ADDRESS BY FIRST PARTY SECRETARY N. S. KRUSHCHEV AT 20TH PARTY CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, because of its importance, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the body of the Congressional Record a State Department release dated today, together with the purported version of the speech of First Party Secretary N. S. Krushchev of the 20th party congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, on February 25 of this year. This was the speech of the so-called down-grading of Stalin and the party hierarchy.

Mr. President, I think one significant thing about the speech, which will be of interest to the Members of Congress and also to the American people—to whom the full text might not otherwise be available—is that except as they may obtain copies of the Congressional Record in the various public libraries—Is that while there is considerable criticism of the methods of Stalin in liquidating certain of the Communists, I find in the speech no expressions of regret on the part of Mr. Khruushchev for the liquidation during the same period of time of the vast number of liberals, democrats, and non-Marxist Socialists, and other believers in human freedom, nor do I find in the speech the slightest indication of regret by Mr. Khruushchev for the destruction of the freedom of the people of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, who lost their freedom and their sovereignty as nations despite the solemn pledges to the contrary by the Soviet Union.

In the speech, I find not the slightest indication of a single deed, such as suggested some time ago by President Eisenhower, which might constitute a demonstration that a basic change had occurred in the policy of the nature of the long-term strategic concept. Neither do I find in the speech any indication in favor of a free and united Germany; nor any indication that the hand of control will be lifted from the satellite governments of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Albania; nor any indication that the hundreds of thousands of persons in the slave-labor camps in Siberia will be given their freedom; nor any indication of any kind of compensation—not restitution caused by any act which cannot be returned to life—for the loss of the lives of those who have been liquidated under the Soviet regime; nor the slightest indication that the Soviets are prepared to accept the kind of aerial inspection of the Soviet armaments as the Eisenhower plan, or, other adequate arms inspection which would avoid the type of forces which has existed in Korea, where the inspection teams have not been able to do their work, under the terms of the Korean armistice.

No, Mr. President; the speech does not contain the slightest indication that any deed of that sort has been performed, aside from the downgrading of the former leader, Stalin; there is no indication of an软化 policy, except sometimes in crimes to return any of the loot.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, following the printing of the speech itself, there be printed a brief article by Roscoe Drummond on the Khruushchev speech.

There being no objection, the speech and article were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

(Worthy—The Department of State has recently obtained from a confidential source a copy of a document which purports to be a version of the speech of First Party Secretary N. S. Krushchev of the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on February 25, 1956. This session was limited in attendance to the delegates from the U.S.S.R. The document is being released in response to many inquiries. This version is understood to have been prepared in advance of the speech leadership of a Communist party outside of the U.S.S.R. The Department of State does not vouch for the authenticity of the document, and I hereby releasing it, intends that the document speak for itself.)

Comrades, in the report of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union, the 20th Congress, in a number of speeches by delegates to the Congress, as also formerly during the plenary CC/CPSU sessions, quite a lot has been said about the cult of the individual and about its harmful consequences.

After Stalin's death, the Central Committee of the party began to implement a policy of explaining completely and consistently that it is impermissible and foreign to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, to transform him into a superman possessing supernatural characteristics akin to those of a god. Such a man supposedly knows everything, can do anything, is infallible in his behavior. Such a belief about a man, and specifically about Stalin, was cultivated among us for many years.

The objective of the present report is not a thorough evaluation of Stalin's life and work; nor an entirely sufficient number of books, pamphlets and studies had already been written in his lifetime. The role of Stalin in the preparation and completion of the revolution, in the civil war, and in the fight for the construction of socialism in our country is unassailable. But a letter to a German political worker, Wilhelm Bloess, Marx stated: "From my antipathy to any cult of the individual, I never made public during the existence of the International the numerous addresses from various countries which recognized my merits and which annoyed me. I merely had to resolutely, sometimes to rebuke their authors. Engels and I first joined the secret society of Communists, and the constant making for superstitious worship of authority would be deleted from its statute. Lessalle subsequently did quite the opposite."

Sometimes later, Engels wrote: "Both Marx and I have always been against any public manifestation with regard to individuals, with the exception of cases when it had an important purpose; and we most strongly opposed such manifestations which during our lifetime concerned us personally."

The great mystique of the revolution, Vladimir Illich Lenin, is known. Lenin had always stressed the role of the people as the creator of history, the directing power of the national party as a living and creative organism, and also the role of the central committees.

Marxism does not negate the role of the leaders of the workers' class in directing the revolutionary liberation movement. While stressing great importance to the role of the leadership of the masses, Lenin at the same time mercilessly stigmatized every manifestation of the cult of the individual. Lenin recognized and foreign-to-Marxism views about a "hero" and a "crowd" and countered all efforts to oppose a "hero" to the masses and to the people.

Lenin taught that the party's strength depends on its indissoluble unity with the masses, on the fact that behind the party there follow the people—workers, peasants and
Nadesda Konstantinovna wrote this letter on October 19, 1923. In March 1928, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin sent Stalin the following letter:

3. The Letter of V. I. Lenin To Comrade Stalin

(Copies for: Kamenev and Zinoviev.)

DEAR COMRADE STALIN: You permitted yourself a rude summons of my wife to the duma and a deplorable presentation of relations between us. (Commotion in the hall.)

Sincerely,

LENIN.

MARCH 5, 1928.

Comrades, I will not comment on these documents. They speak eloquently for themselves. Since Stalin could behave in this manner in life, could thus behave toward Nadesda Konstantinovna Krupskaya, whom the party knows well and values highly as a loyal friend of Lenin and who was one of the driving forces of the party since its creation—we can easily imagine how Stalin treated other people. These negative characteristics of Stalin developed steadily and during the last years acquired an absolutely insurmountable character.

As later events have proven, Lenin's anxiety was justified; in the first period after Stalin still paid attention to his (i.e., Lenin's) advice and did not disregard the serious admonitions of Vladimir Ilyich.

We have to consider seriously and analyse carefully the matter that we may preclude any possibility of a repetition in any form whatever of what took place during the last days of Stalin, who absolutely did not tolerate colleagues among us, and who practiced brutality, not only toward everything which opposed him, but also toward that which seemed to be his acridly despotic character, contrary to his concepts.

Stalin acted not through persuasion, explanation, and patient cooperation with people, but by threatening them and demanding absolute submission to his opinion. Whoever opposed this concept or tried to prove his viewpoint, and the correctness of his principles—was condemned to a life in the leading collective stage or to subsequent moral and physical destruction. This was especially true during the period following the October Revolution, when many prominent party leaders and rank-and-file party workers, honest and dedicated to the new communist idea, fell victim to Stalin's despotic rule.

We must affirm that the party had fought a serious fight against the Trotskyites, rightists, and bourgeois nationalists, and that it disarmed politically all the enemies of Leninism. This ideological conflict was carried on successfully as a result of which the party became strengthened and tempered. Here Stalin played a positive role.

The party led a great political ideological struggle against those in its own ranks who represented a political line hostile to the party and to the cause of socialism. This was a stubborn and difficult fight, but a necessary one, because the political line of both the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc and of the Bukharinian Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc and of the Bukharin-Atamanov group was actually toward the restoration of capitalism, and the struggle of the world bourgeoisie. Let us consider for a moment what would have happened if in 1928-29 the political line of right deviation had prevailed, the political line toward "bourgeois modernisation," or toward the kulak, etc. We would no longer have a powerful, healthy party; we would not have the Kolkhoz, the soviets and kolkhozy, the collective farm, and the country would have been drained and starved in a capitalist encroachment.

It was for this reason that the party led an ideological political fight and explained to all party members the enormous masses the harm and the danger of the anti-Leninist proposals of the Trotskyite opposition. And this great work of explaining the party line bore fruit; both Trotskyites and the rightist opportunists were politically isolated; the soviets supported the Leninist line and the party was able to awaken and organise the working masses to support Leninist party line and to build socialism.

Worth noting is the fact that even during the process of the furious ideological fight against the Trotskyite-Zinovievite, the Bukharinites and others, extreme repressive measures were not used against them. The fight was on ideological grounds. But some years later when socialism in our country
was fundamentally constructed, when the exploiting classes were generally liquidated, when the Soviet society gradually became socially unified, when the social basis for political movements and groups hostile to the party had violently contracted, when the ideological struggle was on the defensive, since defeated politically—then the repression directed against them began.

It was precisely during this period (1925, 1926) that the necessity of mass repression through the government apparatus was born, first against the enemies of Leninism—Trotskyites, who had been politically defeated by the party, and subsequently also against many honest Communists, against those party comrades who had been defeated in the civil war and the first and more difficult years of industrialisation and collectivisation, who actively fought against the Trotskyites for the rights of the Leninist party line.

Stalin originated the concept of the enemy of the people. This term automatically rendered it unnecessary to seek the ideological errors of a man or men engaged in a controversy. It was a convenient, logical error which could be proven; this term made possible the usage of the measure of mass repressions, the mass repressions against all norms of revolutionary legality, against anyone who in any way disagreed with Stalin, and this was the actualisation of the concept of the enemy of the people, actually eliminated the possibility of any kind of ideological fight or the making of one's views known on this or that issue, even those of a practical character. In the main, and in actuality, the only proof of guilt used, against all norms of current legal science, was the utilization of his own word, accused himself, and, as subsequent probing proved, confessions were acquired through physical pressure and threats.

This led to glaring violations of revolutionary legality, and to the fact that many entirely innocent persons, who in the past had defended the party and been through thrones, were later annihilated as enemies of the party and people, and people who had worked with Lenin during his life. Some of these persons had made errors during the struggle but who had not benefited by their work, he corrected them, and he did everything possible to retain them in the ranks of the party; he induced them to follow the party line.

In this connection the delegates to the party congress should familiarize themselves with an unpublished note by V. I. Lenin, received by the central committee's political bureau in October 1920. Outlining the duties of the control commission, Lenin wrote that the control commission must be a real party organ and a proletarian conscience.

“As a special duty of the control commission, especially recommended a deep, individualised relationship with, and sometimes even a type of therapy for, the representatives of the so-called opposition—those who have otherwise been little interested in the cause of failure in their Soviet or party career. An effort should be made to quiet them, to explain the matter to them in a way understandable to them, to avoid the method of issuing orders, a task for which they are psychologically fitted. Advising them to consider the possibility of being formulated by the central committee's organisational bureau, etc.”

Everyone knows how irreconcilably Lenin was against the ideological enemies of Marxism, with those who deviated from the correct party line. At the same time, however, Lenin, as is evident from the given document, could adopt a completely different position, when he demanded the most intimate party contact with people who had shown ideologic stubbornness merely temporary nonconformity with the party line. He was able to turn around the political batting of the party path. Lenin advised that such people should be patiently educated without the application of repression methods. Lenin's wisdom in dealing with people was evident in his work with cadres.

An entirely different relationship with people was required in the struggle for ideological patient work with people; stubborn and painstaking education of them; the ability to induce people to follow him without using any repressive methods. Ideas are to be conveyed to people primarily by ideological influence on them of the whole collective—were entirely foreign to Stalin. He (Stalin) was not a teacher, not a teacher, patient, methodical in provoking and educating; he abandoned the method of ideological struggle for that of administrative violence, mass repressions, ready to spring from the side—increasingly larger scale and more stubbornly through punitive organs, at the same time frequently violating all existing norms of morality and of of that of the party.

Arbitrary behavior by one person encouraged and permitted arbitrariness in others. To thousands of thousands of people of the people of the thousands of people, execution without trial and without normal investigation created conditions of insecurity, fear, and even desperation.

This, of course, did not contribute toward unity of the party ranks and of all strata of working people, but on the contrary brought along from the party of workers who were loyal but inconvenient to Stalin.

Our party has been charged for the implementation of Lenin's plans for the construction of socialism. This was an ideological fight. Had Leninist principles been observed during the work as the Party had done, to principles skillfully combined with a keen and solicitous concern for people, had they not been repelled and wasted but possibly would have not had such a brutal violation of revolutionary legality and many thousands of political victims. Stalin's method of terror. Extraordinary methods would then have been resorted to only against those people who had in fact committed criminal acts against the Soviet system.

Let us recall some historical facts. Lately, after the Great October revolution, two members of the central committee of the Bolshevik Party—Kamenev and Zinoviev—declared themselves against Lenin's policy for a armed uprising. In addition to the other charges they were accused of having set up a commission to stage an uprising, and that the uprising had been organised to take place within the very near future. This was treason against the party and against the revolution. In this connection, V. I. Lenin wrote: “Kamenev and Zinoviev revealed the decision of the central committee, which was not organised for an uprising and that they considered it adventurous. Kamenev and Zinoviev thus disclosed to the public the existence of a commission to stage the uprising, and that the uprising had been organised to take place within the very near future. However, after the Great Socialist October revolution, as is known, Zinoviev and Kamenev, as well as Stalin and Trotsky, put them in positions in which they carried out most responsible party tasks and participated actively in the work of the leading Soviet organs. It is known that Zinoviev and Kamenev committed a number of other serious errors during Lenin's life. In his testament Lenin warned Zinoviev and Kamenev's October episode was one of complete breach. But Lenin did not pose the question of their arrest and certainly not their shooting. Of course, the Trotskyites, Trotskyites. At present, after a sufficiently long historical period, we can speak about the fight with the Trotskyites with complete confidence and with sufficient objectivity. After all, around Trotsky were people whose origin cannot be any other than a bourgeois society. Part of them belonged to the intelligentsia and a certain part were recruited from among the workers. We can name many individuals who served in the Trotskyites. However, these same individuals took an active part in the workers' movement before the revolution, during the Socialistic October revolution itself, and also in the consolidation of the victory of this greatest of revolutions. Many of them broke with Trotskyism and returned to their new positions. Was it necessary to annihilate such people? We are deeply convinced that had Lenin lived such an extreme method would not have been used against such people.

Such are only a few historical facts. But can it be said that Lenin did not decide to use even the most severe means against enemies of the revolution when this was actually necessary? To this yes, Vladimir Ilyich demanded uncompromising dealings with the enemies of the revolution and the most extreme methods were resorted ruthlessly to such methods. You will recall V. I. Lenin's fight with the Socialist revolutionaries organisers of the second attempt to overthrow the Soviet government. Revolutions such as the Bolshevik revolution in 1918 and with others, when Lenin without hesitation used the most extreme methods. V. I. Lenin used such methods, however, only against actual class enemies and not against those who blunder, who err, and whom it was possible to correct through ideological influence, and even retain in the leadership.

Lenin used severe methods only in the most necessary cases, when the exploiting classes were still in existence and were vigorously opposing the revolution, when the struggle for survival was decisively assuming the sharpest forms, even including a civil war.

Let us say that the extreme methods and mass repressions at a time when the revolution was already victorious, when the exploiting classes were already liquidated, and Socialist relations were rooted solidly in all phases of national economy, when our working people, the Soviet masses, had strengthened itself both numerically and ideologically. It is clear that here Stalin showed in a whole series of cases his intolerance of party, his brutality, and his abuse of power. Instead of proving his political correctness and mobilising the masses, he often chose the opposite, he chose the totalitarian methods, not only against actual enemies, but also against individuals who had not committed any crimes against the party and the Soviet state. He used them against his own comrades, not only a demonstration of the brutal force which has once so alarmed V. I. Lenin. Lately, especially after the unmasking of the Trotskyite-Radical Central Committee, Stalin has looked into a series of matters fabricated by this gang. This revealed a very ugly picture of brutal willfulness connected with the interests of his clique. We prove the prove, Stalin, using his unlimited power, allowed himself many abuses, acting in the name of the party, the Central Committee, for the opinion of the committee members or even of the members of the Central Committee's political bureau often he did not inform the central committee concerning very important party and government matters.
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Considering the question of the cult of an individual we must first of all show everyone what harm this caused to the interests of our party.

Vladimir Ilyich Lenin had always stressed the party's role as the highest organ of the Socialist government of workers and peasants; he saw in this the chief precondition for a successful building of socialism. Therefore, the question of the responsibility of the Bolshevik Party, as a ruling party in the Soviet state, Lenin called for the most meticulous observance of all norms, not only in the field of legislation but in the whole field of the principles of collegiality in the direction of the party and the state.

Collegiality of leadership flows from the very nature of the party as the highest organ on the principles of democratic centralism. "This means," said Lenin, "that all party matters are considered by all party members—directly or through representatives—who without any exceptions are subject to the same rules; in addition, all administrative matters, all directorial, all collegial, and holding positions of the party, whose members are elective, they must account for their activities and are recallable."

It is known that Lenin himself offered an example of the most careful observance of these principles. There was no matter so important as his proposal regarding the need for giving the party a new name without asking for advice and approval of the majority of the Central Committee members or of the members of the Central Committee.

In the most difficult period for our party and our country, Lenin considered it necessary regularly to convene congresses, party conferences, and plenary sessions of the Central Committee at which all the most important questions were discussed and where resolutions were voted out by the collective of leaders, were approved.

We can recall, for example, the year 1918 when the country was threatened by the attack of the enemy. In this situation the seventh party congress was convened in order to discuss a vital important matter which could not be postponed—the question of the war. Making no mistakes, the war was raging, the eighth party congress convened, which adopted a new party program, which was designed to cover very important matters as the relationship with the organization of the Red Army, the leading role of the party in the work of the Soviets, the construction of the party, and other matters. In 1920 the ninth party congress was convened which laid down guiding principles pertaining to the party's work in the sphere of the construction. In 1921 the tenth party congress accepted Lenin's new economic policy and the historical resolution called about party unity.

During Lenin's life party congresses were convened regularly; always when a radical turn in the country took place Lenin considered it absolutely necessary that the party discuss at length all the basic matters pertaining to internal and external issues bearing on the development of party and government.

It is very characteristic that Lenin addressed to the party congress as the highest party organ his last articles, letters, and remarks. During the period between congresses the central committee, as the most authoritative leading collectivity, meticulously observed the principles of the party and carried out its policy.

So something very important.

Were our party's holy Leninist principles observed after the death of Vladimir Ilyich? What we have been doing during the first few years after Lenin's death. The tenth central committee plenums took place more or less regularly; later, when Stalin began increasingly to abuse his power, these principles were brutally violated. This was especially evident during the last 15 years of his life. Stalin hated the congresses. We had an experience so many important events! These events demanded categorically that the party should have passed resolutions pertaining to the course of the war, the work of the party, to peaceconstruction after the war. Even after the end of the war a congress was not convened for over 7 years. Congresses became hardly ever called. It should be sufficient to mention that during all these years of the patriotic war not a single central committee plenum was held. Such an attitude by Stalin was an attempt to call a central committee plenum in October 1941, when central committee members from the whole country were called to Moscow. They waited 2 days for the opening of the plenum, but in vain. Stalin did not even want to meet and to talk to the central committee. Stalin was demoralized Stalin was in the first months of the war and how haughtily and disdainfully he treated the central committee members.

In practice Stalin ignored the norms of party life and tramped on the Leninist principles. The central committee created a new system of control over the central committee presidents; it was charged with investigating what made possible the mass repressions against the majority of the central committee members and candidates elected at the 17th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks).

The commission was armed with a large quantity of materials in the NKVD archives and with other documents and has established many facts pertaining to the fabrication of cases against Communists to false accusations, to glaring abuses of Socialist legality, which resulted in the death of innocent people. It became apparent that even the most insignificant acts were criminalized; any act, most petty acts, that were branded in 1937-38 as enemies, were actually never enemies, spies, wreckers, counterrevolutionaries. Communist they were only so stigmatized, and often no longer able to bear barbaric tortures, they charged themselves (at the order of the investigating bodies) with all kinds of grave and unlikely crimes. The commission has presented to the central committee plenary lengthy and documented materials pertaining to mass repressions against the delegates to the 17th party congress and against members of the central committee and the Central Executive Committee who have been studied by the plenum of the central committee.

It was determined that of the 139 members of the central committee who were elected at the 17th congress, 98 persons, that is, 70 percent, were arrested and shot (mostly in 1937-38).

Indictments have been prepared.

What was the composition of the delegations to the 17th congress? It is known that 80 percent of the voting participants of the 17th congress were workers, 9 percent of the participants during the years of conspiracy before the revolution and during the civil war; this means that at least 80 percent of the basic mass of the delegates to the congress were workers (90 percent of the voting members).

For this reason, it was inescapable that a congress so composed would have elected a central committee a majority of whom would prove to be enemies of the party. The only reason why 70 percent of central committee members and candidates elected at the 17th congress were enemies of the party and of the people was because honest Communists were slandered, accusations against them were fabricated, and Socialist legality was gravely undetermined.

The same fate met not only the central committee members but also the majority of the delegates to the congress. Of the 1,066 delegates with either voting or advisory rights, 1,105 persons were arrested on Socialist legality charges; i.e., decidedly more than a majority. This very fact shows how absurd, wild, and contrary to commonsense were the charges of counterrevolutionary activity put to the delegates to the congress.

We should recall that the 17th party congress was historically known as the Congress of Victors. Delegates to the congress were active participants in the building of our Socialist state; many of them suffered and fought for party interests during the prerevolutionary years in the conspiracy and the civil war fighting their enemies valiantly and often nervelessly looked into the face of death. How then can we believe that such people could prove a danger to the country and the cause of the enemies of socialism during the era after the political liquidation of Zinovievites, Trotskyites, and rightists and after the accomplishment of Socialist construction?

This was the result of the abuse of power by Stalin who began to use mass terror against the party and the country.

What is the reason that mass repressions against activists increased more and more after the congress? It was because at that time Stalin had so elevated himself above the party and above the nation that he ceased to consider either the central committee or the party. While he still reckoned with the opinion of the collective before the 17th congress, after the complete political liquidation of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite, Zinovievite, when as a result of that fight and Socialist victories the party achieved unity, Stalin then felt a greater degree to consider the members of the central committee and even the members of the Political Bureau. Stalin thought that now he had the right to do everything and that all he needed were statisticians; he treated all others in such a way that they could only listen to and praise him.

A member of the Central Committee of S. M. Kirov, mass repressions and brutal acts of violation of Socialist legality began. On the evening of December 1, 1934, on Stalin's initiative (without the approval of the Political Bureau—which was passed 3 days later, casually) the Secretary of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee, Yenikidze, signed the following decree:

"I. Investigative agencies are directed to speed up the cases of those accused of the preparation or execution of terror.

"II. Judicial organs are directed not to hold up the execution of death sentences pertaining to crimes of this category in order to save them from terror, because the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee, U. S. R., does not consider as possible the receiving of petitions of this kind.

"III. The organs of the Commissariat of Internal Affairs are directed to execute the sentences of death which are passed in the above-mentioned category immediately after the passage of sentences."

This directive became the basis for mass accusations against Socialist legality. During many of the fabricated court cases the accused were charged with "the preparation"
of terrorist acts; this deprived them of any possibility that their cases might be reexamined, even when they stated before the court that their sentences were not justified by force, and when, in a convincing manner, they disproved the accusations against them. It was only when the circumstances surrounding Kirov's murder hid many things which are inexplicable and mysterious and demand a most careful examination, that the theory of some people who first postulated the possibility that the killer of Kirov, Nikolayev, was assisted by someone from among the people whose sentences were pronounced in the name of Kirov. A month and a half before the killing Nikolayev was arrested on the grounds of suspicious behavior, but he was released and not arrested again. It is by no means an unusual suspicious circumstance that when the Chekit assigned to protect Kirov was being brought for an investigation, on December 2, 1924, he was killed in a cogent action in which no other occupants of the car were harmed. After the murder of Kirov, top functionaries of the Lenin government were given very light sentences, but in 1937 they were shot. We can assume that they were shot in order to cover up the role of the organizers of Kirov's killing. [Mentioned in the text.]

Mass repressions grew tremendously from the end of 1936 after a telegram from Stalin and the Politburo to the Central Committee on September 25, 1936, was addressed to the NKVD, Molotov, and other members of the Political Bureau. The content of the telegram was as follows: "We deem it absolutely necessary and urgent that Comrade Yezhov be nominated to the post of People's Commissar for Internal Affairs. Yezhov has definitely proved himself to be incapable of unmasking the Trotskyite-Zinoviev bloc. The OGPU is 4 years behind in its application. This is noted by all party workers and by the representatives of the NKVD." Strictly speaking we should stress that Stalin did not make this request, but the attractive methods of the NKVD workers on the path of mass arrests and executions.

We should state that this formulation was also forced on the February–March plenary sessions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in 1937. The plenary resolution approved it on the basis of the report, "Lesnae" from the harmful activity, diversion, and espionage of the Japanese-German-Trotskyite agents," stating: "The plenum of the central committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) considers that all facts revealed during the investigation into the matter of an anti-Soviet Trotskyite center and its followers in the provinces prove that the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs has fallen behind at least 4 years in the struggle to unmask these most inexcusable enemies of the people."

The mass repressions at this time were made under the slogan of a fight against the Trotskyite-Zinoviev bloc. The Trotskyites at this time actually constitute such a danger to our party and to the Soviet state? We should recall that in 1937, on the eve of the 15th party congress, the NKVD cast for the Trotskyite-Zinoviev opposition, while there were only 72,000 for the party line. A year and a half later, between the 16th party congress and the February–March central committee plenum, Trotskyite-Zinovievism completely disappeared; many former Trotskyites changed their views and worked in the various sectors building socialism. It is clear that in the situation of Socialist victory there was no basis for mass terror in the country.

Stalin took the February–March central committee plenum in 1937. "Defenestration of party work and methods for the liquidation of the Trotskyites and of other elements attempting to retreat from the ideological justification of the mass terror policy under the pretext that we march forward toward the class war must allegedly sharpen. Stalin emphasized that history and Lenin taught him this.

Actually Lenin taught that the application of terror should be resisted by the resistance of the exploiting classes and workers and that this referred to the era when the exploiting classes existed and were powerful. As soon as the workers had become powerful, the means of terror improved, when in January 1920 the Red Army took Rostov and thus won a most important victory. Lenin, Lenin instilled Dzhugashvily to stop mass terror and to abolish the death penalty. Lenin justified this important political move of the Trotskyites of Lenin. Stalin put the party and the report on the session of the All-Union central executive committee on February 2, 1920:

"We were forced to use terror because of the struggle against the Trotskyites of Lenin. When such strong power threw their hordes against us, not avoiding any type of conditions, it would not have lasted 3 days had we not arrested tens of thousands of officers and White Guards in a merciless fashion; this meant the use of terror, but this was forced upon us by the terrorist methods of the Entente."

"But as soon as we attained a decisive victory, even before the end of the war, as soon as we marched up, as soon as we the use of the death penalty and thus proved that we intend to execute our own program in the manner promised. We said that the application of violence flowed out of the decision to smother the exploiters, the big landowners, and the capitalists; as soon as this was done, we gave up the use of all extraordinary methods. We have proved this in practice."

Stalin deviated from these clear and plain words of Lenin. He was forced to use the NKVD up to the use of mass terror when the exploiting classes had been liquidated in our country and when there were no serious reasons for the use of extraordinary mass terror.

This terror was actually directed at the representatives of the USSR and of the Soviet state; against them were made lying, slanderous, and absurd accusations concerning two-facedness, espionage, sabotage, preparation of fictitious plots, and so forth.

At the February–March central committee plenum in 1937, many members actually questioned the rightness of the established course regarding mass repressions under the leadership of Comrade Stalin.

Comrade Postovsky most ably expressed these doubts. He said:

"I have philosophized that the severe terror of my membership who have lost their backbone down or have joined the camp of the enemy; health elements have fought for this. These were the years of industrialization and collectivization. I never thought it possible that after this severe era had passed Karpov and other members who were in the camp of the enemy. (Karpov was a worker in the Ukrainian Central Committee whom I knew personally.) According to the testimony, it appears that Karpov was recruited in 1924 by the Trotskyites. I personally do not believe that in 1924 an honest party member of the Trotskyite faction undertook the unrelenting fight against enemies for the party and for socialism, would now be in the camp of the enemies. I do not believe it."

I cannot imagine how it would be possible to travel with the party during the difficult years and then, in 1934, join the Trotskyites, and then do some odd thing * * * *(Movement in the hall.)

Using Stalin's formulation, namely, that the closer we are to socialism the more difficult it becomes to apply the resolution of the February–March central committee plenum on the basis of Yezhov's report—the provocateurs who had included themselves in the party, together with conscientious careerists began to protect the party's name the mass terror against party cadres, cadres of the Soviet state, and other workers.

It should suffice to say that the number of arrests based on charges of counterrevolution had grown 10 times between 1936 and 1937.

It is known that brutal willfulness was practiced against leading party workers. The party statute, approved at the 17th party congress, was based on Leninist principles expressed at the 10th party congress. It included an order to apply an extreme method such as terror. The party statute against a central committee member, against a central committee candidate, and against a candidate for the All-Union central executive committee, "It is necessary to call a central committee plenum and to invite to the plenum all Central Committee candidate members, and the party control commission;" only if two-thirds of the members of such a general assembly of responsible party leaders find it necessary, only then can a central committee member or candidate be expelled.

The majority of the Central Committee members and candidates elected at the 17th congress and arrested in 1937–38 were expelled from the party illegally through the brutal abuse of the party statute, because such actions were never studied at the Central Committee plenum.

Now when the cases of some of these so-called spies and saboteurs were examined it was found that all their cases were fabricated. Confessions of guilt of many arrested and charged with enemy activity were gained with the help of cruel and inhuman torture. At the same time Stalin, as we have been informed by members of the Political Bureau of that time, did not show them the state materials. Many such accusations, when they retraced their confessions before the military tribunal and asked for an objective study of the party control commission, had many such declarations, and Stalin doubtlessly knew of them.

The central committee considers, it absolutely necessary to inform the degree of many such fabricated cases against the members of the party's central committee elected at the 17th party congress since 1935. (Commotion in the hall.)

Comrade El'ke was arrested on April 29, 1928, on the basis of slanderous materials, without the sanction of the prosecutor of the U. S. S. R., which was finally received 15 months after the arrest. The case was based in a manner which most brutally violated Soviet legality and was accompanied by willful torture. El'ke was forced under torture to sign ahead of time a protocol of his confession prepared by the investigative judges, in which the most eminent party workers were accused of anti-Soviet activity.

On October 1, 1928, El'ke sent his declaration to Stalin in which he categorically
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denied his guilt and asked for an examination of his case. In the declaration he wrote:

"I should like to repeat that I stood in the hall of a government for which I have always fought."

A second declaration of Elkhin has been presented in which he states that he was arrested on 27, 1939; in it he cited facts very convincingly and countered the slanderous accusations made against him, arguing that this provocat-
tory action was carried out by the N K V D and the Secret State Security of the second work of real Trotskyites whose arrests he had sanctioned as First Secretary of the West Siberian Committee. He declared that he had anticipated in order to take revenge on him, and, on the other hand, the result of the base falsification of materials by the investigative judges.

Elkhin wrote in his declaration: "* * * On October 28 of this year I was informed that the investigation in my case has been con-
cluded and I was given access to the mate-
rials of this investigation. Had I been guilty of only one-hundredth of the crimes with which I am charged, I could not have agreed to send you this precession declaration; however, I have not been guilty of even one of the crimes with which I am charged and my heart is clean of every sin and every bana-
ness. I have never in my life told you a word of falsehood and now, finding two feet in the dust, I am also not lying. My whole case is a typical example of provoca-
tion, slander and violation of the elementary be-
avs of revolutionary legality. * * *"

"* * * Those who were made part of my file are not only absurd but con-
tain some slander toward the Central Commit-
tee of the Communist Party of the U S S R (Bolsheviks) and toward the members of Peo-
ples’ Commisars because correct resolutions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Council of People’s Commissars which were not made on my initiative and without my participation are presented as hostile acts of counterrevolutionary tendencies and based on the suggestion * * *

*I am now of the most disgrace-
ful part of my life and to my really grave
guilt against the party and the state. This is my confession of counterrevolutionary action * * * The case is as fol-

low: most of the materials to which I was submitted by Ushakov, Nikolayev—and especially by the first one—who utilized the knowledge that my broken ribs had not been treated was based on slanderous and fabricated materials from western Siberia for which I assumed all responsibility. If some part of the story which Ushakov, Nikolayev and which I signed did not properly hang to-
gether, I was forced to sign another variation. The same technique was used to me, who was at first designated as a member of the reserve net and whose name later was re-
moved. When telling me anything about it; the same technique was used on the last of the reserve net, supposedly created by Bukharin in 1933. At first I wrote my name in, and then the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) about all this in writing. He assures the court that he personally never had any evil designs in regard to the policy of our party because he and I always agreed with the party policy pertaining to all spheres of economic and cultural activity."

This declaration was ignored, despite the fact that Rudzutak was in the time of the chief of the Central Com-
mittee of the Communist Party, a person who was called into being in accordance with the pur-
pose of fighting for party union. In this manner fell the chief of this highly author-
itative party who was a victim of brutal will-
fulness; he was not even called before the Central Committee’s Political Bureau because Stalin did not want to talk to him. Sentence was pronounced on him in 20 minutes and he was shot. [Indication in the hall.]

After careful examination of the case in 1938, it was stated that accusation against Rudzutak was false and that it was an invention based on slanderous materials. Rudzutak has been reconfirmed posthumously.

The way in which the NKVD workers manufactured various fictitious "anti-Soviet centers" and "biotic" with the help of deception methods is seen from the confession of General Bukharin, party member since 1906, who was arrested in 1937 by the Leningrad NKVD. During the period in 1938 of the Kormorov case Rosenblum revealed the following fact: When Rosenblum was arrested in 1938, he was subjected to terrible torture during which he was forced to give false information concerning himself and other persons. He was brought to the office of Zakovskiy, who was in a condition that he make before the Court a false confession fabricated in 1937 by the NKVD concerning " sabotage, espionage and
diversion in a terrorist center in Lening-
grad." [Movement in the hall.] With un-
believable cynicism Zakovskiy told about the role of his creation of fabricated "anti-Soviet plots."

"In order to illustrate it to me," stated Rosenblum, "Zakovskiy gave me several pos-
itive proof of the existence of this center and of its branches. After he detailed the organization to me, Zakovskiy told me that you could prepare the case of this center, remarking that the trial would be public.

Before the court were to be brought 4 or 5 members of the committee—Mirglov, Usarov, Smorodin, Posern, Shaposhnikova (Chudov's wife) and others together with 2 or 3 mem-
bers of the branches of this center. * * *

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has to be built solidly and for this reason witnesses are needed. Social origin (of course, in the past), the standing of the witness will play more than a small role.

"You, yourself," said Zakovskiy, "will not need to invent anything. The NKVD will prepare for you a ready outline for every branch of the center; you will have to study it carefully, and tell the member of the committee all ques-
tions and answers which he might ask.

This case will be ready in 4-5 months, or perhaps a half year. During all this time you will be studying, getting yourself so that you will not compromise the proceedings and yourself. Your future will depend on how the trial goes and on its results. If you begin to act too pro, the result will make you blame your-
self. If you manage to endure it, you will save your head and we will feed and clothe you for the government's cost until your death."

This is the kind of vile things which were then practiced. [Movement in the hall.]

The Kormorov headquarters of the Sverdlov oblast discovered the so-called Ural uprising staff—an agitator, Kolesnikov, rightists, Trotskyites, Socialist Revolutionaries, church leaders, whose chief supposedly was the secretary of the Sverdlov Oblast Party Committee and member of the Secretariat, All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), in 1934. He had been a party member since 1914. The investigative materials of that time show that in Kolesnikov's shock.-Rightists there supposedly existed rightists Trotskyites, espionage-terror and diversionary organizations and centers that the head of one, a role for no known reason—were first secretaries of oblast or republic Communist Party committee, or local committee members. [Movement in the hall.]

Many thousands of honest and innocent Communists have died as a result of this ingenious falsification of such cases, as a result of the fact that all kinds of slander-
ous confessions were accepted, and as a result of the practice of forcing accusations against the whole party, and of the same manner were fabricated the cases against eminent party and state workers—Koossor, Zilber, Fortshev, Kosarev, and others. In these years repression, church leaders, whose chief supposedly was the secretary of the Sverdlov Oblast Party Committee and member of the Secretariat, All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), in 1934. He had been a party member since 1914. The investigative materials of that time show that in Kolesnikov's shock.-Rightists there supposedly existed rightists Trotskyites, espionage-terror and diversionary organizations and centers that the head of one, a role for no known reason—were first secretaries of oblast or republic Communist Party committee, or local committee members. [Movement in the hall.]

The vicious practice was condoned of hav-
ing the NKVD prepare lists of persons whose cases were under the jurisdiction of the political police. These lists were prepared in advance. Yeshenkov had sent these lists to Stalin personally for his ap-

vival. In 1937-83, 283 such lists were made, in addition of thousands of party, Soviet, Kom-

smol, army, and economic workers were sent to Stalin. He approved these lists.

A large part of these lists were being re-
viewed now and a great part of them are
When we look at many of our novels, films, and historical scientific studies, the role of Stalin in the petrific war appears to be entirely improbable. Stalin had foreseen everything. It was the main task of the pre-war strategic plan prepared by Stalin long before, used the tactics of so-called active defense, and this plan, as we know, allowed the Germans to come up to Moscow and Stalingrad. Using such tactics, the Soviet Army, supposedly, thanks only to Stalin's pre-war strategic plan, was able to subdue and destroy the enemy. The epic victory gained through the armed might of the land of the Soviets, through our heroic people, is ascribed in this book to Stalin's personal work. It is a study as being completely due to the strategic genius of Stalin.

It is easy to analyze this matter carefully because it has a tremendous significance, not only from the historical but especially from the political, educational, and practical point of view.

What are the facts of this matter?

Before the war our press and all our political—educational work was characterized by its laboriousness. It did not violate the holy Soviet soil, then for every blow of the enemy we will answer with three blows, and when we see the state of the soil and the enemy, we will win without much harm to ourselves. But these positive statements were not based in all areas on concrete facts which would actually guarantee the immunity of our borders.

During the war and after the war, Stalin put forward the thesis that the tragedy which our nation was forced to suffer was a result of the unexpected attack of the Germans against the Soviet Union. But, comrades, this is completely untrue. As soon as Hitler came to power in Germany he assigned to himself the task of liquidating communism. Theoretically, they say that they did not hide their plans. In order to attain this aggressive end, all sorts of pacts and blocs were created, such as the famous Berlin Pact. Many facts from the prewar period clearly showed that Hitler was going all out to begin a war against the Soviet state and that he had concentrated large armed units, together with armored units, near the Soviet borders.

Documents which have now been published, which have not been published, and which were published by the British Embassy in Berlin. Through Ambassador to the U.S. S. R., Grippo, personally warned Stalin that the latter was going to launch his armed forces against the Soviet Union with the intent of attacking the Soviet Union. It is self-evident that Churchill did not do this at all because of his friendly feeling toward the Soviet nation. He had in his own imperialistic goals—to bring Germany and the U.S. S. R. into a bloody war, in order to strengthen the position of the British Empire. Just the same, Churchill affirmed in his writings that he sought to warn Stalin and call his attention to the fact that Germany planned to attack the Soviet Union. Churchill stressed this repeatedly in his dispatches of April 11 and in the following days. However, Stalin took no heed of these warnings. We must say that no credence was given to information of this sort, in order not to provoke the initiative, of military operations.

We assert that information of this sort concerning the threat of German armed invasion of Soviet territory was coming in via non-military sources; however, because the leadership was conditioned against such information, such data was dispatched with fear and assessed.

Thus, for instance, information sent from Berlin on May 5, 1941, by the Soviet military attaché, stated: "Soviet citizen Boris ** communicated to the deputy naval attaché that according to a statement of a certain German officer from Hitler's headquarters, Germany is preparing
to invade the U.S.R. on May 14 through Finland, the Baltic countries, and Latvia. At the same time Moscow and Leningrad will be heavily raided by paratroopers landed in both cities."

In his report of May 6, 1941, the deputy military attaché in Berlin, Kihnogor, communicated that the actual situation of the German Army is reportedly scheduled for June 15, but it is possible that it may begin in the first days of June or even a few days later. A cable from London, via Moscow to the U.S. State Department dated 16 June 1941 stated: "As of now Cripps is deeply convinced of the ineffectiveness of all military measures to prevent the advance of the U.S.S.R., which will begin not later than the middle of June. According to Cripps, the Germans have presently concentrated 147 divisions (exclusive of the divisional air and service units) along the Soviet borders." Despite these particularly grave warnings, the necessary steps were not taken to prevent the country from suffering this fate and to prevent it from being caught unaware.

Did we have time and the capabilities for such preparations? Yes; we had the time and capabilities. Our industry was already so developed that it was capable of supplying fully the Soviet Army with everything that it needed. But we do not know whether that was due to the fact that although during the war we lost almost half of our industry and important industrial and food-production areas as the result of enemy attacks and destruction, and also because of the destruction of our industries in the Far East, the Caucasus, and other western parts of the country, the Soviet Nation was still able to organise the production of military equipment in the Great Patriotic War. We all know that the war did not last as long as we feared; that we did not have enough artillery, tanks, and planes to throw the enemy back.

Soviet industry and technology produced excellent models of tanks and artillery pieces before the war. But mass production of all this was not organised, and as a result of fact that no careful planning of military production, no carefully planned equipment on only the eve of the war. As a result, at the time of the enemy's invasion of the Soviet land we did not have sufficient quantities of defense equipment, which necessitated the organisation of a new industry to organise their production. The situation with anti-aircraft artillery was especially bad; we did not organise the production of anti-tank ammunition. Many fortified positions had proven to be indefensible as soon as they were attacked, because the old army had been withdrawn and new ones were not yet available there.

The consumption was, not only tanks, artillery and planes. At the outbreak of the war we did not even have sufficient numbers of rifles. The new mobilised manpower, I recall that it was under the command of General Malenkov from Kiev and told him, "People have volunteered for the new army and we must send out arms." Malenkov answered me, "Then you have arms. We are sending all our rifles to Leningrad and you have to arm yourselves." And we did it, but not because we were not afraid. Such was the armament situation.

In this connection we cannot forget, for instance, the following fact. Shortly before the invasion, the city of Riga was taken by the Hitlerite army, Korpogro, who were the first to cross the Iver River. In the city were preparing for an attack and in the very near future would probably start their offensive. In this connection Korpogro proposed that a strong defense be organised, that it be organised in fortified areas and that several strong points be organised there: Antitank ditches, trenches for the soldiers, etc.

We reconciled ourselves to this proposition with the assertion that this would be a provocation, that no preparatory defensive work should be undertaken at the borders, that the German forces were not prepared for the initiation of military action against us. Thus, our borders were insufficiently prepared to repel an enemy attack.

When the Fashist armies had actually invaded Soviet territory and military operations began, Moscow issued the order that the forces along the German borders should be prepared. Why? It was because Stalin, despite evident facts, thought that the war had not yet started, that this was only a provostive action. We reckoned for only a few days. This was immediately, but even this warning was ignored.

As you see, everything was ignored; warns ignored by our army commanders, declarations of deserters from the enemy army, and the open hostility of the enemy. Is this an example of the alertness of the political and military leadership of the state at this particularly significant historical moment? And what were the results of this carelessness, this disregard of clear facts? The result was that the enemy took hundreds of hours in issuing their orders and days the enemy had destroyed in our border regions a large part of our air force, destroyed all of our other military equipment; he annihilated those numbers of our military cadres and disregarded our military leadership; consequently we could not prevent the enemy from marching deep into the country.

Very grievous consequences, especially in reference to the beginning of the war, followed Stalin's refusal to supply many military commanders and political leaders during 1939-41 because of his suspiciousness and through diabolical accusations. During seven years of repression we were unable to appoint against certain parts of military cadres beginning literally at the company and battalion commander level and extending to the highest party or state ranks of this time the cadre of leaders who had gained military experience in Spain and in the Far East who we had already liquidated.

The policy of large-scale repression against the military cadres led also to undermined military discipline, because for several years there were officers, even soldiers in the party and Komsomol we could not trust, who could not match the standards of the state of the time, who were able to disturb the military discipline in the first war period.

And, as you know, we had before the war excellent military cadres which were undermined, which betrayed the fatherland. Suffice it to say that those who managed to survive despite severe repressions and to which they were subjected in the prison were able to continue their life and show themselves real patriots and heroically fought for the glory of the fatherland; X has been a hero in 1941, D. Gotsias (as, you know, had been jailed), Gorbatenko, Mastetov (who is a delegate at the present Congress), Podles (he was an excellent commander who perished at the front), and many, many others. However, many such commanders perished in camps and jails and the army saw them no more.

And this brought about the situation which existed at the beginning of the war and which was the great threat to our fatherland.

It would be incorrect to forget that after the first severe disaster and defeats at the front Stalin thought that this was the end. In his report he said: "All that Lenin created, we have lost forever."

After this Stalin for long time actually did not direct the military operations and ceased to do anything whatever. He returned to active leadership only when some members of the Political Bureau visited him and told him that he had to take certain steps immediately in order to improve the situation at the front.

Therefore, the threatening danger which hung over our fatherland in the first period of the war was largely due to the faulty methods of directing the nation and the party by Stalin and his group.

However, we speak not only about the moment when the war began, which led to serious disorganisation of our army and borders. When the war began, the nervousness and hysteria which Stalin demonstrated, interfering with actual military operations, caused our army serious damage.

Stalin was very far from an understanding of the real situation which was developing at the front. This was natural because due to his inactivity during the war years he did not visit any section of the front or any liberated city except for a short ride on the Moskva-Shkharovsk railway. He did not see the situation at the front. To this incident were dedicated many literary works full of fantasies of all sorts and so many pantings. Simultaneously, Stalin was absolutely uninterested in the military orders which did not take into consideration the real situation as a given section of the front and which could not help but result in huge personal losses.

I will allow myself in this connection to bring out one characteristic fact which illustrates what happened. In the Congress, Marshal Bagrmatian, who was once the chief of operations in the headquarters of the Red Army, who was present, who can corroborate what I will tell you.

When there developed an exceptionally serious situation for our army in 1943 in the Kharkov region, Stalin decided to drop an operation whose objective was to encircle Kharkov, because the real situation at that time could easily turn our army with fatal consequences if this operation was continued.

I communicated this to Stalin, stating that the situation demanded changes in operational plans so that the enemy would be prevented from liquidating a sizable concentration of our forces.

Contrary to common sense, Stalin rejected my suggestion and issued the order to continue the operation aimed at the encirclement of Kharkov, despite the fact that at that time many army concentrations were themselves actually threatened with encirclement.

I telephoned to Vlasovskiy and begged him—

"Alexander Mikhailovich, take a map (Vlasovskiy is patron and show Comrade Stalin the situation which had developed). We should note that Stalin planned operations on a globe. (Animation in the hall.) I called you, but then I decided to take the globe and trace the front line on it. I said to Comrade Vlasovskiy: "Show Him the situation here. We cannot continue the operation that was planned. The old decision must be changed for the good of the cause."
Vasilevsky replied saying that Stalin had already studied this problem and that he, Vasilevsky, would not see Stalin further concerning this matter, because the letter didn't want to go through the current of the letter of a professional to a professor of a professional.

After my talk with Vasilevsky I telephoned to Stalin. But Stalin did not answer the phone and Malenkov was at the receiver. I told Comrade Malenkov that I was calling from the front and that I wanted to speak with Stalin personally. Stalin informed me through Malenkov that I should speak with Malenkov. I stated for the second time that I wished to inform Stalin personally and that I had already asked for an audience at the front. But Stalin did not consider it convenient to raise the phone and informed me through Malenkov that I should talk to him through Malenkov, although he was only a few steps from the telephone.

After listening in this manner to our plan, Stalin said, "Let everything remain as it is."

And what was the result of this? The worst that we had expected. The Germans surrounded our army concentrations and concentrated fresh forces in the direction of our soldiers. This is Stalin's military genius; this is what it costs us. [Movement in the hall.]

One occasion after the war, during a meeting of Stalin with members of the political bureau, Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan mentioned that Krushechov must have been right when he accused Stalin of being a general of the Kharkov operation and that it was unfortunate that his suggestion had not been accepted.

You should have seen Stalin's fury. How could it be admitted that he, Stalin, had not been right. He is after all a genius, and a genius can be made to err only if one can err, but Stalin considered that he never erred, that he was always right. He never acknowledged to anyone that he had made any mistakes, that he could be wrong. This, in fact, that he made not a single mistake in the matter of theory and in his practical activity. After the party congress we shall probably have to reevaluate many wartime military operations and to present them in their true light.

The tactics on which Stalin insisted without question were the conduct of battles operations cost us much blood until we succeeded in stopping the opponent and gaining a victory. Stalin's military knowledge that already by the end of 1941 instead of great operational maneuvers bringing the opponents together behind defensive lines demanded a strict front and the capture of one village after another. Because of this we paid with great losses for our generals. On whose shoulders rested the weight of the war, conducted in changing the situation and shifting to flexible maneuvers. This immediately broadened and seriously changed the front, the favorable for us.

The more shameful was the fact that after our great victory over the enemy which cost us so much blood began to be reduced. Many of the commanders who contributed so much to the victory over the enemy, because of the long-term work and services rendered at the front should be credited to anyone but himself.

Stalin was very much interested in the assurance of his own brothers as a leader. He asked me often for my opinion of Zhukov. I told him then, "I have known Zhukov for a long time; he is a good general and a representative of our army."

After the war Stalin began to tell all kinds of nonsens about Zhukov, among others the following, "You praised Zhukov, but he does not have it. It is said that each operation at the front Zhukov used to behave as follows: He used to take a map, a glass of wine and say, on can begin the attack, or the opposite, the planned operation cannot be carried out." I stated at that time, "Comrade Stalin, I do not know who invented this, but it is not true."

It is possible that Stalin himself invented these things for the purpose of minimizing the role and military talents of Marshal Zhukov.

In connection Stalin very energetically popularized himself as a great leader: in various ways he tried to associate in his mind the victories gained by the Soviet nation during the great patriotic war were due to the courage, heroism and initiative of the German people. However, this is out of the question. Yet, exactly like Ksya Erxhromskii (a famous Cossack who performed heroic feats against the Germans), he put on dress on seven occasions at the same time. [Animation in the hall.]

In the same vein, let us take, for instance, not literary and literary creations. They make us feel sick. Their true objective is the propaganda of the theme of praising Stalin as a military genius. Let us recall the film, The Fall of Berlin. Here only Stalin acts; he issues orders in the hall in which there are many others. The film was apparently shot for him and him only. He tells him and reports something to him—that is Fekseyevsky, his loyal shield bearer. [Laughter in the hall.]

And what is the military command? Where is the political bureau? Where is the government? What are they doing and with what are they engaged? There is nothing. In the film Stalin is the only one who does everything; he does not reckon with anybody; he does not reckon with anyone; he asks no one for advice. Everything is right in the film. Why? Why? In order to surround Stalin with glory, contrary to the facts and contrary to historical truth.

The Cossack sent a message to the czar about the war, asking for support. The czar replied: "The czar is not interested in supporting the Cossack."

The Central Committee of the members, ministries, military and cultural directors of the political party and Soviet organizations, engineers, and technicians, all wrote to him individually and in joint letters on their own names and on their own behalf, work generously gave of his strength and knowledge toward ensuring victory over the enemy.

Interpersonal heroism was shown by our heroes—surrounded by glory is our whole working class, our Kolkhozes, peasant, the Soviet intelligentsia, who under the leadership of party organizations overcomes unyielding hardships and, bearing the hardships of war, devoted all their strength to the cause of the defense of the motherland.

Great and brave deeds during the war were accomplished by our Soviet women who bore the burden of production work in the factories, on the kolkhozes, and in various economic and cultural sectors; women, participated directly in the war. The Soviet youth contributed immensly at the front and at home to the defense of the Soviet fatherland and to the annihilation of the enemy.

Immortal are the services of the Soviet soldiers, of our commanders and political workers. Certainly a part of the army in the early months they did not lose their heads and were able to reorganize during the progress of the war, which they did. Thus, during the progress of the war a strong and heroic army and not only stood off pressure but also smashed it. The magnificence and hero deeds of hundreds of millions of people of the East and West, the solidarity of nations of the world against the threat of Fascist subjugation which loomed before us will live centuries and millennia in the hearts of future generations of men of all nations and all races. [Thunderous applause.]

The main role and the main credit for the victorious ending the war belongs to our great country—the Soviet Union, and to the tens of millions of Soviet people raised by the party. [Thunderous and prolonged applause.]

Some are not happy, some are not satisfied with some other facts. The Soviet Union is justly considered as a model of a multinational state because we respect the equality and friendship of all nations which live in our great fatherland.

All the more monstrous are the acts whose authors are the people there, which are absolutely violations of the basic Leninist principles of the nationality policy of the Soviet state. We refer to the mass deportations from their homes, their exile, their deportation with all Communists and Komsomols without any exception; this deportation action was not forced by any conditions.

Thus, already at the end of 1944, when there occurred a permanent breakthrough at the fronts of the Great Patriotic War, our defenders began to take part in the rear, and executed concerning the deportation of all the Koreans from the lands on which they lived. In the same period, at the end of 1944, the Jews were deported from the territory under the occupation of the Autonomous Kalmyk Republic. In March 1944 all the Chechens and Ingush were also deported from their homeland; the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic was liquidated. In April 1944, all Balkars were deported to faraway places from the territory under the occupation of the Autonomous Kalmyk Republic and the Republic itself was renamed the Autonomous Kabardian Republic.

The Ukrainians avoided meeting this fate, they were not deported, but because they resisted them and there was no place to which to deport them. Otherwise, they would have deported them also. [Laughter and animation in the hall.]

Not only a Marxist-Leninist but also no man of common sense can grasp how it is possible for one to make a mass deportation of people for political and ideological reasons. The repression of children, women, old people, Communists, and Komsomols, and to expose them to misery and suffering for the hostile acts of individual persons or groups of persons.

At the very conclusion of the patriotic war the Soviet nation stressed with pride the magnificent victories gained through great sacrifices and tremendous efforts and the country experienced a period of political enthusiasm. The party came out of the war, the war party cadres were tempered and hardened. Under such conditions nobody could have even thought of the possibility of some plot in the future.

And it was precisely at this time that the so-called Leningrad affair was born. As we know, the so-called Leningrad affair was fabricated. Those who innocently lost their lives included Comrades Vosmennikov, Kuznetsov, Rodionov, Popkov, and others.

The party and Kuznetsov were talented and eminent leaders. Once they stood very close to Stalin. It is sufficient to mention that Stalin made Vosmenkinskiy, Rodionov, Popkov, and Kuznetsov members of the council of ministers, and Kuznetsov was elected secretary of the Central Committee. The affiliation of these leaders with the Soviet state security organs shows the truth which he enjoyed.

And how it happened that these persons were branded as enemies of the people and liquidated?
Parks prove that the Leningrad affair is also the result of willfulness which Stalin exercised against party cadres.

Adopted or rejected in the party's Central Committee and in the central committee political bureau, affairs of this nature would have been examined there in accordance with established norms and facts assessed; as a result such an affair as well as others would not have happened.

We must state that after the war the situation became even more complicated. Stalin became even more capricious, irritable, and brutal. The persecution mania reached unbelievable dimensions. Many workers were becoming enemies. After the war Stalin separated himself from the others and was even more irritable. Everything was decided by him alone without any consideration for anyone else.

This unbelievable suspicion, was clearly taken advantage of by the abject provocateur and traitor Beriya, who had murdered thousands of Communist and loyal Soviet people. The elevation of Vosmesensky and Kuznetsov alarmed Beriya. As we have now proved, Beriya had in fact been instructed by Stalin to fabricate the affair by him and his confidants in material form of declarations and anonymous letters, and in the form of courts.

The party's central committee has examined this so-called Leningrad affair; persons who have been accused, have been rehabilitated and honored in the glorious Leningrad party organization.

Abakumov and others who had fabricated this affair were brought before a court; their trial took place in Leningrad and they received what they deserved.

The question arises: Why is it that we see the total collapse of the domestic situation, why did we not do something earlier, during Stalin's life, in order to prevent the loss of innocent lives? It was because Stalin personally supervised and controlled affairs, and the majority of the Political Bureau members did not, at that time, know all of the circumstances about matters, and could not therefore intervene.

When Stalin received certain materials from Beriya and Abakumov, without examining them, he referred them to the Central Committee for an investigation of the affair of Vosmesensky and Kuznetsov. With this their fate was sealed. The same was true in the case of the Mingrelian national question which supposedly existed in Georgia. As is known, resolutions by the central committee, of course, were made concerning this case in November 1931 and in March 1935. These resolutions were made for discussion with the Political Bureau. Stalin had personally dictated them. They made serious accusations against many loyal Communist nationals.

On the basis of the so-called Mingrelian national question it was proved that there existed in Georgia a supposedly nationalistic organization whose objective was to destroy the Soviet power in that republic with the help of imperialist powers.

In this connection, a number of responsible party and Soviet workers were arrested in Georgia. As was later proved, this was a slander directed against the Georgian party by Beriya and Abakumov.

We know that there have been times manifestations of local bourgeois nationalism in Georgia as in several other republics. The accusations were fabricated. Could it be possible that in the period during which the so-called national questions referred to above were made, nationalist tendencies grew so much that there was a danger of local bourgeois nationalism in the Union and joining Turkey? [Animation in the hall, laughter.]

This is, of course, nonsense. It is impossible to imagine such assumptions could enter anyone's mind. Everyone knows how

Georgia has developed economically and culturally under Soviet rule.

Industrial production of the Georgian Republic has increased in 27 times greater than it was before the revolution. A number of large new enterprises have arisen in Georgia which did not exist before the revolution: from smelting, oil refining, an armament industry, and others. That is a long story. Liquidation, which, in pre-revolutionary Georgia, included 78 percent of the population, has reduced the liquidation to 10 percent. The liquidation of the industry in their republic with the hard situation of the working masses in Turkey, be joining to join Turkey? In 1926 Georgia produced 9 percent, Russia 5 percent, and Turkey 5 percent. Georgia produces 9 times as much electric energy per person as Turkey. The Kirov collective farm has an area of 1,500 square kilometers, 85 percent of Turkey's total population is illiterate, and of the women, 80 percent are illiterate. Georgia has 18 institutions of higher learning which have more than 26,000 students; this is 8 times more than in Turkey (for each 1,000 inhabitants). The prosperity of the Georgian people has grown tremendously in Georgia under Soviet rule. It is clear that as the economy and culture develop, and as the socialist consciousness becomes widespread, the source from which bourgeois nationalism draws its strength evaporates.

As it developed, there was no nationalistic organization which would have been supported by the people; the accusations were fabricated, and the voices of the innocent people fell victim of willfulness and lawlessness. All of this happened under the leadership of Stalin, the "great son of the Georgian nation," as he calls himself, and Stalin is known to refer to Stalin. [Animation in the hall.]

The willfulness of Stalin showed itself not only in domestic affairs but also in the international relations of the Soviet Union.

The July plenum of the Central Committee adopted in defense of the development of conflict with Yugoslavia. It was a shameful role which Stalin played here. The "Yugoslav affair" contained no problems which could not have been solved through regular party discussions among comrades. There was no significant basis for the development of conflict with Yugoslavia. It was completely possible to have prevented the development of relations with that country. This does not mean, however, that the Yugoslav leaders did not make mistakes which resulted in a break in relations with Yugoslavia. It resulted in a break in relations with Yugoslavia.

I recall the first days when the conflict between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia began to develop. Once, when I came from Klev to Moscow, I was invited to visit Stalin, who, pointing to the copy of a letter I later sent to Tito, asked me, "Have you read this letter?"

Not waiting for my reply he answered, "I will shake my little finger and there will be no war"

We have dearly paid for this "shaking of the little finger." This statement reflected Stalin's mania for greatness, but he acted just like this, killed my little finger and there will be no Kosovo."

"I will shake my little finger once more and Pocshyev and Chubarov will be no more."

This is how the Georgian party leadership treated Beriya and Vosmesensky, Kuznetsov and many others will disappear.

But this did not happen to Tito. Nor the matter of how much or how little Stalin killed not only his little finger but everything which he could shake, Tito did not fall. Why is this? In the case of disagreement with the Yugoslav comrades, Tito had behind him a state and a people who through a severe school of fighting for liberty and independence, a people which gave support to its leaders.

You see to what Stalin's mania for greatness led. He had completely lost consciousness of reality; he demonstrated his suspicion and haughtiness in relation to individuals in the U.S.S.R., but in relation to whole parties and nations.

This is the case of Yugoslavia and we have found a proper solution which is approved by the peoples of the Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia as well as by all progressive people and by all progressive democracies and by all progressive humanity. The liquidation of the abnormal relations with Yugoslavia was done in the interest of the whole internationalism, in the interest of strengthening peace in the whole world.

Thereafter to recall the affair of the doctor plotters. [Animation in the hall.]

Actually there was no affair outside of the declaration of the woman doctor Timashuk, who was arrested. It was then, by some one (after all, she was an unofficial collaborator of the organs of state security) to hear a letter in which she declared that doctors were abetting supposedly improper methods of medical treatment.

Such a letter was sufficient for Stalin to reach the conclusion that there were doctor plotters in the Soviet Union, and he issued orders to arrest a group of eminent Soviet medical specialists. He personally issued orders for the arrest, investigation and the method of interrogation of the arrested persons. He said that the ac- cadeanian Vinogradov should be put in chains, another should be exiled, others arrested at this Congress as a delegate is the former Minister of State Security Comrades Ignatiev. Stalin told him curtly, "If you do not obey my orders, we will shorten you by a head." [Tumult in the hall.]

Stalin personally called the investigative judge, gave him instructions, advised him on which investigative methods should be employed; these methods were simple—but, beat, beat and..."

Shortly after the doctors were arrested we members of the Political Bureau received protocols with the doctors; confessions of guilt were delivered to us. They said they were innocent in this matter, that they did not know about the so-called conspiracy.

The case was so presented that no one could verify the facts on which the investigation was based. There was no possibility of checking these methods; these methods were simple—but, beat, beat and..."

We felt, however, that the case of the arrested doctors was questionable. We knew some of the defendants personally because they had once treated us. When we examined this case after Stalin's death, we found it to be fraudulent from beginning to end.

This ignominious case was brought up by Stalin; he did not, however, have the time in which to bring it to an end (as he considered) and for this reason the doctors were still alive, were rehabilitated; they are working in the same places they were working before; they treat people, not excluding members of the Government; they return to Congress; and they execute their duties honestly, as they did before.

In cooperating with the very dirty and shame- less cases, a very bad role played by the rabid enemy of our party, an agent of a foreign intelligence service—Beriya, who had that capacity. In what way could this provocateur get such a position in the party and in the State, so as to become the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers or a member of the Central Committee Political Bureau? It has now been established that this was the case of a number of people from the government ladder over an unknown number of corpses. Were there any signs that Beriya was an enemy of the party? Yes; there were...
Already in 1927, at a Central Committee plenum, former People’s Commissar of Health Protection Kaminsky said that Beriys worked as an intelligence agent. But the Central Committee plenum had barely concluded when Kaminsky was arrested on a charge of telling lies. Let us again emphasize that Kaminsky’s statements were not the last of Bogdanovich ear; do not remain silent; this lies under your protection; please, help stop the nightmare of interrogations and torture. (I have personally, believe me. Time is money to the truth. I am not an agent, nor was I ever of the Tsarist Chkhur). There was no such organization which Comrade Enegov made at the party’s Central Committee is interesting. (Parenthetically speaking, he was also re- hospitalized for his health in the prison camp.) In this declaration Enegov writes:

"In connection with the proposed rehabilitation of the former Central Committee member, Kartvelishvili-Lavrentiev, I have entrusted the hands of the representative of the committee of state security a detailed deposition. I hope that Beriys, who sits in the disposition of the Kartvelishvili case and concerning the criminal motives by which Beriys was convicted."

In my opinion, it is indispensable to recall an important fact pertaining to this case and to communicate it to the Central Committee, because I did not consider it as proper to include it in the declaration communicated to me.

On October 30, 1931, at the session of the organizational bureau of the Central Committee, All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik), secretary of the trans-Caucasian Kral committee, made a report. All members of the executive of the Kral committee; the district committees, and the representatives of the party at the congresses; the party and the Government. I am an old Bolshevik, free of any stain; I have honestly fought for almost 40 years in the ranks of the party for the good and fame of the nation."

Today, I, a 62-year-old man, am being attacked by the investigative judges with the weapon of pressure. They (the judges) are not capable of becoming aware of their error; of the illegality of the handling of my case, and I am innocent and that there is nothing which can turn a loyal son of the party into an enemy, even right up to the death of Stalin."

"But I have no way out. I cannot divert from myself the hastily approaching new and powerful blows."

His strength, however, has its limits. His health is broken, his strength and my energy are waning, the end is drawing near. To die in a Soviet prison is a vile traitor to the fatherland—what can be more monstrous for an honest man. And how monstrous all these accusations. Bit by bit the pain grips my heart. No. No. This will not happen; this cannot be, I cry. Neither the party, nor the Soviet government, nor the people’s commissar; L. P. Land suggested this cruel irrefutable injustice. I am firmly certain that given a quiet, objective examination, without any false rantings, without any accusation, without any pressure, it would be easy to prove the baselessness of the charges. I believe deeply that truth and justice will prevail."

The old Bolshevik, Comrade Kedrov, was found innocent by the military collegium. But despite this, he was shot at Beria’s order. (Indignation in the hall.)

Beriys also handled cruelly the family of Comrade Ordzhonikidze. Why? Because Ordzhonikidze had tried to prevent Beriys from realizing his shameful plan. Beriys had cleared his way from all that persons who could possibly interfere with him. Ordzhonikidze, a member of the party, whom he told to Stalin. Instead of examining this affair and taking appropriate steps, Stalin allowed the liquidation of Ordzhonikidze. Beriys, a violent enemy himself to such a state that he was forced to shoot himself. (Indignation in the hall.)

Beriys was arrested by the party’s central committee shortly after Stalin’s death. As a result of the particularly detailed legal proceedings, it was established that Beriys committed monstrous crimes and Beriys was shot.

The question arises why Beriys, who had liquidated an important group of party and Soviet workers, was not unmasked during Stalin’s life. He was not unmasked earlier because he had utilised very skillfully his relations with the party authorities. After his arrest, he was charged with high treason, he assisted Stalin in everything and acted with his support.

Comrades, the cult of the individual acquired such monstrous size chiefly because Stalin himself, using all conceivable methods, was no longer the real leader of the state; a person. This is supported by numerous facts. One of the most characteristic examples of Stalin’s self-inflicted and of his lack of self-confidence was the edition of his Short Biography, which was published in 1948."

An expression of the most desperate despair, an example of making a man into a godhead, of transforming him into an infallible sage, “the greatest leader,” “the greatest statesman.” Finally, no other words could be found with which to lift Stalin up to the heavens.

What did Stalin consider essential to write into this book? Did he want to cool the enthusiasm? Is this a repudiation of his Short Biography? No. He marked the very places where he thought that the praise of Stalin was insufficient.

Here are some characteristic Stalin’s activity, added in Stalin’s own hand:

“In this fight against the skepticism and apathy of Trotskyites, Bukharinists, and Kamenevites, I found myself definitely welded together, after Lenin’s death, that leading core of the party that upheld the ideas of the party behind Lenin’s behests, and brought the Soviet people into the broad road of industrializing the country and collectivizing the rural economy. The leader of this core and the guiding force of the party and the state was Comrade Stalin.”

There is no other way, then he adds: “Although he performed his task of leader of the party and the people with consummate skill and enjoyed the unreserved support of the entire Soviet people, Stalin never allowed his work to be marred by the slightest hint of vanity, conceit, or self-adulation.”

Where and when could a leader so praise himself? It is worth noting, a leader of the Marxist-Leninist type? No. Precisely against this did Marx and Engels take such a sharp stand. This always rightly sharply condemned by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin.

In the draft text of his book appeared the following sentence: “Stalin is the Lenin of today. Stalin is the Lenin of today. Stalin is the Lenin of today.” Yehuda said in our party, Stalin is the Lenin of today.” You see how well it is said, not by the nation but by Stalin himself.

It is possible to give many such self-praising appraisals written into the draft text of that book in Stalin’s hand. Especially such statements have a strong praise pertaining to his military genius, to his talent for strategy.

I will cite one more insertion made by Stalin concerning the theme of the Stalinist military genius.

"The advanced Soviet science of war received fuller development,” he writes, “as Comrade Stalin’s hands. Comrade Stalin elaborated the theory of the permanently operating factors that decide the issue of wars, of active defense, as anti-guerilla warfare, offensive, of the cooperation of all services and arms in modern warfare, of..."
the role of vast tank masses and air forces in modern war, and of the artillery as the most formidable of the armed services. At the various mobilization points, the Terrors of the party were found the correct solutions that took account of all the circumstances of the situation. [Movement in the hall.]

Andrei Yegorov Stalin: "Stalin's military mastery was displayed both in defense and offense. Comrade Stalin's genius enabled him to divine the enemy, to destroy him, and to believe in the victor. Our Comrades directed the Soviet armies are brilliant examples of operational military skill."

During the war, Stalin was praised as a strategist. Who did this? Stalin himself, not in his role as a strategist but in the role of an author-editor, one of the main creators of his extraordinary biography. Such, comrades, are the facts. We should rather say shameful facts.

And one additional fact from the same short biography of Stalin. As is known, the Short Course of the History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshlevki), was written by a commission of the party central committee.

This book, parenthetically, was also permeated with the cult of the individual and was worked over by a designated group of authors. This fact is mentioned in the following formulation on the proof copy of the Short Biography of Stalin:

"A commission of the central committee, All-Union Communist Party (Bolshlevki), under the direction of Comrade Stalin and with his most active personal participation, has prepared a Short Course of the History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshlevki)."

But even this phrase did not satisfy Stalin. The same book is mentioned in it in the final version of the "Short Biography of Stalin:"

"In 1938 appeared the book, History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshlevki), Short Course, written by Comrade Stalin and approved by a commission of the central committee, All-Union Communist Party (Bolshlevki)."

Can one add anything more? [Animation in the hall.]

As you see, a surprising metamorphosis changed the work created by a group into a book by the author himself, to an extent not necessary to state now and why this metamorphosis took place.

A pertinent question comes to our mind: If Stalin could do this, he had no doubt to praise the person of Stalin so much and to transform the whole post-October October Socialist Revolution without his own, of our glorious Communist Party solely into an action of "the Stalin genius"!

Did this book properly reflect the efforts of the the October Socialist transformation of the country, in the present day of the Socialist society, in the industrialization and collectivization of the country, and also other major tasks, outlined by Stalin in his famous program of our glorious Communist Party solely into an action of "the Stalin genius"?

Can a Marxist-Leninist thus write about himself, praising his own person to the heavens?

Or let us take the matter of the Stalin prises. [Movement in the hall.]

Not even the Terrors of the party which named Stalin to all is here, if the Terrors of the party praised the person of Stalin, the Stalin prises. [Movement in the hall.] Not even the Terrors of the party which named Stalin to all is here, if the Terrors of the party praised the person of Stalin, the Stalin prises. [Movement in the hall.]

Stalin recognized as the best a text of the national anthem of the Soviet Union which contains not a word about the Com-
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

If we are to consider this matter of Marxism and Leninism, then we have to state unequivocally that the leadership practice of the years during the last years of Stalin's life between the various Soviet workers has not realigned the path of Soviet social development.

Stalin often failed for months to take up specific problems concerning the life of the party and the state whose solution could not be postponed. During Stalin's leadership our peaceful relations were often threatened, because one-man decisions could cause and often did cause great complications.

In the words of a delegate, when we wanted to free ourselves of the ideas of a single person and we could not, the less, of the individual and took several proper steps in the sphere of internal and external policies, they all held hands together, were on the verge of being strangled by their eyes, how the creative activity of the broad masses developed, how favorably all this acted upon the development of economy and of culture. [Applause.]

Some comrades may ask us: Where were the members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee? Where did they not assert themselves against the cult of the individual in time? And why is this being done only now?

First of all we have to consider the facts that the members of the Political Bureau viewed these matters in a different way at different times and that they backed Stalin actively because Stalin was one of the strongest Marxists and his logic, his strength and his will greatly influenced the cadres and mass activity.

It is known that Stalin, after Lenin's death, especially during the first years, actively fought against the enemies of Leninist theory, against the forces who deviated. Beginning with Leninist theory, the party, with its Central Committee at the head, took the road of socialist industrialization of the country, agricultural collectivization, and the cultural revolution. At that time Stalin gained the loyalty of the people, and support, and won.

The party had to fight those who attempted to lead the country away from the correct path, that is to fight Trotskyites, Zinovievites, and their followers and bourgeois nationalists. This fight was insuperable. Later, however, abusing his power and the moral authority of the party leaders, they used terroristic methods against honest Soviet people.

Some comrades have already shown, Stalin thus handled and governed leaders as Kirov, Bukharin, Kollontai, Trotsky, and many others.

The groundless suspicions and charges resulted in the opponent falling victim of the repression. This characterized the fall of Comrade Trotsky.

In one case Stalin expressed his dissatisfaction with Postyshev and asked him, "What are you actually?" and "You are a Bolshevik, Comrade Stal, a Bolshevik."

This assertion was at first considered to show a lack of respect for Stalin; later it was interpreted as a very significant result in Postyshev's annihilation and branding without any reason as a people's enemy.

In the situation which then prevailed I have talked often with Nikolai Aleksandrovich Bukharin; once, when we were two traveling in a car, he said, "It has happened that I have to send my name on your invitation as a friend. And when he sits with Stalin he does not know where he will be." It is clear that such conditions put every member of the Political Bureau in a very difficult situation. And when we also consider that in the last years the Central Committee plenary sessions were not convened, and that the sessions of the Political Bureau occurred only occasionally, from time to time, then we will understand how difficult it is to be a member of the Political Bureau to take a stand against the will of the leadership or another injustice or improper procedure, how great difficulties and shortcomings in the practices of leadership.

As we have already shown, many decisions were taken either by one person or in a discussion without representations. The sad fate of Political Bureau member, Comrade Voznesensky, who fell victim to Stalin's repressions, is known to all. It is a characteristic that Stalin's decision to remove him from the Political Bureau was never discussed but was reached in a devilishly simple way. The same way came the decision concerning the removal of Kuznetsov and Rodionov from their posts.

The importance of the Central Committee's Political Bureau lies in the fact that its work was disorganized by the creation within the Political Bureau of various commissions—the so-called quintets, sextets, septets, and so on. Here is, for instance, a resolution of the Political Bureau of October 3, 1946:

"Stalin's proposal:

"1. The Central Committee's Commission for Foreign Affairs (secret) is to consist of itself in the future, in addition to foreign affairs, also with matters of internal construction and domestic policies.

"2. The Secretariat is to be enlarged to become the Central Committee's Secretariat."

What a terminology of a card player. [Laughter.]

In the fall of 1934, Stalin was the author of the creation within the Political Bureau of this type of commissions—quintets, sextets, septets. The Central Committee was at the principle of collective leadership. The result of this was that some members of the Political Bureau were in this way kept away from party work, reaching the most important State matters.

One of the oldest members of our party, Kil'ment Yefremovich Voroshilov, found himself in an almost impossible situation. For several years he was actually deprived of the right of participation in Political Bureau sessions. Stalin forbade him to attend the Political Bureau and he was not even informed about the documents. When the Political Bureau was in session and Comrade Voroshilov heard about it, he telephoned each time and asked whether he could attend the Political Bureau. Some times Stalin permitted it, but always showed his dissatisfaction. Because of his extreme personal approach and his absurd and ridiculous suspicion that Voroshilov was an English agent. [Laughter in the hall.] It's true—an English agent. A special tapping device was installed in his home to listen to what was said there. [Indignation in the hall.]

A unilateral decision Stalin had also separated one other man from the work of the political bureau—Andrey Andreyevich Andreyev. This was one of the most unbridled decisions.

Let us consider the first Central Committee plenum after the 19th party congress when Stalin, in his talk at the plenum, charged Comrade Molotov and Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan and suggested that these old workers of our party were guilty of some baseless charges. It is known that they were subsequently tried and condemned at the Narkomat for another several months, Comrades Molotov and Mikoyan would probably have not delivered any speeches at this congress.

Stalin evidently had plans to finish off the old members of the political bureau. He feared that some of the old members should be replaced by new ones.

His proposal, after the 19th party congress concerning the selection of 25 persons to the Central Committee plenum, was aimed at
Comrades, we must abolish the cult of the individual declaritively, once and for all. We must draw the proper conclusions concerning both ideological-theoretical and practical work. It is necessary for this purpose:

First, in a Bolshevik manner to condemn and remove the result of the individual as alien to Marxism-Leninism science and to the international working class movement.

Comrades, in order not to repeat errors of the past, the central committees has declared itself against the cult of the individual. We consider that Stalin was excessively extolled. However, in the past Stalin doubtless performed great services to the party, to the workers, and to the international workers' movement.

This question is complicated by the fact that a cult of the individual was not done during Stalin's life under his leadership and with his concurrence; here Stalin was convinced that this was necessary for the defense of the interests of the working classes against the plotting of the enemies, and against the attack of the imperialist camp. He saw this from the position of the interest of the working classes, the laboring people, or the interest of the victory of socialism and communism. We cannot say that this cult was or is a stupid deceit. He considered that this should be taken into account in the interest of the party; of the working masses, in the name of the defense of the revolution's achievements.

Comrades, Lenin had often stressed that modesty is an absolutely integral part of a real Bolshevik. Lenin himself was the living personification of the great interest in the working classes. It cannot be said that we have been following this Leninist example in all respects. It is enough to mention only those towns, factories, and industries where the Kolkhoz was not organized.

In the Soviet institutions and cultural institutions, we have referred to by us with a little—of principle because of the names of those or those governing party or party leaders who were still active and in good health. Many of us participated in the defense of our comrades' names to our towns, rayons, undertakings, and Kolkhozes. We must correct this. [Applause.]

But this should be done calmly and slowly. The central committee is in favor of the last and the respect of the Kolkhoz. Let us consider this museum carefully and simultaneously work. The party's central committee during the last year's demonstration characterized the work of the party's committee by minute observation and hours to the top, of the Leninist principles of party leadership, characterized, above all, by the main principle of collective leadership, which means the participation of the norms of party life described in the statutes of our party, and, finally, characterized by the wide practice of criticism and self-criticism.

Thirdly, to restore completely the Leninist principles of Soviet Socialist democracy, expressed in the constitution of the Soviet Union, to fight wilfulness of individuals as a result of the Marxist-Leninist teaching, and the violation of revolutionary Socialist legality which have accumulated during a long time and are a result of the cult of the individual, the party has to be completely corrected.

Comrades, the 20th Congress of the Communist party manifested, with a new strength the unbreakable unity of our party, its collectives around the central committees, its resolve will to accomplish the great task of building communism. [Tumultuous applause.] And the fact that we present in all their ramifications the basic problems, and, above all, the cult of the individual which is alien to Marxism-Leninism, as well as the problem of liquidating its burdensome consequences, is an evident need of our political and economic strength of our party. [Prolonged applause.]

We are absolutely certain that our party, armed with the historical resolutions of the 20th Congress, has the necessary evidence along the Leninist path to new successes, to new victories. [Tumultuous, prolonged applause.]

Long live the victorious banner of our party—Leninism. [Tumultuous, prolonged applause ending in ovation. All rise.]

[From the Washington Post and Times Edition. 1932.1.6] KRUSCHEV'S SPEECH (By Bowers Drummond)

UNRESTRICTED PARTIES ARE ENLARGING
More information concerning Nikita Khrushchev's famous 8-hour indictment of Stalin and the "cult of the Individual" before the 20th Congress of the Communist Party is significantly coming to light.

This information, which will certainly be in the news, makes it clear that there were aspects of the anti-Stalin speech which were intended only for loyal Communist ears and which were not intended for ears of the Western government or another who would momentarily lay its hands on the unexpurgated version.

It would be a public service to bring out all the facts so that we can know more about what is going on inside Russia without the no-crossing limits of the Soviet censorship.

Embassy diplomatic sources here are already aware in tolerable detail of the unpublished sections of the anti-Stalin speech and those who have access to this information agree that the full text makes several things abundantly evident than came out 3 months ago.

What emerges with new clarity is:

That, however much Khrushchev berated the "cult of the Individual" Mussolini's version did not at any point in his speech berate repression.

That while the "collective" leadership of the Soviet Union policies resemble the "cult of individual" dictatorship, they did not speak harshly at all of dictatorship.

That Lenin's specifically emphasized—and brought up at the same time—that Lenin himself used the most severe measures against "enemies" of the revolution.

That Stalin's greatest offense was not that he used methods of brutality but that he used them when it wasn't really necessary and that:

When the test of this historic speech becomes available, whether through a satellite or otherwise, there is no doubt that it will show that Khrushchev's art of the Khrushchev for using repression when, as he would put it, it was actually necessary.

Khrushchev's indictment of Stalin centers on the criticism that he is accusing the account with him as well as all others who disagreed with him.

It may be true that the Khrushchev speech has given greater significance than it appeared to have in its first international disclosure. Despite the exhaustive efforts of the Russians to be allowed to appear in Moscow, Belgrade and elsewhere, it is clear that the Kremlin has scored a great victory by acting by acting violating revolutionary Socialist legality which have accumulated during a long time and are a result of the cult of the individual has to be completely corrected.

We cannot, however, consider the question of the cult of the individual, cannot let this matter get out of the party, especially not to the press. It is for this reason that we have here after the congress session. We should know the limits; we should not give ammunition to the enemy. It would be like our dirty linen before their eyes. I think that the delegation to the congress will understand and assess properly all these proposals. [Tumultuous applause.]
What the full Khrushchev tack will make clear is that while the "rude" Stalin has been laid to rest, all the organs of rude coercion are retained in the hands of the Kremlin for use whenever necessary.

CONGRESSIONAL INTENT IN EXTENDING BENEFITS OF SPECIAL SCHOOL-MILK PROGRAM TO CERTAIN CHILD-CARE INSTITUTIONS AND SUMMER CAMPS

Mr. AT OBRO. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the body of the Record a statement relative to the extension of the benefits of the special school-milk program to certain child-care institutions and summer camps. I submit this statement in the hope that it will clear up the purpose of that particular piece of legislation.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the Record.

There appears to be some misunderstanding concerning the intent of the action taken by Congress in extending the benefits of the special school-milk program to certain child-care institutions and summer camps. This extension was authorized in Public Law 465, approved April 2, 1966, which provided for the continuation of the school-milk program through June 30, 1966. The action to include certain child-care centers in this overall program originated with the Senate Agriculture Committee. In an amendment to the bill which had originated in the House, the committee held full consideration to the intent of extending the program to these particular institutions. It was the prevailing desire of the committee to direct this extension of the milk program to summer camps and to certain child-care institutions. The program was designed to provide economical food for children who were least likely to be getting adequate amounts of milk during the summer months when schools are closed. In addition to providing milk to the camps and other child-care institutions, it would be extended to the care and training of the unprivileged children on a public welfare basis. This was done with the belief that such camps and institutions for economically underprivileged children offered the best opportunity for increasing the consumption of surplus milk. It was also the belief that this extension would exclude many fine organizations and summer camps, such as Boy Scout and 4-H camps, which are doing splendid work in providing wholesome milk products for all of our boys and girls. However, in view of the basic purposes of the special school-milk program, it was felt that Federal subsidies to such organizations should not be provided under a program which is essentially a price-support activity.

RETIREEIEMENT OF GEN. ANTHONY C. MCAULIFFE

Mr. MARTIN of Pennsylvania. Mr. President, last Thursday afternoon, May 31, 1966, at historic old Fort Myer, the United States Army honored the retirement of Gen. Anthony C. McAuliffe, retiring commander in chief, United States Army in Europe. The occasion brought to a brilliant conclusion the distinguished military career of a great American soldier, following 38 years of service.

The occasion was the opening of the distinguished Eisenhower Army Center, named for Eisenhower in France, the 101st Airborne Division, the 4th Infantry Division, the 3rd Infantry Division, the 2nd Infantry Division, and the 1st Infantry Division.

In honor of the retirement of this outstanding American and brilliant soldier, a full-page salute was held by the 3rd "Old Guard" Infantry Regiment passed in review. That historic outfit never appeared to better advantage. With flying colors, glistening bayonets, and perfect marching, it was an inspiration to see the remaining groups of troops who have so greatly distinguished themselves in combat in all parts of the world.

America is extremely proud of General McAuliffe and his unswerving loyalty to his country and service. His devotion, courage, and justice may inspire every American to stand up for the ideals of our country.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed as part of my remarks a brief biography of General McAuliffe, and that the text be issued in connection with his retirement.

There being no objection, the biographical and citations were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

BIOGRAPHY

Gen. Anthony C. McAuliffe was born in Washington, D.C., in 1888 and was graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1918, when he was commissioned as second lieutenant of field artillery. After an impressive string of battlefields, in 1919 General McAuliffe's career followed the normal peacetime pattern of a field artillery officer. During the 1920s and 1930s he held routine staff and line assignments in the United States and Hawaii.

From 1939 to 1943, General McAuliffe held important posts at the War Department and with the Services of Supply. In August 1942 he was promoted to brigadier general and became commander of the 101st Airborne Division as artillery commander.

On the night of June 5-6, 1944, General McAuliffe parachuted into France with the 101st Airborne Division. Later, succeeding General Pratt (who was killed on D-Day) as deputy commander of that famous division, General McAuliffe led the troops which captured the junction city of St. Lo.

During the desperate Battle of the Bulge, in December 1944, General McAuliffe was appointed commander of the 101st when the Screaming Eagles made their epic stand at Bastogne.

In January 1945, General McAuliffe was promoted to major general and assumed command of the 101st Infantry Division which broke through the Siegfried Line, raced toward the Rhine and cut the Siegfried Line, and the Brenner Pass and linked up with the American 5th Army troops from Italy.

Subsequent to World War II, General McAuliffe has held some of the Army's most important staff assignments, having served as Assistant Chief of Staff of the Army Chemical Corps, and Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration.

The President of the United States of America, authorized by act of Congress, July 9, 1918, has awarded the Distinguished Service Medal, First Oak Leaf Cluster, to Gen. Anthony C. McAuliffe, United States Army, for exceptionally meritorious service in a distinguished manner.

As commanding general, Seventh Army, and later as commander in chief, United States Army in Europe, he demonstrated the highest degree of professional ability, and in all his positions of command he has been an inspiration to his subordinates, and has been recognized as one of the most outstanding military leaders of our time.

The Army joins in wishing for you, in this vital command. His superb leadership and outstanding professional skill were a source of inspiration to all with whom he