CHAPTER III

HUMANISTS AND THEIR OPPONENTS IN PARIS

I have attempted to show that the writings of both opponents and defenders of the Roman on the one hand, and of both attackers and humanist defenders of classical studies, especially of poetry, on the other hand, resemble one another very closely in their arguments. These resemblances suggest that the Quarrel of the Roman may be in fact a quarrel over humanism itself.

In the present chapter, I review the considerable body of research into early French humanism which has been published in recent years and draw from it certain conclusions about humanist activity in France. In the next chapter, I will summarize the results of this inquiry, and give a broader perspective on the activity of these humanists.

Recent research has disclosed several facts which have a bearing on the Quarrel of the Roman.

1. The literary practices of Jean Gerson with regard to classical literature were essentially different from those of the humanists of the chanceries, despite
similarities in some early works of Gerson's.

2. Humanism, in late fourteenth-century France as in the same period in Italy, must be considered the phenomenon of one class of men. Among these men the most ardent humanists were those in the lowest positions, men such as Moccia and Montreuil, the more prominent men such as Nicolas de Clamanges being more reserved. All these differences can be explained as resulting from the different ways in which they acted in order to best further their material interests, as they perceived them. These men were perfectly conscious of the fact that, for them, the development of their classical style was important to their careers. This was therefore one of their chiefest constant concerns.

A distinction existed between those theologians who were somewhat favorable to classical literature and those who were not. But even those who, like Gerson, were most favorable to it saw classical literature strictly within the traditional bounds of the reductio artium ad sacram scripturam. The more ardent humanists did not view the value of humanist studies in this traditional way.

3. The opposition between theologians and humanists, though widely rejected in modern scholarship, existed and must be recognized if we are to understand the Quarrel
of the Roman. It is clearly evident in the Quarrel of the Roman itself.

4. The Quarrel of the Roman may in part stem from the specific historical circumstances of the Schism as well as from a general and longstanding suspicion against the new class of humanists (reflected, as we have seen, in the long series of humanists "defenses of poetry").

During the past thirty years it has become common for scholars to regard Jean Gerson as a humanist as well as a theologian. Gerson's admitted accomplishments in classical Latin style are no doubt largely responsible for this misapprehension. André Combes noted Jean de Montreuil's admiration for Gerson's style. Early texts of Gerson's have come to light since then which show a mastery of classical Latin unusual for his time and place. As a result, scholars such as Gilbert Ouy have concluded that Gerson was no different from other humanists.

But the evidence does not bear this out. Despite the idée fixe that there can have been no real antagonism between the humanists and the theologians at this time in

1 Combes, Jean de Montreuil, pp. 594 ff.

2 See note 4 to the Introduction above, and the discussion of Ouy's argument in Chapter IV below.
history, the differences between the two camps are very marked. I shall concentrate on Gerson.

Speaking of Nicolas de Clamanges' reluctance to go to Paris, where a lower level of Latin style prevailed, Ezio Ornato says:

Pour Gerson, qui, à la tête de l'Université, mettait tous les jours en pratique le principe de l'éloquence ancilla sapientie, donc de la Théologie, ce genre d'isolement [i.e. from centers where classical style was admired and studied] devait être moins pénible. Pour Clamanges, au contraire, qui n'était pas officieusement engagé pour réaliser l'union au sein de l'Eglise, et qui subissait presque malgré lui un irresistible penchant vers la Rhetorique, cela pouvait constituer . . . une difficulté insurmontable.3

Ornato later cites a collation of Gerson's from the year 1392 in which the Chancellor vindicates the study of pagan literature with the phrase "omne verum, a quocumque dicatur, a Spiritu Sancto sit." It is a real defense of the classics in a sense; yet Ornato notes how different it is from the position Jean de Montreuil expressed a few years later:

La philosophie païenne ancilla de la théologie, cela n'est pas contesté; mais la langue des classiques ancilla de l'Écriture, voilà ce que le prévôt de Lille remet en question, et ce n'est pas sans importance.

The collation of Gerson's shows that there must

3 Ornato, Jean Muret, p. 40.
have been opposition to the study of classical works among some theologians, for it is this which Gerson is defending. However, Gerson confines himself strictly to the bounds of the medieval concept of *eloquentia ancilla sapientiae*, or of the *reductio artium ad sacram scripturam*, while Jean de Montreuil did not. ⁴

In the same context Ornato notes that both Jean de Montreuil and Jean Muret wrote works in which classical citations outnumbered non-classical citations. In fact Jean de Montreuil's only letter to a pope, the letter *Altitudinem tuam* (No. 59), has more than twice as many classical as non-classical citations. According to Ornato, there is not a single example among Gerson's writings of a letter in which classical citations outnumber the non-classical; in the one surviving letter to a pope, Gerson uses no classical citation at all. ⁵

⁴Ornato, *Jean Muret*, pp. 148-150; p. 149, n. 224. See Franco Simone, "La 'Reduction artium ad Sacram Scripturam' quale espressione dell' Umanesimo medievale fino al secolo XII," *Convivium*, n.v. (1949), 887-927. See also Chapter IV for Francesco da Fiano's strong statements concerning the superiority of classical to scriptural style.

In an earlier article Ornato examined the different attitudes towards humanism in late fourteenth-century France. For example, although both Jean de Montreuil and Gerson quote Terence, Ornato notes an important difference in their use of this writer:

Se, ad esempio, è ormai tramontato, sempre per merito del Combes, il mito secondo il quale Gerson avrebbe rimproverato a Jean de Montreuil di far citare, in una prosopopoeia, Terenzio dalla Chiesa (cfr. l'epistolo Nunc demum, ibid., p. 63) [i.e. in Combes' Jean de Montreuil et le Chancelier Gerson], e ben vero, tuttavia, che Gerson, il quale non esita nei suoi sermoni, a citare Terenzio, lesse quest'autore sotto l'angolo visuale del predicatore, cercando unicamente, cioè, di ricavarne sentenze di carattere morale, mentre il prevosto di Lilla, pur non trascurando tale fattore, che impedì l'oblio di Terenzio durante tutto il Medioevo, ne fece, soprattutto, un maestro di stile.\(^6\)

Later in the same article Ornato quotes several letters which show that, for Jean de Montreuil, rhetoric and *ars dictandi* were just as important as moral philosophy.

In this respect Jean de Montreuil differed from non pochi fra i suoi contemporanei che, per amore dell'edificazione, saccheggiarono a piene mani le enciclopedie ed i repertori, ammascando alla rinfusa una lunga serie di sentenze e di esempi, e trucidando

barbaramenta, per così dire, le stile degli autori citati intimamente persuasi che esso, ai loro fini, non contasse per nulla.  

In an earlier article on the *Sophilogium* of Jacques Legrand, André Combes had noted that the theologian Legrand's use of classical citations is less restricted than Gerson's.  

Legrand uses his classical works more freely, in less thoroughly theological contexts, and with less emphasis on doctrine. But Legrand copied most of his classical citations from such medieval sources as Vincent of Beauvais.

Combes mistakes this thoroughly traditional attitude for "humanism." But it is not. Jean de Montreuil may have been attracted to Legrand because of the latter's use of classical citations, for his idea that some degree of wisdom of the Christian faith was attained by the purely natural reason of pagan writers, or simply because Montreuil was also a Christian. The interesting thing is that except

7Ibid., p. 408.

8André Combes, "Jacques Legrand, Alfred Coville, et le 'Sophilogium',' *Augustiniana*, VII (1957), 494-97; 499; 510-12; 140-47; 161-63. Combes wrote this before the discovery of Gerson's early humanist writings. However, Combes was the foremost authority on Gerson, and knew the later Gerson's writings very thoroughly. As we shall see, there is no evidence that Gerson's early "humanism" continued into later life.
for the very early Gerson, the Gerson of the Bucolicum Carmen and the unfinished attack on Jean de Monzon, the monk Legrand shows more freedom in using the classics than the Chancelor.

Gerson's extant eclogue is unique among his surviving works. We know of no other (certainly no later) poetry in a consciously humanist form and style from his pen. Ouy also reveals that in this poem (written before 1383) Gerson is reflecting the "official doctrine" of the University of Paris in his attitude toward the Schism.

This is in contrast to his later attitudes towards the Schism which Combes analyzed at great length. The mature Gerson is much more moderate than the University of which he became Chancelor. Jean de Montreuil's letter to Benedict XIII, Altitudinem tuam, reflected (according to Ornato) the opinion at the Court. Although opinion at the Court was on the whole more moderate than that at the University, Combes shows that Gerson's attitudes towards the Schism are still utterly at variance with Montreuil's, as expressed in this letter. 9

It should be noted that Gerson's poetic practice was very different from what we know of that of the humanists of the chanceries. Moccia and Muret have left traces of an exchange of letters in verse (Muret is as yet known only by a few lines). Moccia's collection, as yet unedited in full, yields several examples of "light" poems on topics such as his love affairs and his dreams. Although Nicolas de Clamanges' surviving eclogue (of 1394) is also religious, several of his other poems are not. Gerson's surviving poetry, including this early piece, is all strictly religious. Though it is a negative, not a positive fact, and may be disproven by the discovery in the future of later poetry by Gerson of a non-religious nature, yet this fact is consistent with Gerson's literary attitude towards classical writing in general.\(^\text{10}\)

Gilbert Ouy has suggested that a recently discovered poem of Gerson's clearly reveals that the Chancellor became increasingly suspicious of humanist activity.\(^1\) Whereas the literary topos of *taedium scriptorum gentilium*, the rejection of pagan for Christian writings, was not taken seriously by the humanists who used it such as Clamanges, Gerson's rejection seems to have been sincere.

I would argue further that the very existence of the topos in humanist writings of the fourteenth century, and especially in France, reflects the fact that humanists were conscious of a certain contradiction between humanist studies and religious pursuits. We have encountered this contradiction earlier. It lies at the root of all the humanist defenses of poetry we have found.

Gerson's poem criticizes what he thinks is too great a concern with classical literature. He emphatically puts all literature in the context of the *reductio*. It is to be secondary to sacred scripture:

Eternus liber est unus, quem lumine puro
Cernere quere. Scies omnia. Finis erit.
Hinc Salomon: 'Reverere Deum, mandataque serva.'
Hoc est omnis homo; terminum iste libris.

Ouy dates this poem at about the year 1400—exactly the time of the Quarrel of the Roman!—and equally contemporary with the Italian debates about poetry between Salutati, Johannes Dominici and others. Alternatively, Ouy proposes a much later date for the poem, but without giving any reason. We must await an authoritative estimate since that of Glorieux is suspect, as his edition is by all accounts very careless.

Ouy's comments on this poem of Gerson's show that he recognizes it cannot be called a humanist work. I would go further and say it is not the work of a humanist. After pointing out that the controversy on the utility of poetry had reached France, Ouy discusses Gerson's relationship to it:

Il est vrai qu'il y eût deux camps: dans l'un, on trouve, bien sur, Giovanni da San Miniato et Giovanni Dominici, dans l'autre Coluccio Salutati. Mais ce n'est pas, me semble-t-il, l'aspect le plus intéressant de cette querelle. Il faudrait insister davantage sur son interiorisation. La lutte se transporte en effet sur un autre champ de bataille qui se situe dans la conscience de bien des lettrés. Et elle déborde bientôt le problème limité de savoir s'il est bon ou mauvais de lire, d'étudier, d'imiter les auteurs palens, pour s'étendre, en fait, à toute l'activité intellectuelle. Alors que commence à jaillir la source
Though he says *certain* s, he is clearly referring to Gerson.

In conclusion, Ouy draws a clear distinction between Gerson and "real" humanist activity. He clearly makes the latter a quality of the Renaissance, one which the Chancellor does not share:

*Le chrétien se doit de pratiquer l'humilité, donc de rejeter curiositas et singularitas.
Mais il était déjà trop tard pour réagir. En contribuant, avec d'autres jeunes lettrés de sa génération, à faire pénétrer à l'Université de Paris, l'influence de Pétrarque, Gerson avait aidé le coup à entrer dans la bergerie. On verra bientôt son ami Nicolas de Clamanges s'adonner avec passion à la chasse aux manuscrits d'œuvres antiques. Les auteurs païens--latins, d'abord, et bientôt grecs--, secouant la poussière des florilèges pour écoles de grammaire, vont revivre parmi des hommes toujours plus avides d'accueillir leur pensée. Curiosité et originalité ne seront plus des vices, mais des vertus. Le Moyen Age aura pris fin.*

13 The consensus of modern scholarship, then, is that Gerson differed greatly from contemporary humanist-notaries, both in his literary practice and in his attitudes towards humanism itself (except possibly in his very early,

12 Ouy, "'Taedium Scriptorum Gentilium'," p. 22.

13 Ibid., pp. 24-25.
post-University days). By the time of the Quarrel of the
Roman, Gerson was opposed to, or at least suspicious of,
humanist activity. It is in this context, I think, that
we ought to put a text of Gerson's cited by Ornato:

Hinc fit ut simplices et plerumque litteris secularibus
inflati a pestiferis erroribus rapiantur, seducantur,
obruantur: Quot putas hanc ob causam hereticos esse
de his qui specietenus in Ecclesia conversantur . . .
Illic sub joci specie hereses effunduntur, cum nullus
in fidem cadat jocus; ubi contra theologos totis itur
sententiis et irrisoriis interrogationibus, eo tunc de
sacris bonis disputatur . . . theologia ab eis stulti-
logia nominatur . . . quinetiam, nisi fama mentitur,
prelatorum nonnulli, quod vix credere ausim, stultitie
palam arguant homines theologie operam impendentes,
quasi ipsa res sit fatua, inutilis, phantastica;
theologus, inquint, ergo phantasticus. O nefandas
diabolicasque voces et perditissimis auctoribus suis
persimillimas!14

Rather than being merely a reflection of a "rivalry of
faculties" at the University, as Ornato calls it, this is
another example of Gerson's concern about the moral effects
of classical studies.

Throughout his monograph on Jean Muret Ornato is
bent on providing support for the thesis that there was no
antagonism between humanists and theologians. The evi-
dence he cites, however, shows the opposite.

Gerson's attitudes separate him from the humanist
group as a whole. However, there were significant differ-
ences among the humanists themselves. In a certain

14Ornato, Jean Muret, p. 151, n. 228.
restricted sense these differences do not appear of capital importance for the study of the Quarrel of the Roman. So far as we can tell, the humanists were united around defending the Roman. But there is evidence of opposition to the Roman, as well as to poetry in general, in the chanceries where most of our humanists worked. What we might call "humanist consciousness," or a tendency of a whole class of men to adopt similar attitudes towards literature because of the material conditions under which they earned their living, did not develop evenly or in an identical manner in every individual. At the same time we must beware of setting down all of the differences among the individual humanists simply to differences in personality, taste, or --in a word--"psychology." Some of these differences can be explained in more concrete ways. Specifically, we may easily identify a tendency for more prominent humanists to hold more conservative, and less prominent humanists, more advanced, views concerning the cultivation of classical literature. This fact strengthens my contention that humanism was the phenomenon of a certain class of men and that only by dealing with it in this way is the Quarrel of the Roman understandable.

Nicolas de Clamanges represents, for recent scholarship, the apex of French humanism at the turn of
the fifteenth century. Jean de Montreuil considered him to be the foremost among French masters of Latin style. Clamanges himself was conscious of his vanguard position in this respect and vain of it as well. All this is proved sufficiently by Ornato in his monograph on Jean Muret.

However, Jean de Montreuil was in a real sense a more devoted, or single-minded cultivator of humanist trends than Nicolas, although the "splendidissimus stilus clemanginus" (to use Jean's words) far excelled de Montreuil's own. To the best of my knowledge this has not been noticed before. I shall first cite the evidence that this is so and then hazard an explanation of this fact. It is, I believe, a result not of a difference in "personality," but of the differing material conditions in which these men lived.

Nicolas de Clamanges' attack on the study of the liberal arts is his homily "De filio prodigo" is also an attack on classical literature, as Ornato has noted.15

Alii in supervacuis occupantur, ut qui in poeticis fabulis auctorumque gentilium libris etatem conterunt,

quos in adolescentia tantummodo non nimium moroso
gradu transisse sufficit.\textsuperscript{16}

Nicolas reaffirmed that scripture and theology have the
primacy over eloquence (the notion of eloquentia ancilla
sapientie):

Ubi enim adest preambula Spiritus sapientia, que docet
de omnibus et quae, teste Apostolo, loquitur misteria,
neceesse est pedissequam sapientie, sicut eam
Augustinus appelat, sequi eloquentiam.\textsuperscript{17}

Cecchetti hastens to add that the attack on secular litera-
ture by the humanist Clamanges in "De filio prodigo"
appears to be atypical of Clamanges. Moreover, immediately
after reaffirming the Augustinian notion of eloquentia
ancilla sapientie, Nicolas declares eloquence superior to
all the other arts. Cecchetti concludes from this that
Nicolas' praise of the liberal arts remains

pur sempre nell'ambito della reductio, che attribuisce
valore spirituale, e non puramente retorico, all'eser-
cizio stilistico e letterario.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{16} . . . Nicolai de Clemangiis . . . Opera omnia
qua' partim ex antiquissimis editionibus . . . edidit
Johannes Martini Lydus . . . Lvgdvni Batavorum [Leiden],
apud J. Balduinum . . . MDCXIII, p. 110. It is quoted in
Cecchetti, "L'elogio delle arti liberali," p. 4. Further
references to the works of Clamanges from this edition
shall be identified by a reference to "Lydus, ed."

\textsuperscript{17}Cecchetti, "L'elogio delle arti liberali," p.
3, quoting from Lydus, ed., Ep. LXV.

\textsuperscript{18}Ibid., p. 5.
In fact, Cecchetti has difficulty explaining these 'vacillations' of Clamanges', although he notes that Petrarch and Boccaccio state similar reservations.

In the same article, Cecchetti illustrates Jean de Montreuil's attitude towards eloquence through remarks in his letters. In a letter to Cardinal Guillaume Fillastre Montreuil states:

De traditiva et suasiva loquor, que maxime rhetorices et eloquentie regulis constat consequiturque, et sine qua sermocinatio, que finis esse michi videtur theologice facultatis, redditur pene inutilis, inanis et vacua, teste oratore supremo Cicerone ubi ait: Sed mandare quemquam litteris cogitationes suas, qui eas nec disponere, nec illustrare possit, nec delectatione aliqua allicere lectorem, hominis est interperanter abutentis et ocio et litteris.\(^{19}\)

Combes had taken this letter to be an example of how Jean de Montreuil admired Gerson's style. It is that, but much more. Far from a reaffirmation of the traditional reductio, it is really the opposite. For in it Jean avers that sermocinatio, the goal of theology, is empty without eloquence! And nowhere does he affirm the traditional view which Gerson held, that eloquence is vain without theological wisdom. As authority for this unorthodox view he quotes, not a Christian sage, but his beloved

\(^{19}\)Ibid., p. 9; quoted from Ornato ed., No. 169, p. 258, l. 10-17.
Cicero.

If this is Jean de Montreuil at his most conservative, we must recognize that even here he has taken a much bolder position than did Clamanges. Cecchetti recognized this as well. He cites another passage where Jean de Montreuil discusses the relationship between eloquence and wisdom. After condemning those who attack poetry because they cannot understand it, Jean continues:

. . . non intelligentes nostri correctores ineptissimi quod, ubi vacat sententia, nullo pacto eloquentia dici debet, quinpotius verbositas reputanda sit et vana loquutio. 21

This is not the old idea that poetry beautifies the exposition of Christian thought, the reductio artium ad sacram scripturam, but a startling new concept; that an elegant style always sets forth ideas! This, then, is how pagan writers could write things worth reading. 22

Thus it appears that Jean de Montreuil never expresses more traditional, less "humanistic" views, while

20 Ibid., p. 11.


22 Cecchetti, "L'elogio delle arti liberali," p. 11.
Clamanges sometimes does.\textsuperscript{23} Nor has recent scholarship found anything in Clamanges' writings to equal Jean de Montreuil's praise of eloquence. Gilbert Ouy has recently examined several more quotations from Clamanges made much later in his life, when he claimed to have rejected classical studies. Ouy successfully shows that Clamanges never in fact did stop his classical studies, despite his advice to the contrary. It is nonetheless instructive that he still felt the contradiction between humanist and Christian studies enough to have reflected it, however faintly, in letters of the 1420s.

In contrast, there is no evidence, to my knowledge, that Jean de Montreuil ever recognized any such contradiction.

We have evidence of what Jean de Montreuil's views about the propriety of classical letters were about the year 1404.\textsuperscript{24} Jean is responding to someone who Ornato thinks may have been a theologian.\textsuperscript{25} As we might expect,

\textsuperscript{23}Ouy, "'Taedium Scriptorum Gentilium'," found several more quotations from Clamanges, but mentions none from Jean de Montreuil.

\textsuperscript{24}Ornato, Jean Muret, p. 206.

\textsuperscript{25}Ibid., p. 142.
therefore, the recipient, though interested in the classics, was still conscious of some contradiction between pagan and Christian literature. He objected to Jean's having put a quotation from Terence in a prosopopoeia of the Church ("Ecclesia") contained in a letter to Pope Benedict XIII. After pointing out that Cicero cited Terence even in serious philosophical works and that Seneca quoted the poets also, Jean asked three questions of his correspondent:

(1) "si in divinis ac salubribus scripturis quipiam poete allegentur"; (2) "et an in sui latitudine alvei Scriptura Sacra allegabilia plura contineat quam Tullius, Demonsthenes sive Crassus"; and (3) "et si de omnibus indifferenter paganorum scriptis, Ecclesia, que omnem scientiam, artes omnes complectitur, ad suos cultores loqui possit."\(^{26}\)

In contrast to Ornato, I believe each of these questions is rhetorical. The first question is most obviously so. St. Paul's quotations from Aratus and Christ's from Terence were very well known. Given the fact that Demosthenes and Crassus were unknown to medieval Europe except as mentioned by authors such as Cicero, it seems clear that the second question is rhetorical as well. This does not seem to have occurred to Ornato, who

\(^{26}\)Ibid., p. 140. See Ornato ed., No. 51, p. 84, ll. 31-35.
wonders whether Jean is joking, or trying to impress his correspondent with his knowledge of Greek writers. Both are highly unlikely. It would have been clear to any correspondent of Jean's that he knew no Greek. Since it is preceded by a rhetorical question, it seems likely that this one is as well.

But Ornato finds evidence of Jean's advanced (for this time and place) views concerning classical literature in the second and third questions:

. . . demander si l'Ecriture contient plus d'allegabilia que Cicéron ne revient-il pas à affirmer que les écrivains païens pouvaient exprimer certains concepts tout aussi bien que les textes sacrés? Et proclamer que l'Eglise embrasse toutes les sciences, ne revient-il pas à attribuer à certains paganorum scripta une parcelle de vérité? . . . Il ne semble s'intéresser que sur l'éventualité de donner aux classiques une certaine primauté littéraire, tout en reconnaissant qu'ils touchèrent parfois à la vérité. C'était un point de vue qui était loin d'être révolutionnaire, mais qui, au début du XVᵉ siècle, ne devait pas être universellement partagé. . . .

In a letter of 1417 Jean reaffirms the fact that pagan writers attained some truths through philosophical reasoning. 28

27 Ornato, Jean Muret, pp. 143-44.

Ornato still concludes that this is no reason to "ressusciter le schema d'un antagonisme philosophique entre théologiens et humanistes, inconcevable à l'époque."
But of course this is wrong. The contemporaneous debate between Dominici and Salutati is certainly an example of such an antagonism, for instance. Later we shall examine some further examples of theological opposition to humanists. And Gerson, as we have seen, came to distrust humanist activity long before 1404.

If the Quarrel of the Roman be yet another example of theological opposition to humanism, it was far from unprecedented.

Of course, there were also differences concerning the utility of the study of classical literature among the theologians themselves. The fact that Gerson became unsympathetic to certain manifestations (at least) of humanism did not prevent him from being relatively more tolerant of humanist activity than many of his colleagues. On the one hand, as we have seen, Jacques Lecland used classical citations more freely than Gerson; similarly the Chancellor was no doubt more critical of humanist activity than some of his ecclesiastical contemporaries in Avignon or Italy.

On the other hand, Gerson is known to have defended
the study of classical literature before audiences of theologians in August and September, 1392.\textsuperscript{29} Ornato concludes:

Or le fait que Gerson, devant un auditoire composé de théologiens, sent le besoin de condamner en termes assez vifs l'attitude de certains d'entre eux à l'égard de la culture classique, semble bien montrer que la question était d'actualité en 1392, et confirme par là qu'une opposition Théologie-Humanisme existait réellement en France à la fin du XIV\textsuperscript{e} siècle; Paris avait aussi peut-être ses "Giovanni Dominici" qui, malheureusement, ne nous ont pas laissé de Lucula noctis. . . .\textsuperscript{30}

There is nothing strange at all in this. In fact, as we have seen, all the humanists of the fourteenth century faced plenty of opposition to their activities very often from among theologians. This opposition became particularly sharp towards the end of the century. A similar climate of opinion seems to have been in evidence at the University of Paris in the 1390s (among some, at least). In this light it becomes easier to see how Gerson could begin to suspect the morality of humanism some years later. Many of his colleagues already did.

Gerson's conception of the role of eloquence was a strictly traditional one. This is very clearly expressed

\textsuperscript{29}Ibid., pp. 148-51, and the texts quoted there.

\textsuperscript{30}Ibid., p. 150.
in his defense of secular letters in the citation quoted by Ornato, Jean Muret, pp. 148-49. This traditional attitude was being rejected by the real humanists of the chanceries. Rare in Nicolas de Clamanges, it is absent altogether in Jean de Montreuil, so far as we can tell. As Coville wrote many years ago, these early humanists were "épris de l'Antiquité pour elle-même."\footnote{Coville, Gontier et Pierre Col, p. 7.}

How can we account for these different attitudes towards humanist activity? No scholar seems to have asked this question until now. Widespread scholarly acceptance of the erroneous notion that there can be no essential difference between the attitudes of "theologians" and of "humanists" at this period is doubtless partly to blame for this. In the next chapter, I shall try to point out how this notion led Gilbert Ouy to dismiss the very sharp differences expressed in the Quarrel of the Roman as minor disagreements which reflect only differences in personality or taste among the disputants. To "explain" the Quarrel by reference to such unknowable factors is in fact to abjure any attempt at explaining it.

Our analyses of (a) other literary debates of these early French humanists, and (b) the defenses of poetry of
fourteenth-century humanists, suggest a more fruitful explanation. In the debates we have discerned a certain sense of "solidarity" among our French humanists. This solidarity is reflected in a desire for reconciliation even in serious disputes, an attempt to keep all disagreements within the group, even a desire to engage in debate for its own sake which makes it difficult or impossible to gauge the extent to which "disagreements" were sincere within the coterie of humanists.\textsuperscript{32} The acrimony and substantive disagreements raised in the Quarrel of the Roman show that this debate was essentially different from those among the humanists alone. Secondly, we have seen that fourteenth-century humanists were commonly attacked by theologians and occasionally by other professionals (doctors, lawyers). These humanists engaged in a conscious effort to extend the acceptability and influence of the new classical style, relying (in the case of Petrarch, whose "school" of supporters is best known) mainly on the notaries and secretaries to become supporters of humanism. Finally we have seen that, in the case of Italian humanists who were engaged in the defense of humanist activity, all were notaries or secretaries with the exception of Petrarch,

\textsuperscript{32}See Appendix 2.
who, though offered the post of papal secretary, was able to avoid any such dependency by virtue of his fame.

The "vanguard" of humanism, those most wholeheartedly devoted to its propagation, were uniformly men to whose livelihood the acceptability of the new humanist style was vital. This was also the case in late fourteenth-century France. The loyal humanists were all secretaries or notaries such as Jean de Montreuil, Nicolas de Clamanges, Giovanni Moccia, Jean Muret, Nicolas de Gonesse, Jean Lebègue, Gontier Col, Laurent de Premierfait, and no doubt many others of whom little or nothing is known. Only among these men were the bounds of the medieval reductio habitually transgressed. And it is among these men that we find all the defenders of the Roman whose identities we know (unfortunately, we are too ignorant of Pierre Col's life to know whether or not he served as a secretary).

This idea—that humanism was first of all a phenomenon of the chanceries and was propagated mainly by "professional" humanists—is not a new one. Note these remarks by Jerrold Seigel:

Before seeking the ways in which it [i.e. humanist culture in Italy] may have been characteristic of Renaissance society as a whole, the historian should be aware that it was primarily identified with a particular group of men within that society: the professional humanists. There was always a distinction
between the professional humanists, who taught grammar and rhetoric and served in the chanceries of the towns, and the amateurs, who were their students and audience. The first group was the real source of humanist culture; its members were completely identified with it. The studia humanitatis was the basis not only of their intellectual orientation, but of their social position as well. The most prominent humanists of the Quattrocento did not come from patrician families like the Manetti of Florence or the Quirini of Venice. The great humanist chancellors of Florence—Salutati, Bruni, Poggio Bracciolini, Carlo Marsuppini—were not even native Florentines. Each was born in the Tuscan hinterland and sought his fortune in the city. For such men, a place in the upper levels of Renaissance society was not guaranteed by birth and wealth, but attainable only by excelling in their profession. Many of them achieved striking economic and social success. But this success resulted from their professional eminence, not vice versa. To exalt humanist culture and declare its superiority to scholasticism was, for them, to justify both their own activity as intellectuals and the position which this activity had gained for them in society.  

Seigel argues persuasively that the content of humanist studies also attracted the men of the chancery. In Cicero he sees a man who was basically an orator, fundamentally devoted to the active life of politics. Though concerned with reconciling the conflicting claims of philosophy or morality with eloquence or political activity, Cicero always vindicated the latter. This contradiction Seigel then traces in the writings of Salutati and of Petrarch.

Seigel's point is that Cicero's insistence on the dignity of eloquence provided an excellent rationale for the attitudes which medieval secretaries and notaries (who were fundamentally diplomats) had to have in order to exercise their functions. For a secretary-diplomat the life of philosophic withdrawal and contemplation was impossible. Such men were forced to justify the active life as just as virtuous as the contemplative, if not more so. No doubt such a rationale would have been developed through necessity in any case. But the pursuit of eloquence in itself implies some social or political activity, and this fact surely made Cicero, the master of style as well as of politics, seem doubly worthy of imitation.

It is just this phenomenon of "professional humanism" which we also find in late fourteenth-century France. Other cultivators of humanist style such as the theologians either restricted themselves to the medieval reductio (Legrand) or even came to suspect humanist activity altogether (Gerson).

Two more facts about the relationship between humanism and the class position of the humanists are relevant here. First, I wish to give a few brief examples of how the development of humanist style was connected to the career ambitions of some of these French humanists.
Second, I wish to suggest that their careers affected their political attitudes and to draw certain implications from this which are relevant to the Quarrel of the Roman. Ezio Ornato's monograph gives many examples of letters written by these humanists which are mainly concerned with furthering their careers as secretaries. Ep. II of Nicolas de Clamanges' is, he shows, an attempt to prove to the recipient, Pope Benedict XIII: (a) that classical style is now more common in Paris; and (b) that, though he was the author of the letter from the University of Paris to Benedict XIII which sharply criticized the Pope (Ep. I in Lydias' collection), nevertheless Clamanges himself does not really share these ideas, and so might be a suitable candidate for a post in Avignon. In Ep. III Nicolas indignantly reproaches certain friends of his in Avignon who have made changes in both the form and the content of Ep. II before passing it on to the Pope. Clamanges is as concerned about the changes in language and style as about those in content. Ornato concludes that this is because Nicolas' career was as much dependent upon his style as upon his ideas, if not more so.\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{34}Ornato, Jean Muret, pp. 13-27.
In fact, this interpretation throws another light upon the literary debate involving Cardinal Pietramala, Nicolas de Clamanges, and Jean de Montreuil, which is examined in Appendix I. Pietramala's letter, though flattering to Clamanges, stated that the Cardinal felt Paris was devoid of good Latin stylists. Clamanges' responses, then, are probably more than a nationalistic reaction combined with another attempt to show off his style. Perhaps Clamanges also meant to defend Paris as a center of humanism in fear that the Pope would have little reason to take on a secretary from an uncultivated place, even if he showed some evidence—perhaps secondhand or otherwise plagiarized?—of good style.

Clamanges may also have been trying to cast some reflected glory on his secretary friends in Paris, particularly upon Jean de Montreuil. Ornato guesses that Clamanges had worked in concert with Jean from the beginning, from the time of his letter to Pope Benedict XIII.35

At any rate, Ornato concludes, Clamanges took great care in choosing a position after his rupture with the University of Paris. He could have continued teaching

35Ibid., p. 31; p. 16.
at the Collège de Navarre, or, like Ambrogio dei Migli, become a secretary of a prince of the royal household. Ornato thinks he was drawn to Avignon precisely because of its superiority in classical learning. But I believe his purposes were more concrete. Clamanges estimated that his chances of advancement in his career would be greatest precisely where classical style was most valued. As we shall see, classical style was somewhat dispraised in Paris. Therefore Clamanges could have been led to break with the University of Paris because of a desire to further himself in Avignon just as easily as by a personal conviction that the University was wrong and Benedict XIII right (pp. 35-36).

I wish to return later to this question of the role of careerism and self-aggrandizement in the literary career of Nicolas de Clamanges. Let it be noted, however, that, so far as primary sources permit us to judge, this careerism was common to other humanists as well. Several of Jean de Montreuil's letters attest his constant attempts to get new positions, prebends with more income, etc. Jean included these in his Epistolary. This is evidence that he took care with their style, and felt that his
classical learning would be of benefit to him. Concern about their jobs and mutual recriminations about their careers was one of the principal topics in the literary debate involving Jean de Montreuil, Gontier Col, and Ambrogio dei Migli (see Appendix 2). Ornato points out how vigorously Jean de Montreuil struggled for acceptance of classical style at his chancery in Paris and how vehemently he requested Nicolas de Clamanges to move to Paris instead of going to Avignon. For the presence at Paris of the acknowledged leader of the humanist movement in France would undoubtedly have helped Jean's struggle and thus made his literary talents more marketable (p. 81, ll. 43-45).

Careerism is evident in the writings of other humanist-secretaries at the time as well. In one of Giovanni Moccia's poems Moccia asks Jean Muret to recommend him to the Pope for a benefice on the strength of his literary skills. In his discussion of the career of


Jacques de Nouvion (also involved in the debate in which Ambrogio dei Migli attacked Cicero) Coville pointed out that five of the letters edited or dictated by him were meant to recommend himself for a benefice. And career advancement was the motive behind Jean Lebègue’s letter to Pierre Lorèvre asking for the hand of his daughter, as Gilbert Ouy has surmised. Ouy guesses that Lebègue abandoned a career in the Church because of a lack of theological training but also because of an estimate—obvious enough given the circumstances—that the conditions of the Schism made his chances of a Church career even worse. Marriage with the daughter of Lorèvre, lawyer and member of the King’s council, would have indeed been a triumph for a relatively obscure notary in the royal chancery.

For a final example of humanist careerism we must return to Nicolas de Clamanges. Ornato shows how, after the subtraction of obedience from the Avignon Pope Benedict XIII by the French crown (15 July 1398), the humanist

38 Coville, Recherches, pp. 175 ff.; p. 186.

cenacle, and specifically Nicolas de Clamanges, left Avignon. Clamanges probably received the benefice of "treasurer" of Langres shortly before the subtraction. When it became clear that the French crown would soon refuse to recognize appointments by Benedict, the Pope attempted to put Clamanges in a safe spot until the changing tides of politics could reunite the papal chancery in Avignon once more.\(^{40}\) The Pope had provided well for Clamanges, and Nicolas expatiates at length upon the favors that he enjoyed at the papal court in Ep. XIV (pp. 57-58). Nevertheless Ornato tries to prove that Clamanges acted out of principle and patriotism in leaving Benedict XIII. Angered by Coville's unflattering characterizations of the French humanists, Ornato tries to salvage Clamange's reputation:

\[\text{A ce propos, ayant préalablement exclu l'hypothèse du taedium curiae, nous pourrions en avancer une autre: ayant obtenu, le 22 juin 1398, le bénéfice de Langres, Clamanges estima que tout problème financier était ainsi résolu et qu'il valait mieux, prenant pour prétexte sa maladie, fuir au plus vite les sombres nuages de la tempête. Or, bien que l'on ait parfois expliqué tous les actes de nos humanistes par des mobiles fort médiocres [here Ornato refers to Coville's characterizations], tout nous impose de rejeter, cette}\]

\(^{40}\)Ornato, Jean Muret, p. 65.
fois, une pareille hypothèse. ... Certes, la valeur morale de Clamanges n'est pas une raison suffisante pour écarter de notre enquête tout facteur économique: Il serait absurde d'éliminer a priori un élément qu'aucune personne normale, avant de prendre une décision d'une certaine importance, ne songerait à négliger. (pp. 59-60)

Ornato then cites a letter from Jean de Montreuil which promises that Clamanges' success as a professor at Navarre would be great. He concludes that, since Clamanges settled instead for the relative obscurity and modest income of his Langres benefice,

   ... par conséquent, l'aspect économique ne saurait constituer, dans ce cas, un élément de poids dans notre jugement.

Clamanges acted, then, out of love for the Pope, and even more out of the higher motive of "patriotism":

Si sa raison et son coeur étaient du côté de Benoit XIII, et il eût le courage de le proclamer même au moment ou tant de personnages n'hésitaient pas à brûler ce qu'ils avaient adoré—il n'oublia jamais que son premier devoir était de se plier aux ordres du roi de France. (pp. 60, 61)

This explanation, though some might consider it flattering to Nicolas de Clamanges' image, does not do justice to the facts in our possession. It is another attempt to explain history by referring to the "personalities" of the participants in it. Now in fact "personality" differences between people do, and did exist, and so must affect history in some ways. But to try to reconstruct
the psychology of men long dead is perilous. It is impossible (as a rule) to tell when they reveal their "true" motives, of course. More significantly, it is to accept their own account of their own motives at face value, rather than seek the historical roots for them. Finally, it can blind one to more logical explanations. So to have recourse to this kind of "psychologizing" is to commit a serious error in historical methodology, none the less serious for being extremely common.

Let us first consider a few facts concerning Nicolas de Clamanges' later career. Back with the Pope after the restitution of obedience (28 May 1403) Clamanges was again caught in a conflict of loyalties in 1407 as relations between the French crown and Benedict XIII began to deteriorate seriously. Clamanges, a loyal follower of the Pope's, was accused in Paris of having composed the secret bull excommunicating the King which Benedict had had drawn up. Ornato details Nicolas' painstaking efforts (included in six letters in all) to protest his loyalty and dissipate the rumors of his treachery in Paris.

However, Clamanges was also accused of trying to exchange some French benefices for foreign ones. It is significant that, in a letter drawn up to reply to these accusations (p. 180, n. 363), Clamanges does not deny those
allegations. Ornato believes that Clamanges may also have drawn up, for Benedict XIII, a list of his enemies (i.e. men among the royalist party), since Clamanges' denials of the charge that he did so are very perfunctory (p. 180, n. 1).

In his analysis of the treatise on the destruction of the church, Coville points out that Clamanges praises Benedict XIII as one of the two good ministers of the church (his friend and possibly ex-teacher Pierre d'Ailly being the other). As late as Clamanges' Commentary on Isaiah written after his return to Paris (sometime between 1423-26) he still praises Benedict XIII. 41

None of this activity is consistent with that of a man who recognizes that his King has the highest claims on his loyalty. On the contrary, all of his actions are consistent with the theory that Clamanges remained fundamentally loyal to the Pope, at whose court he first achieved eminence and great favor. Faced with a sharply antagonistic situation between the University of Paris (where he once taught) and Benedict XIII, Clamanges chose to cast his

lot with the fortunes of the latter. He must have known that this probably cut off any return to Paris and would naturally earn him enemies in the French capital in proportion to the animosity with which Benedict XIII came to be viewed there as a consequence of his feud with the crown.

Nicholas de Clamanges is called a "moderate" because of his refusal to take an extreme stand against Benedict XIII even when this policy was being urged by some around the royal court and the University of Paris. I contend that Clamanges had good reason to be "moderate." As a high functionary with connections in both the royal (the University) and papal camps, Clamanges was materially helped by any rapprochement between the King and Pope. After all, he got his job with the Pope at least partially as a result of his former prominence in Paris (any Avignon pope being under much French influence). Consequently Clamanges' fortunes and prospects were hurt by any sharpening of contradictions between the King and Pope. And it was at such times, naturally, when the more exclusive partisans of either side (and especially of the royal side, such as the University) tended to predominate over equivocators such as Clamanges and to call the loyalty of such men into question.
However it was in Paris, and under royal tutelage, that Clamanges rose as high as he did. Only because of his prominence there did he get his job at Avignon in the first place. As with the bourgeoisie as a whole, his personal interests dictated a patriotic attitude—which does not make his patriotism less "sincere" at all.

But certainly Clamanges acted out of economic motives. Ornato is simply wrong in denying this. Ornato seems to be concerned to "rehabilitate" Clamanges' fair reputation, once sullied by Coville's characterizations. But he falls into the same trap as did Coville. A person is not "nobler" if he acts out of pure idealism than out of self-interest. And in any case, the dichotomy is false. To put it another way, the evidence indicates that Clamanges was just as self-seeking as Coville suggested, only more far-sighted than Coville thought. While remaining with the Pope, to whom his star was hitched, Clamanges also tried to save his reputation in Paris as much as possible. Hardly "idealistic"—but it seems to have worked, for we find him back at the University of Paris after 1420.

In this context I would like to consider a related question, the relative unpopularity of classical style at Paris in the late fourteenth century. In detailing Clamanges' motives for writing Benedict XIII and thereupon
engaging in the literary debate with Pietramala, Ornato noted that Jean de Montreuil had tried to convince Clamanges to stay in Paris. The opportunity to study with the master of French Latin stylists would no doubt have made Jean de Montreuil's campaign to raise the stylistic level of the Parisian chanceries easier. This would have furthered Jean's career opportunities as well.

Jean's campaign to promote humanist style at Paris was a difficult one. In at least three letters (Nos. 48, 170, and 102), Jean attests to the presence of detractors of the humanist style in Paris:

Ego vero his in vulgaribus missivis scriptionibus solum versor, quae si Tullii aut priscorum cuiuspiam quoquopacto fabricam redolerent, aut etiam sincatheorema poneretur insuetum, barbaries diceretur a nostris superioribus protinus, ac poema eredone.

Ad te redeo, pater carissime ac venuste, hoc unum orans rogansque et obscurans, ne tuam discretionem ab hac nostrre suasione dismoveat aut revocet turbaplerorumque imperita, falsa existimantium doctrinam cum eloquentia coniungi non posse, aut eloquitionem sententias comitari, quin, cum primum ornatam vident propositionem, vel sincatheorema audient insuetum poesim totum vocent, in mala sua hora dicentes omnia verba esse. . . .

Vale, nec te juristarum quorundam allices decretis, quo soleo admirari, qui, cum seu leges omni ornatu ac verborum et sententiarum gravitate referente sint, orationem vix tamen unicam elegantia quavis conditam admittere queunt, quin protinus Poesim reputent atque vocent et cum indignatione reiciant, quasi eis quisquam barbarae loqueretur. Ex quo eos leges suas non intellegere, aut invidia esse rhetoribus a recto censetur
iudicio. In this final letter, No. 102, "Auffugienti michi" Jean de Montreuil is, we may recall, engaged in a defense of poetry which is largely composed of a quotation from Boccaccio's Genealogia defense.

So among certain circles in Paris, including the chanceries, classical style was greeted with hostility and equated with "poetry." Probably the equation with poetry is a reference to the use of rare words and a special syntax. Classical Latin would tend to seem that way to men trained in medieval Latin, and Jean's attempts at classical style are--to the chagrin of modern students--particularly full of learned words and unusual constructions.

So "poetry" and classical style are, in Paris, being derided in the same breath precisely during the time of the subtraction of obedience and near or at the time when the Quarrel of the Roman was raging (Ornato dates No. 48 as around 25 January 1404). It was at this time that Jean de Montreuil's letter to the Pope (No. 59, "Altitudo-nam tuam") was criticized for the inclusion of a quotation

\(^{42}\) Quoted in Ornato, Jean Muret, p. 138.

\(^{43}\) Ibid., p. 137.
of Terence. In an earlier article Ornato conjectures that letter No. 102, "Auffugienti michi," the defense of poetry clearly addressed to a lawyer, may have been addressed to the same lawyer to whom Jean de Montreuil addressed the letters "Quo magis" and "Nugis ex," in defense of the Roman de la Rose.\textsuperscript{44} In any case, "Auffugienti michi" dates from the same general period as No. 48 (though Ornato cannot date it more precisely than between 1397 and 1407).

In his analysis of Gerson's early "Pastorium Carmen," Gilbert Ouy has noted that, judging from references to each other's writing by contemporary Avignon humanists, French humanism was, in the papal city at least, thoroughly identified with the composition of poetry. (Unfortunately, very few poems by these men have come to light as yet.)\textsuperscript{45} This is as we should expect. For as Seigel has pointed out the same was true in Italy; for the foremost humanist of the day, Coluccio Salutati, poetry and oratory were equivalent, even more so than they were for Petrarch.\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{44} Ornato, "Per la fortuna," p. 263.

\textsuperscript{45} Ouy, "Gerson, Emule de Pétrarque," p. 184.

\textsuperscript{46} Seigel, Rhetoric, p. 68; p. 36.
Let us sum up the results we have so far:

1. In Paris, classical Latin style was frequently dispraised, and called "poetry," in an obviously contemptuous manner.

2. This suggests that poetry, too, was dispraised in Paris at this time.

3. As Pietramala noted in his letter to Clamanges of 1398, a classical style was associated with Italy, or at least with Avignon, not with Paris.

4. During the period of the subtraction of obedience (1398 to 1404) but probably for sometime before and especially afterwards as well, there was great tension between the Pope and the King, and between their respective supporters (which placed such men as Gerson and Clamanges in difficult positions).

It seems probable then that both classical style and poetry would tend to be associated with Avignon or Italy among those in Paris, around the Royal court and chancery, where it was unfamiliar. It would not be unreasonable to assume that the political tensions between the Pope and King would tend to make both poetry and humanist style seem unpatriotic and foreign in Paris.

The Quarrel of the Roman was taking place precisely during this time, the subtraction of obedience. Jean de
Montreuil defended both poetry and the Roman in the same terms. He even used the same exemplum in his letter No. 154, "Ut sunt mores hominum," in defense of the Roman, as he had earlier used in No. 97, "Si Thersitem," in defense of Nicolas de Clamanges' poetry in 1395. Whatever the motives of Christine and Gerson for suspecting the defense of Jean de Meun's poem, the other attackers of the Roman de la Rose, particularly those such as the causidicus and those around the chancery, may well have been reacting "patriotically" against what they may have viewed as foreign or "Italian" enthusiasms.