Review of David Cortright, Soldiers in Revolt: The American Military Today. Anchor Press/Doubleday, 317 pp. From The New York Review of Books, May 13, 1976, p. 30.(note: this is the second part of the review, the first part of which dealt critically with General William Westmoreland’s book A Soldier Reports).

By Kevin Buckley

Westmoreland misunderstood America, Vietnam – and, eventually, his own arm. There was, he admits, some dissent and rebellion within the ranks, but these were ‘usually fanned by outsiders.’ In any case, morale problems were never very serious, he claims. ‘Nor were the military services ever anywhere near the distressful state that some hand-wringers tried to depict.’

He is wrong. David Cortright, a veteran of three years of active duty in the army, is hardly a hand-wringer. He has made a careful inquiry into the attitudes of US troops; his book is an exhaustive account of rebellion all the armed forces, not only in Vietnam but throughout the world. He makes it clear that by 1971 the greatest danger facing the US Army might well have been itself. Cortright, who was himself a member of the GI antiwar movement, maintains that

In a very real sense, the American Army was fighting on two fronts, one against the Vietnamese guerrillas in the jungles and the other against embittered militants within its own ranks. The strain of black resistance was a key factor in crippling US military capabilities in Vietnam.

That view is probably exaggerated. Despite the disaffection, in varying degrees, of countless officers and enlisted men US military forces were still able to crater the landscape and kill Indochinese quite effectively until they were pulled out. Many infantrymen resented being sent on dangerous missions whose only purpose was more glory and promotions for ambitious officers. Still most orders to go on patrol were obeyed. But it remains true that the fear that growing dissent among GIs would spread was one of the main reasons why US forces withdrew from Vietnam.

The most vivid acts of rebellion occurred when men refused to go into combat and officers were "fragged," both in the field and in the "base camps." But Cortright shrewdly points out that the more common kind of rebellion was less obvious: it was in fact a second, nonviolent guerrilla war:

Solidarity was expressed symbolically through long hair and afros, rock and soul music, beads and black bracelets, peace signs and clenched fists. The consequences of open defiance could be extremely harsh, and most GIs thus normally expressed their loathing for the military through more subtle means. Vast numbers of Vietnam-era servicemen participated in countless minor acts of sabotage and obstruction designed to clog the gears of the "Green Machine."

Every unit had its examples of intentionally bungled repair or paperwork, of unexplained minor damage to equipment, of constant squabbling between certain GIs and the "lifers," of mysteriously appearing peace signs, etc. the cumulative effect of thousands of such acts constituted the reality of the morale crisis.

Perhaps Cortright’s most important conclusion is that most of the GI resistance came not from draftees "but from volunteers … from working class backgrounds." He shows convincingly that the poor blacks and high school graduates who enlisted were quite as opposed to the war as the more publicized college protesters. My own experience as a reporter in Vietnam suggested that many of the volunteer combat soldiers were more seriously skeptical about the announced aims of war than those at home. They found themselves risking their lives for an ‘ally’ whose army did not want to fight.

This should be borne in mind when one considers the current volunteer army, much of it black and most of it drawn from the poorer classes. By many accounts the tumult of the early Seventies has subsided and the army is getting back on its feet. But to do what? It is hard to conceive of any place right now where the new all-volunteer army could engage in sustained combat. That may be one of the most important consequences of the war in Vietnam.

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