

EAST TIMOR, INDONESIA, AND THE WEST
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For the peoples of Indonesia and East Timor, relations with the West have been intimate and bitter. After centuries of colonial domination, both Indonesians and East Timorese have organized and struggled for independence, self-determination, and a just social order, part of the great international movement which Professor W. F. Wertheim has rightly entitled the "Rising Wave of Emancipation."¹ The metaphor of the wave is particularly apt in the case of these two peoples, for, if sometimes the wave seems to crash hopelessly against a barrier of rocks, science can assure us that in time, if the wave keeps coming, the rocks will eventually weaken and erode away. The wave will pass over, through, and beyond the barrier.

COLONIAL BACKGROUND

After centuries of indirect contact through Arab and Indian traders, Europe made its "discovery" of Southeast Asia when Portuguese sailors rounded the southern tip of Africa in 1498. By 1511 the military superiority of the Europeans, conferred by their possession of gunpowder, had led to the conquest of Malacca and soon thereafter, forays began into what was known as the "spice islands." A century later, the Portuguese were driven from most of the area by the Dutch navy, and the Portuguese settled for the sandalwood trade on the Island of Timor, which they carried to their outpost on Macau and sold to Chinese traders. The Dutch, for their part, seized control of the spice islands of Banda, Ceram, and Neira through a long series of treaties, battles, and intrigues, culminating in 1621 in a punitive expedition all too similar to events which we have witnessed in East Timor in more recent times. The colonial forces in the spice islands, fearing an uprising by the people whose nutmeg trees they so desired to control, and led by Jan Pieterszoon Coen:

...sent out party after party, not only on Lonthor but on the other islands as well, to burn and raze the almost deserted villages and to harass the refugees wherever they might have taken shelter. Those who did surrender were frequently herded together with those who had been captured. They were then loaded onto troop transports to be shipped off to Batavia, where they were sold as slaves...Others died by the hundreds and thousands of exposure, starvation, and disease. When forced onto the heights from which there was no escape, many leaped to their death from the sheer sea cliffs...Of the 15,000 persons [of Banda and Neira], no more than about a thousand seem to have survived within the archipelago.²

Not all Dutch people were pleased with such happenings. At least one of

Coen's own officers wrote that "All of us, as professing Christians, were filled with dismay at the way this affair was brought to a conclusion, and we took no pleasure in such dealings."³ But the "Seventeen Gentlemen of the East Indies Company, from their faraway offices in Amsterdam, offered only a mild reprove, and the expansion of the empire continued.

By the early 17th Century, the English too had entered the competition for the riches of the East Indies, and the next three centuries saw a whirl of alliances, counter-alliances, sieges, attacks, export bans/military treaties, pirate exploits, punitive expeditions, and monopoly agreements—all the while the precious spices satisfied European tastes and cured their illnesses. Just how destructive these events were for the Bandanese is illustrated by the fact that the present population of the island is about 15,000, only as great as in the 16th Century.⁴

As Europe changed, the scramble for spices gave way to other involvements. The scene shifted from the spice islands to Java and Sumatra. Coffee, tea, and sugar grew on land previously worked by Indonesian farmers for rice and vegetables, or left in forest so necessary for the maintenance of ecological balance and soil conservation. So oppressive was the confiscation of land, the tax burden, the corruption, and the brutality, that the colonial government itself admitted in the title of a report, to the "Declining Welfare of the Javanese,"⁵ and one former official who took the name Multatuli, protested the system by writing one of the greatest of Dutch novels, the "Max 6 Havelaar."⁶ The novel aroused a widespread and indignant reaction in Holland in the late 19th Century.

Resistance to colonial rule went far beyond the occasional Dutch official, however. Frequent rebellions broke out, among which the best known are the Diponegoro uprising in Central Java, 1825–1830, in which perhaps 200,000 Javanese lost their lives, the Banten peasants' rebellion of 1888, the Achenese resistance in the early 20th Century, the Samin and Samat movements in Java in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries, and the peasant rebellion of West Java and Sumatra in 1925-26.⁷

As a result of the discontent and the debate over colonial policy, a new, "ethical policy" was promulgated in 1901, and just three years later Portugal and The Netherlands signed a treaty fixing the boundaries on the island of Timor which had long been divided between them.

In East Timor itself, Portugal had also been active in attempting to control the resistance of the people, who fought a several decades' struggle from 1702 onwards that resulted in 1769 in the founding of Dili as the capital: the Portuguese could not hold the interior of the country. Again in 1910 a major rebellion broke out, led by Dom Boaventura. Over 3,000 Timorese were killed and 4,000 arrested after the Portuguese reinforced their positions with troops from Mozambique and Lisbon in 1912.⁸

INDEPENDENCE AND THE POST-WORLD WAR II WORLD

It was the Second World War, however, and the collapse of Dutch power in the East Indies that provided historical conditions in 1945 that led to the proclamation of independence by Indonesian nationalists. After a four year struggle, and with diplomatic support from the United States and other nations, Holland recognized Indonesian independence in 1949 and a period of open political activity within the society abruptly began.

Some would view the US support for Indonesian independence as the natural affinity of one independent, noncolonial power for another. But such a view ignores the expansion after 1945 of US economic and military control in Asia and Africa at the cost of the older colonial countries such as Holland England, and France.⁹ While the US was supporting Indonesian independence, France was being physically expelled from its former Indochina empire, and here the US took a very different posture, siding directly with the old colonial government and providing enormous amounts of military assistance.

The US aid to France from 1946 to 1954 was not unrelated to Indonesia. In 1953, defending \$400 million in US military aid to France's war against the Indochinese peoples, US President Dwight Eisenhower asked if "we lost" Vietnam and Malaysia, "how would the free world hold the rich empire of Indonesia?" Our financial aid to the French war, he said, was lithe cheapest way...to get certain things we need from the riches of the Indonesia territory." Several years later, President Richard M. Nixon (who was Eisenhower's Vice President in 1953), added that "With its 100 million people and its 3,000 mile arc of islands containing the region's richest hoard of natural resources, Indonesia constitutes the greatest prize in the Southeast Asian area." Because of its small size, East Timor was not at the time considered of very great consequence.

US Senator and representative to the UN Henry Cabot Lodge also thought highly of the opportunities for US entry into the region, stating in a speech to the Senate in 1965 that "That empire in Southeast Asia is the last major 10 resource area outside the control of any of the major powers on the globe."¹⁰ And, the authoritative *US News and World Report*, which represents the more conservative views within the US business community, wrote as early as 1954, that:

One of the world's richest areas is open to the winner in Indochina. That's behind the growing US concern...tin, rubber, rice, key strategic raw materials are what the war is really all about. The US sees it as a place to hold – at any cost.¹¹

None of these prestigious commentators seems to have a word of concern about the people of the region.

Raw materials and large populations were not the only interests that linked Indonesia with Indochina and the rest of Southeast Asia in the minds of US

officials, however. As Lawrence Griswold wrote in the official journal of the Navy League of the United States in 1973, “Indonesia is endowed with what is probably the most strategically authoritative geographic location on earth.”¹² Straddling as it does the entrances between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, Indonesia commands key oil routes between the Middle East and Japan and the Western United States, as well as major “choke points” used by warships. To those who see the world in terms of “empire”, Indonesia is indeed a “prize.”

THE DESTRUCTION OF INDONESIAN DEMOCRACY

In order to assert its domination over Indonesia, US policy makers have followed a course in several stages. The first, as noted above, was to side with the nationalist forces and remove the Dutch colonial establishment, thereby turning Holland into a *junior* partner in maintaining Western influence. The second phase entailed the intervention in Vietnam in the 1950s and through the 1960s along with a substantial program of training for Indonesian military officers. Even while Sukarno was in power in Jakarta before 1965, US military aid was granted in large amounts. In 1968 Pentagon official Paul Warnke made the following blunt admission about the purposes of the aid:

The purpose for which it was maintained was not to support an existing [ie. Sukarno] regime. In fact, we were opposed, eventually and increasingly to the then existing regime. It was to preserve a liaison of sorts with the military of the country which in effect turned out to be one of the conclusive elements in the overthrow of that regime.¹³

Equally unabashed in his praise of the effects of US military aid to Indonesia was Congressman Broomfield (D-Mich) who stated in a House floor debate on March 3, 1976:

I think probably one of the best areas we can look at is the Indonesia of a few years ago with Sukarno. Through our training program we trained many of the military people who were able to take over Indonesia and they have become friends of the United States. I think they have done a good job. I think this program creates good relations between the United States and the military people we train.¹⁴

Regarding the creation of good relations, there can be little disagreement. One might wonder, however, what Congo Broomfield is talking about in reference to the “good job” our “friends” are doing.

The training programs to which the Congressperson was referring, however, were certainly extensive. Between 1950 and 1965, the US trained 1,200 Indonesian officers, including senior military figures, over 500 police officials in the US, and participated in the training of 62,000 of the 110,000 national police in Indonesia. It was these US-trained officers who played a large role in the coup and bloodbath of 1965 in which hundreds of thousands of Indonesians were

massacred and in which all democratic organizations in the country were subjected to brutal and complete destruction. To maintain their hold on the great prize, US policy makers worked behind the scenes; and even when their plans were realized, they kept a controlled response. US political commentator James Reston, for example, who has direct access to high-ranking government officials, wrote in the *New York Times* on 19 June, 1966, of “the savage transformation of Indonesia from a pro-Chinese policy under Sukarno to a defiantly anti-Communist policy under General Suharto”, adding that “Washington is careful not to claim any credit for this change.” Reston went on to comment that:

...it is doubtful if the coup would ever have been attempted without the American show of strength in Vietnam or been sustained without the clandestine aid it has received indirectly from here [ie. Washington]¹⁵

SACRIFICE OF OTHER PEOPLES

The subordination of human life and dignity to US corporate and government interests in Indonesia also helps explain another turn of US policy. The massive invasion of Vietnam is clear enough as is the Indonesian massacre. In West Irian, a different tack was taken.

In 1962, the US Government coerced The Netherlands into granting Indonesian control over the decolonization of West Irian. To the uninformed, this appeared to be a highly irrational act, with Sukarno and the Indonesian left appearing to gain in power as a result. But Washington viewed matters otherwise. The transitional plan for West Irian was submitted to the Dutch by US Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker in the form of a letter from then President John F. Kennedy. This secret letter has recently been published by a Dutch official involved in the case, and states in part that the US feared active warfare between Indonesia and The Netherlands and that:

Such a conflict would have adverse consequences out of *all proportions to the issue at stake*...Only the Communists would benefit from such a conflict...The whole non-Communist position in Vietnam, Thailand, and Malaya would be in grave peril and as you know these are areas in which we in the United States have heavy commitments and burdens.¹⁶

The section reading “out of all proportions to the issue at stake” is most revealing here. Apparently the rights of the Irianese were not worth much to President Kennedy when compared with US geopolitical interests in Southeast Asia. Today, however, the Irianese are organized and fighting to regain their rights to self-determination and cultural identity.

SUHARTO’S INOONESIA: A NEW PROWESTERN REGIONAL POLICEMAN?

In 1975 two major events sharpened the conflict between Western interests

and the peoples of Southeast Asia. First came the spectacular collapse of US forces and their allies in Indochina.. Within a few weeks, Laos, Kampuchea, and Vietnam threw out the neocolonial armies that been nurtured by the US over many years. We all remember the last days when the helicopters lifted US personnel and some of the Saigon military and police officials from the top of the US embassy as the National Liberation Front was capturing the city. The “loss” of Vietnam altered US military and strategic thinking. With three newly socialist governments in the region, with the Vietnamese armed forces in possession of hundreds of US planes and other heavy equipment captured from the fleeing Saigon forces, with the Vietnamese army clearly a proven fighting force of the first order, with the weakening of the military hold on Thailand whose civilian government moved increasingly away from the US (until the 1976 coup that turned the country into a smaller version of Suharto’s Indonesia), and with the rising once again of the guerrilla movement in Malaysia and fears of instability in the Philippines, US planners began to look more and more to Indonesia to fill the so-called power vacuum left by the US defeat in Indochina. Like Brazil in Latin America and Iran in the Middle East, Indonesia was marked as the new regional subpower. Once a giver of spices, tea, coffee, and sugar, Indonesia was now a source of oil and a strongarm for the West.

Even before the Indochina defeat reached the newspapers, the US had begun thinking along these lines. We have noted earlier the vast population, area, and strategic location of Indonesia. To these natural endowments were added more than \$1.5 billion in US economic aid and more than \$143 million in military aid from 1967 to 1975. When all the Western partners are counted in, total economic aid from 1967 to 1976 equals \$6.5 billion, and with the revelations of the Pertamina scandal, we can estimate the total foreign debt at over \$19 billion, or, enough to absorb 20% of all government foreign exchange during the 1980s.¹⁷ Just how eager are US officials to give, loan, and sell military equipment to Jakartars generals is illustrated by the statement of Brigadier_General T.C. Pinckney to a US Congressional Committee on February 21,1980. In justifying a \$30 million sale of hardware including some patrol boats and at least one C-130 transport plane, Pinckney was asked if there is any *real* threat to Indonesia’s security from outside. He responded that:

They see a potential threat from Vietnam. They see a potential threat from China. They see a potential call from their ASEAN partner, Thailand, for help if the situation there develops in various ways.

Not to be outdone, State Department spokesperson Richard Holbrooke added: “I do not think the threat has to be an immediate, present danger...”¹⁸

Counterbalancing China or Vietnam, aiding the Thai generals – these are the regional police roles publically announced in high US circles as the role for their Indonesian partner.

Formal diplomatic ties have also been strengthened. President Suharto paid a state visit to Washington in 1970. He was followed in 1975 by General Ali Murtopo, who was already carrying out the initial phases of what became the massive military invasion of East Timor.

And it was in East Timor where 1975 also saw events of major importance, including in particular the consolidation of political power by FRETILIN, the most popular of the East Timorese political organizations and the country's only genuine liberation movement.

The appearance in East Timor of a progressive administration was not taken lightly either in Jakarta or in Washington. Murtopo's October, 1975 visit to the US was followed by President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in turn visiting Indonesia. Ford toasted champagne glasses with Suharto on December 6, 1975, just hours before the first Indonesian marines hit the beaches of Dili, and Kissinger told reporters in Honolulu shortly after the invasion had begun that "the US understands Indonesia's position."¹⁹ That was certainly an understatement coming from a high-ranking official of the nation that had trained and equipped Indonesia's armed forces and was evidently planning to watch them carry out an easy practice action in preparation for their larger role in Washington's minds.

Throughout the invasion, despite the fact that in terms of international law, the territory of a US ally has been attacked (Portugal is a member of NATO and still the official administrative power according to the U.N.), despite several UN resolutions condemning the invasion, the statements by the non aligned nations and the like, US officials have been consistent in their acquiescence. At different times pleading either ignorance or inability to get data on what is actually happening in East Timor, or distorting events so as to make it appear that most deaths occurred during the brief civil war of August-September, 1975, high-ranking officials always return to the same theme: the importance of Indonesia to Western interests. For the most recent example, here is how Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke put it on June 10, 1980, before a US Congressional panel:

Indonesia, with a population of 140 million people, is the fifth largest nation in the world. It has the largest Muslim population in the world, is a moderate member of the Non-Aligned Movement, is an important oil producer – which plays a moderate role within OPEC – and occupies a strategic position astride the sea lanes between the Pacific and Indian Oceans....It has played a central role in supporting Thailand and maintaining the security of Thailand in the face of Vietnam's destabilizing actions in Indochina....Indonesia, is, of course, important to key US allies in the region, especially Japan and Australia.²⁰

After such an introduction, how could any member of Congress be expected

to have concern for the mere rights to life and self-determination of a people most of them have only begun to hear of? The continuing resistance in East Timor and the growing restlessness in Indonesia have finally reached into and caused some second thoughts in high places, however.

EAST TIMOR RESISTS AGGRESSION

Despite overwhelming superiority in numbers and equipment, the Indonesian police action has been a failure. For 2½ years Fretilin maintained almost total control over the East Timorese countryside. They fought a classical guerrilla war in which weapons were captured from the enemy, while political and social programs organized and bolstered the population. This organization was particularly important in the wake of large scale search-and-destroy operations by the Indonesian forces. As late as 1977, 85% of the countryside remained firmly in Fretilin hands, and the liberation forces often engaged the Indonesians in heavy battles.

Beginning in April, 1977, and especially in April, 1978, the Indonesian military launched a series of massive air and artillery attacks throughout the mountain regions. Armed with newly supplied OV Bronco-10s – the US-made electronic bombing aircraft widely used over North Vietnam – the Indonesian forces were able temporarily to destroy the agricultural and social basis of the resistance in many areas.

The constant dislocation of villages by bombing attacks made planting and harvesting of crops impossible. The destruction of schools and hospitals meanwhile weakened the liberation movement's ability to provide the progressive social programs that attracted the overwhelming majority of East Timor's people to Fretilin.

Especially following the brutal 1978 attacks, Fretilin found it necessary to begin encouraging people to come down from the mountains to insure their survival. When they emerged, they were rounded up by Indonesian troops and herded into concentration camps. These camps have become centers of disease and starvation – the extent of which finally brought East Timor onto the pages of major newspapers in 1979.

The resistance reached its most difficult period with the defection of central committee member Alarico Fernandes in late 1978 and the killing by the Indonesians of Fretilin president Nicolau Lobato in early 1979.

In recent months, Western press coverage has dwelt mostly on the need for emergency relief supplies for the 300,000 plus starving refugees forced from their homes by the Indonesian air force. In this same period, however, the liberation forces began to renew fighting in many parts of the country, making ambushes on

Indonesian positions, including on the outskirts of Dili, the occupied capital. This confirms the ability of the liberation forces to pass through various regions undetected by the Indonesians and supported by the local population. Other sources indicate that the occupying forces are sustaining at least 30 casualties each week. In addition, Fretilin field radios continue to broadcast programs from the mountains to Dili, where they are picked up by the people.

Of equally great significance, Fretilin's leadership inside East Timor has survived the two massive Indonesian campaigns. Most of the 50 central committee members are alive and in the mountains. Indonesian strategy seems designed to hold the 300,000 people now refugees interminably in the concentration camps or to "resettle" them along major highways where the occupying forces can maintain better control.

Even if temporarily successful in a military sense, this strategy will ultimately fail. People will filter away from the resettlement zones, and begin small-scale farming in the mountains. Even the 40,000 troops occupying the country will find it difficult to police the rugged terrain which they have not even penetrated in many areas except by air bombardment.

More recently, reports of fighting in Dili have been carried by Reuters and have been reprinted in major Western newspapers.²¹ The inability of the Indonesian military to effect a conquest has left serious doubts in US and European circles about the advisability of continuing to support Jakarta's generals in this venture, and some kind of discussions are now underway to search for a way out of the quagmire. In January of 1980, for example, *The New York Times*, which has maintained a nearly total silence on events in East Timor for three years, ran a lengthy series outlining the horrors which the Indonesian invasion had brought. This was followed on 25 July, 1980, by an editorial in which the *Times* referred to "reports that Portugal may offer to resume its stewardship of East Timor if Indonesia can be persuaded to pull back." The *Times* thinks such a plan is "a long shot course, but even Jakarta may now be willing to reckon the costs of a messy war with a stubborn people." We might add that Jakarta will *have* to become willing if pressure emerges from its major financial and military supporters who so far have been only too prepared to sacrifice the East Timorese people, just as their predecessors were prepared to sacrifice the Bandanese in 1621, the East Timorese in 1910, the West Irianese in 1962, and the Indonesians themselves in 1965. As Western government intrigues continue, Indonesia's East Timor debacle becomes more apparent to a larger number of people. Like Coen's unwilling officer back in 1621, ordinary people in the West, are filled with dismay at what is happening. Indeed, they often become outraged at the complicity of their governments and begin to demand a withdrawal of support.²²

And within Indonesia itself, change is increasingly likely. Cornell University Indonesia specialist Benedict Anderson summed up the situation in Indonesia as of 1980 for a group of US Congresspeople as follows:

There is every indication that the repression in Indonesia is deepening. If you talk to young people in Indonesia today, you sense that things are much worse now than they were 3 or 4 years ago... [and]...in the long run...explosive forces are accumulating. The middle class is being squeezed. Students are being radicalized all the time.²³

To Anderson's low-keyed summary we might add that in recent years the government has also come more and more frequently into conflict with the rural peasant population and struggles over land have increased the possibility of a truly major popular opposition. While much of this has to do with the military's own internal policies, it is also closely related to the courage and strength and organization of East Timor's people.

The "stubborn people" of East Timor, as the *New York Times* calls them have done more than provide an example of stubbornness. Like the people of the Western Sahara, Iran, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Zimbabwe, and Namibia these past few years, the East Timorese have thwarted the intrigues and the invasions, the military and the political plots to turn back the wave of emancipation. In causing Jakarta's generals to stumble, the people of East Timor, under the leadership of Fretilin, the Revolutionary Front for the Independence of East Timor, have earned the independence which they will have eventually – and they have hastened the day also when the people of Indonesia themselves and the other peoples of Southeast Asia will be able to throw out the military overlords and open a path to democracy and liberation.

¹ Wertheim, W. F. 1974. *Evolution and Revolution: The Rising Waves of Emancipation*. Baltimore: Penguin Books.

² Hanna, Willard A. 1978. *Indonesian Banda: Colonialism and Its Aftermath in the Nutmeg Islands*. Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues. Pp. 54–55.

³ *Ibid*, page 56.

⁴ *Ibid*, page 144.

⁵ The "Commission of Enquiry on the Declining Welfare of the Population of Java and Madura" published its several volumes report in 1912.

⁶ Multatuli (Eduard Douwes Dekker) published *Max Havelaar* in 1860. An English translation, with an introduction by D. H. Lawrence, is published by London House and Maxwell, New York, 1967.

⁷ It is interesting to note that Clifford Geertz, perhaps the most influential U.S. scholar to write on Indonesia, provides an impression of an essentially passive people simply working harder and producing more children. See Clifford Geertz, 1963. *Agricultural Involution*. Berkeley: University of California Press. For more balanced accounts, see Malcolm Caldwell and Ernst Utrecht. 1979. *Indonesia: An Alternative History*. Sydney, Australia: Alternative Publishing Co-operative Ltd; Sartono Kartodirjo. 1966. *The Peasants' Revolt of Banten in 1888*. The Hague; and Harry J. Benda and Lance Castles, 1969, "The Samin Movement," in *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde* 125(2):207–240.

⁸ Hill, Helen, 1975. *The Timor Story*. Fitzroy, Australia: Timor Information Service.

⁹ This phenomenon is discussed, for example, in Harry Magdoff. 1966. *The Age of Imperialism*. New York: Monthly Review Press.

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- ¹⁰ Quoted from standard sources in “Indonesia: The Making of a Neocolony.” *Pacific Research and World Empire Telegram* 1(1):6–16. August 1969.
- ¹¹ *US News and World Report*, 4 April 1954.
- ¹² Michael Klare. 1975. Indonesia and the Nixon Doctrine. In Malcolm Caldwell, ed. *Ten Years Military Terror in Indonesia*. Nottingham, Spokesman Books. P. 271.
- ¹³ U.S. House. 1968. *Foreign Assistance Act of 1968*. Hearings, House Foreign Affairs Committee. Washington, D. C., U.S. Government Printing Office. P. 706.
- ¹⁴ Congressional Record, Vol. 122, No. 9. March 3, 1976. P. H1539.
- ¹⁵ *The New York Times*, 19 June 1966.
- ¹⁶ As published in J. G. de Beus. *Morgen bij het aanbreken van de dag*, and cited in Kees Lagerberg. 1979. *West Irian and Jakarta Imperialism*. New York: St. Martin’s Press. P. 87. De Beus was the Dutch ambassador to Australia during much of the period in question.
- ¹⁷ Michael Klare, *op cit*, p. 268; Caldwell and Utrecht, *op cit*, p. 147; Benedict Anderson. 1978. Last Days of Indonesia’s Suharto? *Southeast Asia Chronicle* 63:2 *et seq.*
- ¹⁸ U.S. House. 1980. *Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal 1981 (Part 4)*. Hearings, House Foreign Affairs Committee. Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. Feb. 21 1980. Washington, D. C. U.S. Government Printing Office.
- ¹⁹ *Los Angeles Times*, 7 December 1975, as quoted in Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman. 1979. *The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism*. Boston: South End Press. P. 156.
- ²⁰ Statement by Mr. Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State before the House Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Committee on Appropriations, June 10 1980 (to be published at the U. S. Government Printing Office) typescript pp. 1–2. For an overview of many of the State Department distortions and prevarications, see Chomsky and Herman, *op cit, passim*.
- ²¹ For example, *The New York Times*, 29 July 1980.
- ²² A detailed account of the Australian and Portuguese intrigues in 1975 appears in Jill Jolliffe. 1978. *East Timor: Nationalism and Colonialism*, esp. chapter 9. St. Lucia, Australia: University of Queensland Press.
- ²³ Testimony on February 6 1980. U.S. House. *Human Rights in Asia: NonCommunist Countries*. Hearings, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs and on International Organizations. Washington, D. C. U.S. Government Printing Office. Pp. 254–55.