SUBJECT D IS THE LABEL MOST RECENTLY used by the federal government to de-
scribe a certain high-ranking Nazi collabor-
ator, an alleged war criminal whose cor-
operation with the Central Intelligence
Agency allowed him to enter this country
in 1940 and later become a U.S. citizen.
Subject D's history was supposed to re-
main hidden; indeed, he felt so secure
that his telephone number is listed under
his real name. Now, after nearly 40 years,
his secret is out.

Last June, the General Accounting Of-
fect (GAO) completed a three-year inves-
tigation of the illegal postwar immigra-
tion of Nazis and Nazi collaborators, and
of the secret assistance they allegedly re-
ceived from U.S. intelligence agencies.
This sensitive federal study was ordered
by the House Judiciary Committee to sup-
plement a 1976 review of accusations
that federal agencies obstructed the pro-
suction of alleged Nazi war criminals.
After reviewing voluminous files and
conduing many interviews, the GAO
found "no evidence of any U.S. agency
program to aid Nazis or Axis collabora-
tors to immigrate to the United States."
But among the 114 cases it reviewed—
dealing with a small fraction of the sus-
ppected war criminals—the GAO did dis-
cover five cases of Nazis or collaborators
"with undesirable or questionable back-
grounds who received some individual as-
sistance in their U.S. immigrations." Al-
though the 40-page report said that three
of them were already dead, it named no
names, or even nationalities, and referred
to the five only as Subjects A through E.
Much of the information about them and
their activities remains classified. In two
cases, the accused individuals were pro-
tected by the intelligence contacts from
authorities seeking to enforce immigra-
tion laws that prohibit the entry of war
criminals and other perpetrators.

The authors of the GAO report seem
eager to justify the actions of the govern-
ment, and regardless of bias, their effort
hardly represents a comprehensive ex-
amination of this historic problem. Yet
neatly eludes the shortcomings, the re-
landmark—an official admission that
Nazis and Nazi collaborators were assist-
ed in entering the United States by the
CIA.

The Voice has learned that the collabo-
ar discussed in the GAO report as "Subject D" is a prominent Ukrainian
nationalist. In 1934, he was imprisoned
for attempting to assassinate the interior
minister of Poland; he ran the security
force of a Ukrainian fascist organization
and has been accused of ordering the
murders of many of his colleagues.
He attended a Gestapo training
school where
Jews were killed
for practice, and
has been accused
of ordering the
murders of
many of his
countrymen.

In 1957, he be-
came a U.S. citizen.
His name is Mykola Lebed, and he
lives in Yonkers.

MYKOLA LEBED IS 75 YEARS OLD, AND HAS
resided in this country for nearly half his
life. Several years ago he moved from
Washington Heights, a largely Jewish
neighborhood, to a modest two-family
brick house on a pleasant Yonkers hillside.
Short, wiry, and bald, with alert blue eyes, the retired Lebed spends most
of his days at home, where he is working
on his memoirs.

His recollections are likely to be cast in
the heroic, patriotic light that illuminates
most histories written by adherents and
defenders of the Organisation of Ukrai-

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nian Nationalists (OUN) that he once
helped lead. All that can be seen in these
accounts is a fiery commitment to an in-
dependent Ukrainian state and the re-
sulting conflicts with both German and
Soviet oppressors. Obscured is the more
complex story of OUN collaboration with
Nazi war criminals, and the OUN's own fas-
cist and racist ideology.

Details of Mykola Lebed's involvement
with the OUN have been pieced together
from Army Counterintelligence Corps
(CIC) files, other military archives, and
immigration records; from interviews
with Ukrainians; and from histories of
the period, including an eyewitness ac-
count in the files of the Holocaust docu-
mentation center at Yad Vashem in Jeru-

Large portions of pages from the CIC
file on Lebed, obtained under the Free-
dom of Information Act, were "sanitized"
(that is, obfuscated) by the Army before
being released to the Voice. To justify the
withholding of certain facts, the Army
cited FOIA exemptions pertaining to pro-
tection of "intelligence sources" and "na-
tional security." One document was ap-
parently withheld at the request of

Citizen Lebed: Can the allegations about his past be proved in court?
The Ukrainian targets of the OSI have so far been minor figures—policemen in the service of the new state of the Ukraine, who don’t figure as individuals in any of the histories of the period. Most wartime leaders of the OUN are dead, and thus safe from the reprisals of the state. But the Voice has learned that the OSI maintains an open file on Lebed, as a potential defendant in denazification proceedings. Material pertaining to his case from the GAO probe, gleaned from the files of military intelligence and the CIA, were turned over to the OSI last summer.

If the OSI determines that Lebed was a member of the Nazi party, he could be stripped of his citizenship and deported, the information in those files may become public. Although much of Lebed’s activities have been murky, concealed in classified government archives, there is little doubt that a display would severely embarrass not only the OUN and its supporters but the U.S. government as well—especially the CIA.

The long-standing U.S. immigration laws, strengthened in 1978, allow the deportation of other people on the basis of race, religion, national origin, or political activity. The OSI has been hampered by the fact that the case is being heard in a court outside the U.S., and they are not required to prove that anyone worked for the OSS.

Lebed’s main defense is that he did not work for the OSS. He claims that he was only a volunteer, and that he was later forced to work for the OSS by the Soviets. However, the evidence presented by the OSI does not support this claim. Lebed’s arguments are weakened by the fact that he has not been able to produce any evidence to support his claim.

The case is being heard in a court outside the U.S., and the OSI is not required to prove that Lebed worked for the OSS. Lebed’s main defense is that he was only a volunteer, and that he was later forced to work for the OSS by the Soviets. However, the evidence presented by the OSI does not support this claim. Lebed’s arguments are weakened by the fact that he has not been able to produce any evidence to support his claim.

The OSI has presented a large amount of evidence against Lebed, including his membership in the Nazi party, his work for the OSS, and his involvement in various criminal activities. Lebed’s defense has been unsuccessful in discrediting this evidence.

The OSI is seeking to have Lebed deported to the U.S. in order to face trial. Lebed has been arrested in the U.S. and is being held pending the outcome of the case. The OSI has been successful in having other Ukrainian nationals deported to the U.S. for trial, and Lebed is expected to be deported soon.

The case has been widely discussed in the Ukrainian and international press. The OSI’s actions have been criticized by some as politically motivated, and there have been concerns raised about the fairness of the trial. However, the OSI has been successful in obtaining a conviction in most cases, and Lebed is expected to be deported to the U.S. for trial.

The case of Lebed is an example of the OSI’s ongoing efforts to hold Ukrainian nationals accountable for their actions during the war. The OSI has been successful in obtaining convictions in many cases, and it is expected that Lebed will be deported to the U.S. for trial.
from its inception. It was the Nazi inva-
sion of Poland in September 1939 that
allowed Lebed and other convicted
pilots to escape from Warsaw’s Swietly
Kroczy priory after its closure, and
converted to the Polish Air Force.

The morphic, antidemocratic, and
anti-Semitic nationalism of the OUN
meared easily with Nazism. The com-
pliment was not always returned, however.
Within the Nazi hierarchy, opinions
about the Ukrainians diverged. Powerful
Nazi figures considered the Ukrainians
an inferior people, subject to govern-
ment, whereas the OUN leaders hoped
that they would be able to set up an
autonomous fascist state, as part of
Hitler’s “New Europe,” under a German
protectorate.

Such aspirations congealed into a mil-
itary, political, and espionage alliance be-
 tween the OUN and the Nazi war
machine. Even after 1940, when the OUN
split into two feuding factions—the more
extremist led by Bandera, Lebed, and
Yaroslav Stetsko—both sought an
accommodation with the German occu-
pers. After the war, the Germans al-
ternated between courting and repressing
the Ukrainians, but many OUN members
continued to fight in Ukrainian formations,
from the Waffen-SS to the Waffen-SS
police forces, which murdered thousands
of Jews, Poles, communists, and socialists.

**DURING THE MONTHS FOLLOWING THEIR RE-
lease from prison, Lebed and the other
OUN leaders chafed under the temporary
constraints of the 1939 treaty between
Hitler and Stalin. According to Jozef
Stalin, they eagerly abetted the secret
Soviet preparations for invasion of the
Soviets, sending their young adherents
to German military training in mountain
miles near the site of an ancient 13th-
century castle. Sources friendly to
Lebed—who slanted accounts may be
found in memoranda compiled by the
Army Counterintelligence Corps be-
 tween 1947 and 1948—understandably
pass over this period.

Only hints of what Lebed was actually
done in 1940 and 1941 appear in the CIC
documents. However, a September 30, 1944,
document does mention that “For a short time, [Lebed]
attempted to get an insight into the tac-
matic situation.” And a card in the CIC file identifies Lebed
and his associates as “members of the OUN, Poland
military police.”

A former OUN member, now dead,
died in 1954 and more detailed
contents of Lebed’s journal to the Gestapo.
Retrieved from the files of the daily diary
in Jerusalem, the declaration of Mikołaj Kosakiewicz
portrayed Lebed and the OUN as eager
pupils of the Gestapo.

Kosakiewicz joined the OUN in 1933,
and after sojourns in Czechoslovakia
and Germany, he became the CIC informer,
returning to the Carpathian Ukraine late
in 1942. He was among the OUN officers
present when the
“Ukrainian Training Unit” was estab-
lished at the Gestapo school in Zakopane
in February 1943. According to his de-
claration, the Ukrainian unit was “organ-
ized by the OUN leadership and by per-
mission of the German Security Service.”
It included 120 specialists, trained and
under the guidance of a Gestapo officer
called Kruger, who was in charge of the
unit.

The curriculum included drills,
intelligence and counterintelligence
training, and interrogation techniques,
which included “exercises in the
hardening of hearts.”

“At sundown,” recalled Kosakiewicz,
“Kruger, Rosenbaum, Lebed and a few
other OUN members would go to Zakopane,
where they would find a few Jewish
homes on the way. They would grab a
Jew, and bring him to the Unit. One eve-
night, in November or early December
1939, they returned with a young
Jew. In the presence of Ukrainian
nomen, including myself, Kruger and
Rosenbaum, armed with an ice pick,
proceeded with their demonstration of the
proper methods of interrogating an
innocent Jew.”

Seeking to influence the innocent Jew
in order to confess that he had raped an
“Armenian” woman, the German officers beat
and tortured him, using their fists, a
sword, and iron bar. When he was bloody from
head to toe, they applied salt and flame
to his wounds. The broken man then con-

fessed his fictional crimes, but that was
not the end.

“Then, you see,” Kosakiewicz con-
tinued, “he was taken to the corridor
of the house and the ‘looters’ (three
women members of the unit) were called in.
In their presence, Rosenbaum beat the
Jew again with an iron pipe and Lebed
assisted manually in that ‘harsh action.’
One of the senior Ukrainians and I with-
drew from that spectacle to our rooms.
We learned afterwards that the tortured
man was stripped naked, stood up, 
and forced to stand in front of the
school as a ‘sentry’ and doused with water
in heavy frost.”

Kosakiewicz and his friends escaped
from Lebed the next day, but the comman-
dant told them bluntly that “it was the
duty of every member of the OUN to
show the Germans that their nerves are
just as tough as a German’s and that
the idea of any nationalist is just as
hard as steel.”

**FROM THEN ON**, conditions worsened
for the OUN, including the harassment
of many OUN leaders, including
Kosakiewicz, who was arrested by
German police in late 1940. Others equally
sickened, he learned, left earlier, but
Lebed remained until late March of that
year, when the unit moved to Zakopane,
where the Gestapo’s depredations continued.

When he finished his statement on De-

dember 14, 1956, in Germany, the former
OUN member declared that he was dying
of heart disease, according to the intro-
ductive note written by the late Dr.
Franz Ferenko, a Ukrainian liberal and
impeccable critic of the OUN. “I owe it
to my conscience to make this declara-
tion public, to report the facts I wit-
tnessed myself,” he wrote. “Mikołaj Lebid evidently
believes that his infamous accomplishments in
the Ukraine and elsewhere are forgotten and
that the multitudes of his innocent vic-
tims, that every witness of his tortures
activities is either murdered or dead.

Only Lebid is to blame for this.”

Kosakiewicz’s statement must be read
in context, as the product of one man’s
memory, and that of Ukraini-

can emigre, respectively; otherwise it
was published indiscernable Lebed and
the OUN. Yet there is supporting evidence for his story in the historical record.

The Gestapo, as it was known, according to Dr.
Yakov Weiss and his wife, was moved to the
neighborhood of Raba in 1940. There was a
Village in the area, and helped lead a joint
Nazi-OUN pogrom when the German Army’s Brandenburg Regiment
occupied the Galicia capital of Lvov in late June
1941.

And there is no question that a German
official, Wilhelm Rosen-

Continued on next page
Continued from preceding page

The Ukraine was a commandant at Zakopane and Rabka during the training of Ukrainians. In 1964, that same Rosenbaum was arrested in West Germany and charged, among other crimes, with the murder of 200 Jews at Rabka between May 1942 and January 1943. According to Simon Wiesenthal's 1967 book The Murderers Among Us, the unit was a "training center for future cadres of SS killers. . . . SS men at Rabka were being hardened so they would not break after a few weeks of duty. They had to become insensitive to the sight of blood, to the agonized shouts of women and children. The job must be done with a minimum of fuss and maximum of efficiency. That was a Führerisches—"the Führer's order." Rosenbaum was convicted in Hamburg in 1968 and sentenced to hard labor for life.

Lebed declined to be interviewed by the Voice about Zakopane or any of his wartime activities. But in a brief conversation on the doorstep of his Yokker home last month, he conceded that he had been at the Gestapo school, although he believed it had been during the winter of 1940-41, not 1939-40 as Rosokin's "yes, he said. "I left after five weeks. I have exactly the dates. I quit." He declined to be interviewed by the Voice about Zakopane or any of his wartime activities.

LEBED'S TRAINING AT ZAKOPANE, however, was soon recognized by his fellow leaders in OUN-B, whose acronym designated its domain by the nationalist fuerher Bandera. When their split from the old leadership became irrevocable in 1941, Bandera commissioned the creation of a "security service," the Shushke Bezpeky, under Lebed's command. Historians of the OUN-B agree that he ran the SNB not only during the war, but long afterward. Armstrong, who interviewed Lebed at length, stated the facts with characteristic discretion: "In Lebed—small in stature, quiet, yet determined, hard—the SNB found a well-qualified leader, but one who was to acquire for himself and his organization an unequalled reputation for ruthlessness." In an interview last month Armstrong was still sympathetic to Lebed, but more candid. "We grew up fighting against the Poles," he explained the historian, "and he developed a terrorist complex. He killed other Ukrainians, rivals in the organization [OUN]."

Yet Lebed told the Voice that he had never commanded the SNB. He claimed that the SNB had instead been run by someone named "Artyanyc . . . He's dead now."

"Such reluctance to assume the SB's legacy is understandable. Even those Ukrainians who ignore the fascist brutalities against Jews and Poles are still troubled, and in some cases outraged, by the SB's infamous assaults on Ukrainians who dissented from the OUN-B leadership. Lebed's direct responsibility for crimes attributed to the OUN-B is difficult to establish. Perhaps the lowest point of the Bandera's alliance with Nazi was the occupation of Lwov in June and July 1941, when Yaroslav Stetsko and a large contingent of OUN-B troops entered the city along with the Brandenburg regiment and other German detachments. The first days of mayhem followed. Lwov's Jewish population was decimated, but Polish university professors and anyone who could be tied to the Communists were also killed. Survivors reported that the Ukrainians were even more bloodthirsty than their German patrons. But, as Armstrong points out, the SNB was under the control of the UPA's Bandera, and the atrocities were committed in order to gain the support of the German Army."

The Ukrainian leader named Stetsko prime minister and Lebed minister of security. But the new regime didn't last long. By July 9 the Nazis would no longer put up with this "independent" charade, and arrested Bandera, Stetsko, and other members of the leadership. Lebed escaped; the others were held under "house arrest" in Berlin but they were not mistreated. According to Armstrong, the OUN leaders were "allowed to carry on their political activities in Berlin; Stetsko was even able to go to Cracow, where he was reputedly received by German officials who apparently delegated to take command of all activities in the Ukrainian lands." Even pro-OUN writers admit that the German suppression of the Ukrainian nationalistic was mild, and cooperation continued on many levels throughout the war.

There were also periods when some of the nationalist Ukrainians, formed into guerrilla groups, fought the Germans as well as the Soviet partisans, and there is evidence that Lebed took part in those actions, especially after 1942. But by 1945, the Bandera leaders were cooperating in the formation of a new Ukrainian SS division, and in 1944 Bandera himself—though he had been interned at Sachsenhausen—was helping to assist the German war effort against the Russians.

Lebed, who had meanwhile adopted the nom de guerre Maxym Ruban, tried to seize control of all factions in the nationalist movement. Independent nationalist bands were carrying out small-scale actions in Volhynia and the western Ukraine under the name of the Ukrainian Party of the Aryan People (UPA). The UPA was at first able to Lebed, who demanded that all the Ukrainian guerrillas come under his command. The result was violent internecine warfare among the nationalists, a period from which Lebed's reputation did not emerge unscathed. Leading figures of the UPA's "military police" were "liquidated," according to a 1948 CIC memo. "As a result, the Ukrainians now have difficulty forgetting the fact that Lebed killed some Ukrainian partisans who were fighting for the same cause."

Other writers, like the Ukrainians Panas Fedenko and O. Shuliak, condemned Lebed in harsh terms for these killings after the war. Shuliak wrote in 1947 that Lebed's SB men carried out the murder of dissenters from the OUN line. "It's perfectly evident that neither soldiers nor officers of the UPA had anything to do with these atrocities. The orders were the Security men under the orders of Lebed." Massacres and other acts of terror were also carried out against civilians, against Soviet prisoners of war, against entire Polish villages in the Ukraine, and against Jews fleeing from Nazi persecution.

In his own booklet on the history of the UPA, published in 1946, Lebed says its aim was "to clear the forests and the surrounding areas of foreign elements." According to the late historian Philip Friedman, this meant not only Poles but Jews and Russian partisans as well. Friedman says that postwar UPA efforts to disclaim responsibility for anti-Jewish atrocities "cannot be taken seriously."

LEBED'S Career IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE war is difficult to trace. By then the OUN had established a new front-group, the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council, known by its transliterated initials, UHVRI—of which Lebed became "First Secretary." Several CIC documents report that his wife and daughter were held in Buchenwald concentration camp by the Germans for several months as hostages against Lebed's guerrilla activities, but they were released in 1944, well before the war's end.

Lebed, who had lived in Rome and Munich, seeking Allied support for the remnants of the UPA to fight against the victorious Soviets. A "political history," he says, is that he traveled illegally around Western Europe, organizing the foreign offices of the UHVRI.

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The CIA brought Mykola Lebed under an assumed name and concealed his past from the INS.

Prolog was, in fact, at least partly a front for the former Banderaites grouped around the UHVR and Lebed. The sources of its funding are mysterious. Prolog's current officers insist that it has always been financially self-sufficient, with adequate support "from the Ukrainian community." Although the market for its books and magazines is tiny, Prolog is now a for-profit corporation. It has at various times maintained offices in Munich, London, and Cairo as well as New York. During the 70s Prolog published eight to 10 volumes annually, plus two or three small-circulation magazines on Soviet and Ukrainian affairs.

Ukrainians familiar with the workings of Prolog say that it could not have sustained itself solely from sales of its publications—many of which were regularly smuggled into the Soviet-ruled Ukraine—and that it probably received help from a government agency. Two mentioned the CIA. Ilynytskyi said he didn't know whether Prolog had received any such subsidies. "They keep some things hidden," he said. But he believes Lebed "has some connections with the American authorities. What kind of connections, or whether they included financial help, I don't know." None of the other Ukrainians who discussed Prolog and its financing would let their name be used. As one put it, "People simply don't talk about these things."

Very little about subject D's past appears in the GAO report, although clues were present in the records available to government investigators; three years of research are boiled down to three vague paragraphs. Because it omits nearly all the significant facts, the report suffers from the same moral obtuseness that tainted the CIA's relationship with Lebed.

Eli Rosenbaum, a former OSI prosecutor and now general counsel to the World Jewish Congress, recently examined the declassified CIC files and other documents on Mykola Lebed. "I'm particularly dismayed," he said, "by the absence of even the slightest indication that any of the government agencies cared to ascertain the truth of the damaging and very specific charges against Lebed contained in these files. It's as though they assumed the charges to be true, and proceeded to bring him here anyway."

After 40 years, a government agency—the office of Special Investigations—is finally examining the evidence against Lebed. But difficult legal and historical questions must be answered before the OSI can consider denaturalization proceedings against Lebed: Did the 1949 CIA Act which permitted his entry allow him to evade serving the purposes of other immigration laws which would forbid it? Can the allegations about his past be proved in court? The confidentiality of the OSI's operations is so strict that if the case is dropped the public will probably never know why. Mykola Lebed is, and has been for 20 years, a citizen with constitutional rights. All we know for now is that the file on Subject D is still open.

Research assistance by Ellen McGarrah, Leslie Yenkin, and Kevin Coogan.

"Because of fear for his personal safety and his familiarity with U.S. intelligence operations," the section in the GAO report on Subject D explains, "the CIA brought him to the United States under an assumed name." His naturalization papers, filed in January 1957, show that Lebed arrived in New York harbor on October 4, 1950. The truth about his identity and history was concealed from the Immigration and Naturalization Service. But two years later, the INS learned who Lebed was and opened an investigation that, the CIA was informed, might lead to his deportation. "In attempting to obtain the CIA file," the report says, "the INS had learned that the subject's conviction had been for involvement in an assassination and that allegations of terrorism existed against him." To protect Lebed the agency invoked Section 8 of the CIA Act.

All this, because, according to the GAO, "the subject was considered extremely valuable by U.S. intelligence." And after Lebed had been employed by the CIA for a few years, it became impossible to let him go, because of "fear for his personal safety and his familiarity with U.S. intelligence operations." Once he knew the CIA's secrets, the Soviets couldn't be permitted to capture him—so Lebed was smuggled into the U.S.

Lebed became a citizen on March 18, 1957. His application listed an address in Washington Heights as his home, and "journalist" as his profession. He had two witnesses: Boldan Caniskyevsky, also a writer and a longtime friend of Lebed, and Alexander S. Alexander, who listed his job as "government employee."

The new citizen was entitled to call himself a journalist because of his position as president of the Prolog Research and Publishing Association. Founded as a nonprofit publisher in the early '50s, it has always specialized in Ukrainian-language books and magazines, many of them with anti-Communist political themes. Prolog's certificate of incorporation filed in New York in 1950 listed Lebed as a director; it gives as its purposes "investigation of the history, economics, politics and culture of the Ukraine," and "exposing to the public opinion of the world the true nature of communist dictatorship and the threat of international communism to freedom everywhere."

Roman Ilynytskyi, a longtime Lebed associate who worked for Prolog, says that Lebed was "completely absorbed" in his work at the Ukrainian publishing company's tiny, cramped offices in midtown Manhattan, although he was never an editor. Aside from keeping Prolog alive, Lebed's vocation until he retired in 1980 was to promote the views of the UHVR, the faction of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists which he headed.