Ostrovsky, Glupost’ ili izmena? – Conclusion

Foreword to this translation. Aleksandr Vladimirovich Ostrovskii (1947-2015), a prolific and, as far as evidence is concerned, a meticulous historian, published Glupost’ ili izmena?Rassledovanie gibeli SSSR – "Stupidity or Betrayal? An Investigation into the Collapse of the USSR" in 2011. In it he studies the reasons for the downfall of the Soviet Union and concludes that it was the result of a deliberate plan – one could say, conspiracy – by Mikhail S. Gorbachev and his right-hand man Aleksandr N. Yakovlev.

The text below is my translation of the conclusion, pages 660 – 670 of the Russian-language original.

I and my Moscow-based colleague Vladimir L’vovich Bobrov have been unable to discover who owns the copyright. The publisher, "Krymskii Most 9D" no longer exists. Attempts to locate Ostrovskii’s widow have been unsuccessful. The publisher of the French translation of the whole work, Les Editions Delga, has no information about the legal rights and cannot put me in touch with the French translator.

I have included the footnote numbers but not the notes themselves, all of which are to Russian-language sources. Those able to read Russian can download Ostrovsky's book from many places on the Internet.

* * * * *

In the case of two of the quotations I have inserted a longer passage in square brackets from the text from which Ostrovskii quotes in order to make the quotation more understandable to the reader. A few brief notes by me are also in square brackets.

 – Grover Furr, July 5, 2025.

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CONCLUSION

The material examined above shows that the disappearance of the Soviet Union from the world map was preceded by: a) the emergence and aggravation of the economic crisis, b) the weakening of the [central[ Soviet government and its gradual loss of control over the events that were taking place, c) the growth of the opposition, including the nationalist movement, the increase in its influence and its gradual seizure of power at the local level, d) the collapse of the previous ideology and the spread of new ideological values.

It is tempting to consider the demise of the USSR as the result of the development of these and other similar processes. However, such an approach to this problem would be acceptable only if the said processes had been spontaneous in nature.

Meanwhile, as already noted, even Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev and his closest associates admit that in 1985 there was no economic crisis in the country. Consequently, the crisis arose and began to acquire a catastrophic character only during the years of perestroika. And although its prerequisites were formed in the previous era, the policy of the reformers did not lead to the suppression of crisis tendencies, but to their stimulation.

These were: 1) the anti-alcohol campaign, which made the first serious breach in the country's budget; 2) the rejection of the monopoly on foreign trade, which in many ways contributed to the emergence of a negative foreign trade balance, which hit the budget even harder and contributed to the growth of the foreign debt; 3) the economic reform of 1987, which stimulated a reduction in production, pushed up inflation and also hit the budget; 4) the creation of cooperatives, which marked the beginning of the privatization of state property and the legalization of criminal capital, opening up the possibility of pumping state funds into the private sector.

The political processes developing in the country had a similar artificial character. The course taken by the party leadership towards decentralization of the economy was accompanied by decentralization of governance -- a sharp weakening of the [central] Soviet and strengthening of the republican bodies. Under those conditions a destabilizing role was played by the self-removal of the CPSU from power, which resulted in the loss of operational control over economic and political processes on a national scale. Moreover, both the first and the second were carried out purposefully by the "architects of perestroika," since the result of the political reform they had conceived was to turn the USSR into a confederation.

Meanwhile, historical experience shows that a confederation as a form of state structure is not only a rare phenomenon, but also a transitional form either to a federation, if independent states are united on a confederative basis, or to a set of independent states, if a federation is transferred to a confederative basis. Consequently, the transformation of the USSR into a confederation represented a camouflaged destruction of the union state.

It might be assumed that the development of the economic crisis and the weakening of the central government resulted in the growth of mass discontent in the country and the consolidation of the opposition which, contrary to the wishes of the "architects of perestroika," further destabilized the situation in the country and made the developing processes uncontrollable.

However, as has been shown, the decisive role in inciting mass discontent, provoking national conflicts, and organizing the opposition both in the center and locally was played by the Central Committee of the CPSU and the KGB of the USSR. Moreover, the beginning of this activity dates back to 1987-1988, i.e. to the time when the economic crisis was just emerging and political reform was only in the planning stage.

This means that the "architects of perestroika" deliberately brought destructive social and political forces to life.

It was precisely in 1987-1988, i.e. the time when political reform was being planned and the country was still on the threshold of economic crisis, that the beginning of the ideological rearmament of society, carried out by the party leadership under the banner of the idea of ​​glasnost, dates back to. It began with criticism of Stalinism and ended with the discrediting of Marxism and Soviet power.

"Glasnost," writes F. M. Burlatsky, "was perhaps the main battering ram that destroyed the communist system." "Ogonyok," "Moskovskie Novosti," and "Literaturnaya Gazeta," and after them new publications and, to a large extent, television, rocked public opinion and directed discontent against the system of power"3800.

Thus, it can be stated that all the factors that led to the death of the USSR were set in motion by the "architects of perestroika."

Moreover, the facts show that the USSR did not collapse, but was dismembered, and in a forced manner and with the grossest violation of the laws that were in effect. This is especially true for the period from August 19 to December 26, 1991, when the seizure of Soviet property and mass media, and the artificial destruction of union state structures began in the republics. In fact, it was a creeping coup d'etat that lasted for four months.

What accounts for these actions by the reformers?

In search of an answer to this question, it should be noted that from the very beginning of perestroika, the Soviet leadership proclaimed the slogan "Europe is our common home" (1985), then the concept of a "common European home" was developed and approved by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (1987), the possibility of a single planetary leadership of the world was recognized (1988), and, finally, the Vienna Convention was signed, proclaiming the supremacy of international law over national law (1989).

In this regard, it seems possible to put forward the following hypothesis. Perestroika was conceived as preparation for the entry of the Soviet country into the world economy and the creation of not only a "common European home," but also a "new world order."

For this, as already noted, it was necessary that a) the USSR renounce its spheres of influence, b) Comecon and the Warsaw Pact be liquidated, c) the economic, political, and spiritual appearance of the Soviet country change, d) the USSR be divided into smaller states.

And indeed, the material that we have examined shows that by the beginning of perestroika, Gorbachev had a general plan for reforms, the goal of which was to liquidate the Soviet Union as a state corporation.

To achieve this goal, it was planned to: privatize state property and restore a multi-structured market economy; remove the CPSU from power and create a multi-party political system; abandon the monopoly of the "Marxist-Leninist" ideology and move to a bourgeois ideology of the Western type; transfer property and power from the center to the republics and transform the USSR into a confederation or commonwealth; embark on the path of disarmament and abandon spheres of influence abroad, primarily in the countries of Eastern Europe.

If we accept this version of events, the policy of Gorbachev and his inner circle acquires a certain meaning. The only question is who could have conceived such a program and did the reformers understand what its realization could lead to?

No, -- asserts Alexander Sergeevich Tsipko: "Gorbachev's team, with rare exceptions, did not realize that in fact, with its policy of glasnost, it was stimulating counterrevolution"3802.

Leaving the words about the "rare exception" on Tsipko’s conscience let us turn to the memoirs of Aleksanr Nikolaevich Yakovlev, who headed the Propaganda Department of the CPSU Central Committee in 1985-1988. Didn't he really understand what he was doing?

Explaining his position on this issue, Yakovlev wrote:

Perhaps Gorbachev and his associates did not understand what consequences the "abdication" of the CPSU from the throne would have for the country?

To answer this question, we should recall how in 1984 Gorbachev spoke out against the transfer of real power from the party to the soviets. He said: "

Consequently, if he realized this, once he had become General Secretary, Gorbachev immediately raised the issue of the need for separation of powers, which he himself later called "abdication from the throne." This means that he consciously took a course towards the destruction of the Soviet system.

Perhaps the "architects of perestroika" did not understand what the outcome of reforming the USSR according to the option they chose would be?

The answer to this question is given by the confessions of Yakovlev, which we have already cited, and that of Eduard Amvrosievich Shevardnadze, that they made in a conversation with the former director of the US National Security Agency, W. Odom. According to Odom, "They knew that the Soviet Union would collapse"3806.

Gorbachev also understood this. Let us recall how in 1987 he dissuaded V.I. Vorotnikov from creating the Communist Party of the RSFSR, arguing that this would be the first step towards the collapse of the USSR, and how in 1989-1990 this same idea was implemented under his leadership.

Perhaps the reformers thought that the collapse of the USSR would open up an opportunity for more successful development for the former Soviet republics? Speaking at a Politburo meeting on July 14, 1989, Gorbachev said:

And here is his, Gorbachev’s, forecast, made in the spring of 1990:

We already know what difficulties Gorbachev saw ahead. Let us recall his speech on October 12, 1987 in Leningrad on the Field of Mars, where he reminded Leningraders of the blockade. On January 9, 1991, if we are to believe F.D. Bobkov, Mikhail Sergeyevich told V.A. Kryuchkov [head of the KGB – GF]: "I feel sorry for the grandchildren"3809. This means that he understood that the perestroika he had begun would not yield beneficial results in either the near or even in the distant future.

Perhaps only the General Secretary had such foresight? No. Here is what Anatolii Sergeevich Chernyaev wrote in his diary on November 15, 1990:

However, it was not a question of turning the USSR into a "civilized country." At the very time when Chernyaev was writing the lines I just quoted, the IMF and other international structures already had a plan for transferring the Soviet economy to market relations, which envisaged de-industrializing the Soviet republics and turning them into a supplier of raw materials, an appendage of the world economy 3811.

It is significant that Yakovlev also saw de-industrialization as one of the main tasks of the reforms that had begun 3812.

Meanwhile, de-industrialization, if we translate this term into more understandable language, means the destruction of the industrial potential and the infrastructure associated with it, i.e. the energy capacities that feed it, the transportation routes that serve it, the system of secondary and higher vocational education that trains specialists for it, the design bureaus and the scientific research institutes that work for it, etc.

The young reformers assessed the tasks of the reforms even more cynically. According to the American journalist Paul Klebnikov,

N. B Bikkenin writes .".. Kozyrev, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs (of Russia -- A.O.), and now a pharmacist in California -- did not hesitate to call his compatriots "cattle"3814.

Vitalii Ivanovich Vorotnikov, a Politburo member, noted later:

Yakovlev admitted this more openly.

And here are his, Yakovlev’s, words from another interview:

As he has admitted:

F.D. Bobkov wrote:

Thus we can confirm that the reformers understood very well what the results of perestroika and its consequences would be, and therefore they deliberately led to the death of the USSR. The only question: is what motivated them.

In this regard, it is no coincidence that a version has appeared that the main headquarters of perestroika was not in Moscow, but in Washington.

This story immediately led to objections in the liberal press. In his book "Death of an Empire" Yegor Timurovich Gaidar noted:

If Gaidar had written this immediately after the "collapse of the Soviet Union," we could accept his words with confidence. However, by 2006, when he shared his memories on this matter, the book "Victory" by former American intelligence officer Peter Schweizer had already been published. This book provides convincing evidence that American intelligence agencies were pursuing a deliberate policy of destroying the USSR 3821.

Therefore, the version about the participation of an external factor in the collapse of the USSR does not require [further] substantiation. The only problem is to obtain a concrete idea about this matter.

The version about connections of the "architects of perestroika" with foreign intelligence services also has a certain plausibility ]lit. has a right to exist]. It is enough to recall the strange story with the "exposure" of Aleksandr Yakovlev. [This refers to the allegation that Yakovlev was a agent of Western intelligence. See the Russian edition, pp. 401 ff.] Also worthy of attention is the speech of the Chairman of the KGB of the USSR Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kryuchkov on June 17, 1991 at a closed meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, in which he directly referred to the existence of "agents of influence" used by the West to make the USSR collapse.

This fact is well known. Less well known is that the KGB chief presented two appendices to his statement.

Speaking at a meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation on February 7, 1992, Sergei Nikolaevich Baburin proposed making these appendices public 3822. This has not been done to this day.

The allegations of the bribery of our leaders also deserves verification. Touching upon this problem, General Leonid Grigor’evich Ivashov writes:

It is also widely believed that, when perestroika began, the reformers tried to convert power into money. A.S. Tsipko fiercely disputes such accusations 3824. However, firstly, he limits the circle of reformers to only four names, and secondly, he puts them all on the same level.

But the reformers were not all united. Gorbachev and N.I. Ryzhkov, A.N. Yakovlev and E.K. Ligachev cannot be put on the same level. The material at our disposal shows that among the "architects" and "foremen" of perestroika there were those who truly wanted to renew the Soviet system, and those who sought to liquidate it.

The first group includes one of the most decent Soviet leaders, N.I. Ryzhkov. That is why he later bitterly admitted:

But among the reformers there were also those who tried to make money on perestroika and about whom one involuntarily recalls a joke. One woman asks another: "How did you give yourself to someone the first time: for love or for money?" And she hears in response: "Of course, for love. You can’t call ten rubles ‘money’."

Our "leaders" were no doubt counting on more than that.

Therefore, one can understand the feeling of resentment with which

Aleksandr Yakovlev left this world:

In his memoirs Yakovlev takes offense at the statements of George Bush and some other American politicians that the USA won the Cold War against the USSR. What caused the former Soviet leader's disagreement? It turns out that the Americans did not "win" – it was the Soviet leaders themselves who surrendered their country3827.

They surrendered it and hoped that the surrender would be counted in their favor [not in the Americans’].

And the Americans not only do not want to cooperate on equal terms, not only did they not pay them for the betrayal as they should have done -- they don’t even let us lick their boots.

But we need to understand them too. There are many who wanted to do just that.

Moreover, despite all their efforts, our party "leaders" have not managed to fully rehabilitate themselves in the eyes of the West. V.K. Bukovsky wrote:

Poor Alexander Nikolaevich! How he tried to please his new masters. But in their eyes he remains the Soviet Goebbels.