaem). Roginskii also admits that Ezhov’s note to himself is not dated.

In other words, Roginskii has no idea when Ezhov wrote it or why. There is no indication that the note is related to any talk with or orders from Stalin, let alone to a specific talk with Stalin in June 1937. Evidently Stalin’s name is not associated with this note, for if it were he would certainly have said so.

In any event, why would Stalin have to direct that NKVD property – Iagoda’s dacha – be returned to the NKVD, when it had always been in the property of the NKVD? The map reproduced in Novak’s article makes it clear that this is a single property. According to Novak it had been so since before the Revolution.

While conceding that there is no indication at all of when Ezhov wrote the three-word note to himself Roginskii adds that it is in a notebook "in which he usually recorded [zanosil] (in an extremely abbreviated form) Stalin’s directives." But Roginskii cites no evidence to support this statement. Evidently Ezhov also recorded other matters in this notebook. Otherwise Roginskii would surely have written that all the other contents of this notebook consists of directives by Stalin; that this was a notebook dedicated by Ezhov to recording Stalin’s directives; and that therefore this three-word note must be a directive of Stalin’s too.

Therefore Roginskii has no basis to assume that this note by Ezhov to himself was an "abbreviated" reminder of a directive of Stalin’s. Even if it were, though, it would prove nothing. As we have pointed out above, the most logical interpretation is that Iagoda’s dacha and its territory should be returned to the "Kommunarka" NKVD country club of which it had originally been a part. Ezhov almost certainly had the authority to make this decision on his own, without checking such an insignificant detail with Stalin.

Roginskii concludes:

С этой записи, видимо, и начинается история «Коммунарки» как места захоронения.

With this note, evidently, begins the story of the "Kommunarka" as a site for burial.

In fact this note says nothing whatsoever about the use of the land as a burial place for anybody, let alone for NKVD men. Roginskii says "evidently" (vidimo) because he realizes that he is guessing.

One remark by Roginskii suggests that this interpretation may have been inspired by Nikita Petrov. At note 11 he thanks Petrov for help with this article:

Пользуемся случаем поблагодарить Н.В.Петрова, поделившегося с нами своими наблюдениями относительно этих списков.

We take this opportunity to thank N.V. Petrov who shared with us his observations concerning these lists.

We are now in a position to evaluate Petrov’s and Baberowski’s statements.

Not Petrov and not Roginskii, but Novak is the expert on the "Kommunarka" site. Novak has nothing about any decision to bury executed NKVD men there.

Baberowski’s reference to "einem Sommertag im Juni 1937" ("a summer day in June 1937") comes from Petrov. But Petrov does not claim that "Stalin’s directive" was issued then. Instead, Petrov just begins the paragraph with an unrelated event that took place on June 20, 1937.

There is no evidence that Stalin spoke with Ezhov about Iagoda’s fate ("uber das Schicksal von Genrich Jagoda") in June 1937. We don’t know the content of any of the discussions that took place in Stalin’s office, including those with Ezhov.

There’s no evidence that the three-word note refers to any discussion with Stalin whether in June 1937 or at any other time. Ezhov certainly met frequently with Stalin during that month. However, Ezhov continued to figure in the list of visitors to Stalin’s office both before and after June, 1937. ("Posetiteli Kremlevskogo kabineta I. V. Stalina …" Istochnik 4, 1995, 15 – 73. For June 1937 see pp. 54-57)

Therefore, there is no evidence whatsoever that Stalin ordered Ezhov to kill Iagoda and his lieutenants and bury them on the property of Iagoda’s dacha. This is all an elaboration of Petrov’s interpretation of the three words in Ezhov’s notebook.

Petrov wrote:

Stalins Ha? auf Jagoda kam zum Ausdruck als er Jeshow wahrend einer Beratung zurief: Jagodas Datscha sollen die Tschekisten jetzt bekommen. Das bedeutete, da? die Leichen der ermordeten Tschekisten auf dem Gelande des Staatsgutes Kommunarka verscharrt worden sollten, an das die Datscha Jagodas grenzte.

Stalin’s hatred for Iagoda found expression when during a session he shouted to Ezhov: "The Chekists should now get Iagoda’s dacha." That meant that the corpses of the murdered Chekists should be buried on the land of the state-owned "Kommunarka" property, which bordered on Iagoda’s dacha.

This article has demonstrated that there is not a shred of evidence for any of these statements. Consequently, there is no evidence whatsoever to support Baberowski’s statement.

Petrov is vice-chairman and senior investigator for the Russian "Memorial" organization. He is, or is commonly thought to be, an historian.*** He has an historian’s obligation to give evidence in support of the statements he makes, and to make it clear to his readers when he is speculating beyond the existing evidence.

Baberowski holds a position in the History faculty at the Humboldt University of Berlin. Presumably he knows that statements made by another historian cannot be simply accepted as factual or true -- particularly when, as with Petrov’s article, no evidence is given for those statements.

Both Baberowski and Petrov have flagrantly betrayed their professional obligations as historians. Petrov fabricated a story about Stalin and Baberowski repeated it as fact. Roginski imagined a connection between Ezhov’s three-word note and the use of the "Kommunarka" country club as a burial site.

Another Lie: The "Lists"

Incidentally, Roginski is a liar as well (or incompetent and blinded by his anticommunist prejudices -- it is often hard to tell which!). He writes:

Здесь есть только одна неточность — на самом деле на смертную казнь обрекала не Военная коллегия. Она лишь оформляла решения, вынесенные до того, как дело поступало на ее рассмотрение. Решение же выносили Сталин и несколько человек из его самого близкого окружения.

There is only one error here – in point of fact the Military Collegium did not determine the death sentences. It only formalized the decisions taken before the case had come before it for review. The decision itself was taken by Stalin and a few men from his closest circle.

This is false. The introduction to the "Lists" in question makes it clear that these lists were sent to Stalin and others in the Secretariat of the Bolshevik Party "for review." We know of many examples of individuals who, despite being on the "lists" in "Category 1" (execution) were not executed. The "Categories" were not sentences but indications of the sentence that the State would ask if the individual were convicted of the crimes he or she was charged with.

We have discussed these lists in a separate work as follows:

Like Khrushchev did, the very anti-Stalin editors of these lists do in fact call the lists "sentences" prepared in advance. But their own research disproves this claim. The lists give the sentences that the prosecution would seek if the individual was convicted – that is, the sentence the Prosecution would ask the court to apply. In reality these were lists sent to Stalin (and other Politburo or Secretariat members) for "review" – rassmotrenie – a word that is used many times in the introduction to the lists. (http://www.memo.ru/history/vkvs/images/intro1.htm )

Many examples are given of people who were not convicted, or who were convicted of lesser offenses, and so not shot. A.V. Snegov, whom Khrushchev later befriended and mentioned by name later in this speech, is on the lists at least twice.

• At http://stalin.memo.ru/spiski/pg13026.htm , No. 383;
• At http://stalin.memo.ru/spiski/pg05245.htm , No. 133.

In this last reference Snegov is specifically put into "1^st Category", meaning: maximum sentence of death. A brief summary of the Prosecutor’s evidence against him is provided, and there seems to have been a lot of it. Nevertheless Snegov was not sentenced to death, but instead to a long term in a labor camp.

According to the editors of these lists "many" people whose names are on them were not in fact executed, and some were freed.

For example, a selective study of the list for the Kuibyshev oblast' signed on September 29, 1938 has shows that not a single person on this list was convicted by the VK VS (the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court), and a significant number of the cases were dismissed altogether.

- http://www.memo.ru/history/vkvs/images/intro.htm

So Khrushchev knew that Stalin was not "sentencing" anybody, but rather reviewing the lists in case he had any objections. Khrushchev knew this because the note from Kruglov, Minister of Internal Affairs (MVD) to Khrushchev of February 3, 1954 has survived. It says nothing about "sentences prepared in advance," but gives the truth:

These lists were compiled in 1937 and 1938 by the NKVD of the USSR and presented to the the CC of the ACP(b) for review right away. [emphasis added, GF]****

The Prosecutor went to trial not only with evidence, but with a sentence to recommend to the judges in case of conviction.

(Furr, Khrushchev Lied, Chapter 4.)

Conclusion

Baberowski’s article is an illustration of the problem with the historiography of the Stalin years in the Soviet Union generally. For the most part it consists not in an attempt to discover the truth, but in anticommunist falsehoods. These falsehoods are placed at the service of moralizing and condemnation, often in the most strident tones. Baberowski’s exclamation on the first page of his article

Stalinismus und Terror sind Synonyme. Stalinismus ist Terror.

Stalinism and terror are synonymous. Stalinism is terror.

sounds like one of Josef Goebbels’ Nazi rants: "Hitler ist Deutschland, wie Deutschland Hitler ist" (also the leitmotiv of Lenni Riefenstahls’ film Triumph des Willens). It is a particularly tasteless form of propaganda. It has nothing at all in common with historiography.

There is, perhaps, one positive aspect to this otherwise sad state of affairs. No one lies when the truth is on their side. So we can confidently conclude that the truth, as demonstrated by reasonable deductions from the available evidence, does not support the fanatic anti-Stalin, anticommunist conclusions that these and many other historians – and, no doubt, those who back them – want. For if the truth did support their preconceived conclusions, they would tell the truth. In fact, they could dispense with their preconceived conclusions!

But they continue to fabricate – in plain language, to lie. Sometimes the lies are as blatant as those we have exposed here – obvious to anybody with a little knowledge plus patience, access to sources, and curiosity.

This is strong evidence that the truth will not sustain the anticommunists’ project. In that fact there is much hope for the future of a far different project: to discover the truth, successes and failures, triumphs and tragedies, of Soviet history.

Grover Furr
Montclair State University
Montclair NJ 07043 USA