

Famine in Ukraine

The central authorities continued to impose unrealistic demands on the agricultural population after the initial collectivization assault in 1929–30 and to blame *kulaks* and incompetent or allegedly subversive Communists for failures in delivering grain quotas. This situation peaked in 1932 when excessive grain targets combined with a poor harvest to reduce sharply the amount of grain available for delivery to the cities. Forced collections again provoked resistance, which prompted further repressive measures on the part of Soviet authorities: any theft of grain or agricultural produce was severely punished. Stalin himself ordered that Communists who showed mercy to the “saboteurs” be singled out for special punishment (Document 183).

Some historians link this famine with a parallel assault on Ukrainian nationalism and on overly independent Ukrainian Communists and, in fact, argue that the famine itself was a deliberate attempt by Stalin to starve the Ukrainian peasantry into subservience, to break the back of Ukrainian nationalism by wiping out the property-owning *kulak* class. They see the excessive quotas and the zeal with which they were collected as part of this policy of genocide, whose goal was to wipe out the Ukrainian nation.

There is no question that the harvest of 1932 was followed by a tragic famine in early 1933 and that Soviet authorities tried to cover up the very existence of the famine. When a representative of the Ukrainian Communist Party asked Stalin for special assistance for victims of the famine, Stalin reprimanded him, saying, “You’ve made up a fable about famine, thinking to frighten us, but it won’t work.” The writer Mikhail Sholokhov also appealed to Stalin to order the end to arbitrary methods of grain collection. Stalin’s reply (Document 177) claimed the peasants themselves were to blame. For decades thereafter, the famine was a forbidden topic among Soviet historians and writers. It was not until 1987 that discussion of the famine began to appear in Soviet publications.

Recent evidence has indicated that part of the cause of the famine was an exceptionally low harvest in 1932, much lower than incorrect Soviet methods of calculation had suggested. The documents included here or published elsewhere do not yet support the claim that the famine was deliberately produced by confiscating the harvest, or that it was directed especially against the peasants of Ukraine. The poor harvest of 1932 and resultant famine were certainly due to the combined effects of the collectivization policy and coercive campaigns of grain procurement beginning in 1928, and thus were one of the consequences of the entire program of forced-draft economic development. In this sense, the famine was “man-made.” As the central grain-growing area of the USSR, Ukraine suffered enormously, with some of the most seriously affected regions located in Ukraine, but the effects of the famine were observed and reported throughout the country.

DOCUMENT 180 *Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee resolution, April 1, 1932, on the eviction of kulaks from the Poles'e region*

Proletarians of All Countries, Unite!

TOP SECRET

CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE UKRAINIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (BOLSHEVIK)
[TSK KP(b)U]

SPECIAL FILE.

No. PB-70/6
April 1, 1932

Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)
[TSK VKP(b)] Official Directive to Comrade Kol'tsov

Extract from Protocol No. 70 of the Central Committee Politburo
session of March 29, 1932

On Poles'e.

1. It must be considered essential to purge the Poles'e region of *kulak* elements, as we have determined the number of families subject to deportation to be 5,000.

2. The deportees are to be utilized to develop quarries for stone, clay, etc., and for this purpose permanent *kulak* settlements are to be established on the left bank of the Dnepr River in regions where quarries are located.

3. It is ordered:

a) organizations which will utilize the labor of the special deportees are to provide fully the food supply, living quarters, and cultural-medical services to the special deportees. In particular, the People's Commissariat for Supply of Ukraine must exercise particular supervision in supplying food and manufactured goods to the special deportees.

b) Administrative Control of the special deportee settlements is to be undertaken by the State Political Directorate [GPU] of the Ukrainian SSR, which will conclude the appropriate agreements with managers.

4. The GPU of the Ukrainian SSR, together with the appropriate People's Commissars, is ordered to develop the policy and instructions which derive from the present resolution.

SECRETARY TSK KP(b)U
S. Kosior

Source: ?

DOCUMENT 181 *Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, November 27, 1932, concerning the harvest and measures to combat sabotage*

Supplement to Politburo minutes No. 92

TO ALL OBLAST' COMMITTEES

{Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee [TSK] of the Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) [KP(b)] of Ukraine, November 27, 1932}

The fifth five-day week in the four main *oblast's* (Dnepropetrovsk, Odessa, Kharkov, Kiev) resulted in a decrease of 574 thousand poods. In the other *oblast's* the level of grain procurement still has not ensured fulfillment of the procurement plan set for the period. Reductions in procurements have been allowed to happen in a number of key *raions* and in these *oblast's*.

Such a steep decline cannot be explained by any objective factors such as rain, etc. The TSK finds the primary cause to be poor organization of procurement in the *oblast's* as well as in the *raions* and villages.

After making a degree of progress during the fourth five-day week, these successes were not reinforced, instead, they rested on their laurels, assuming that an accelerated pace of grain procurement had been accomplished. The result of this complacency was a reduction in procurement for this five-day week, while a level that would have ensured fulfillment of the plan had not yet been achieved. The reduction in procurement during this period indicates that the measures called for in the TSK's decree of November 18 have not yet been implemented. On the contrary, resistance and sabotage organized by *kulak* counterrevolutionary elements and their degenerate party member supporters have not yet been broken, and repressive measures against them have been insufficiently and indecisively applied.

In this connection the TSK orders:

1. Regarding *kolkhozes* that have most persistently sabotaged procurement, allowing concealment and theft of grain while not significantly contributing to procurement, the *kulak* and anti-Soviet elements organizing sabotage must be exposed and isolated, speedily brought to trial, and the sentence of the court together with notice of its execution must be published in the local district press.

2. First to be held to judicial account must be the degenerate supporters of *kulaks*, party members in responsible positions in the *kolkhozes*—accountants, storekeepers, and the like. Their arrest and trial must be publicized immediately. Communists who have abetted deception of the state and organized sabotage of procurement must be dealt with especially severely by the courts and the verdicts and notices of execution of sentences published in the district press.

3. *Oblast'* committees must take these matters directly in hand through the judicial system and the GPU to ensure that in the districts essential organizational steps are taken in accord with the party line to crush *kulak* sabotage of procurement, as well as to win support of the *kolkhoz* members and achieve fulfillment of the plan for grain procurement.

The TSK must be informed immediately of the most critical developments, particularly involving Communists.

4. From the case lists of recently arrested managers and accountants, *oblast'* committee secretaries, together with chiefs of *oblast'* sections of the GPU, must select the most serious cases, bring them to trial promptly with the severest of sentences, and forward them to Kharkov for confirmation. The TSK must be informed as to the execution of this point within five days.

5. In regard to Communists, especially key workers in villages and *raions* expelled for consorting with a class enemy, a list must be compiled and sent via the GPU to Kharkov of those to be exiled as politically danger-

ous elements. In special cases, upon expulsion from the party, responsible Communists will immediately be arrested and brought to trial.

The TSK will send the *oblast'* and *raion* committees a separate directive regarding further measures.

SECRETARY OF THE TSK KP(b)U - S. KOSIOR

True copy

RTSKhIDNI, fond 17, op. 26, d. 55, ll. 21-22.

DOCUMENT 182 *Resolution of the Ukrainian Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, December 6, 1932, on blacklisting villages that maliciously sabotage grain collection*

Addendum to the minutes of Politburo [meeting] No. 93

RESOLUTION OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS [SNK] OF THE UKRAINIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC AND OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY (OF BOLSHEVIKS) OF UKRAINE ON BLACKLISTING VILLAGES THAT MALICIOUSLY SABOTAGE THE COLLECTION OF GRAIN

In view of the shameful collapse of grain collection in certain regions of Ukraine, the SNK and the TSK call upon the *oblast'* executive committees and the *oblast'* [party] committees as well as the *raion* executive committees and the *raion* [party] committees: to break up the sabotage of grain collection, which has been organized by *kulak* and counterrevolutionary elements; to liquidate the resistance of some of the rural Communists, who in fact have become the leaders of the sabotage; to eliminate the passivity and complacency toward the saboteurs, incompatible with being a party member; and to ensure, with maximum speed, full and absolute compliance with the plan for grain collection.

The SNK and the TSK resolve:

To place the following villages on the black list for flagrant disruption of the grain collection plan and for malicious sabotage, organized by *kulak* and counterrevolutionary elements:

1. Verbka village in Pavlograd *raion*, Dnepropetrovsk *oblast'*
2. Gavrilovka village in Mezhev *raion*, Dnepropetrovsk *oblast'*
3. Liuten'ki village in Gadiach *raion*, Kharkov *oblast'*
4. Kammennye Potoki village in Kremenchug *raion*, Kharkov *oblast'*
5. Sviatotroitskoe village in Troitsk *raion*, Odessa *oblast'*
6. Peski village in Bashtan *raion*, Odessa *oblast'*

The following measures should be undertaken with respect to these villages :

1. Immediate cessation of delivery of goods, complete suspension of cooperative and state trade in the villages, and removal of all available goods from cooperative and state stores.
2. Full prohibition of collective farm trade for both collective farms and collective farmers and for private farmers.
3. Cessation of any sort of credit and demand for early repayment of credit and other financial obligations.

4. Investigation and purge of all sorts of foreign and hostile elements from cooperative and state institutions, to be carried out by organs of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate.

5. Investigation and purge of collective farms in these villages, with removal of counterrevolutionary elements and organizers of grain collection disruption.

The SNK and the TSK call upon all collective and private farmers who are honest and dedicated to Soviet rule to organize all their efforts for a merciless struggle against *kulaks* and their accomplices in order to: defeat in their villages the *kulak* sabotage of grain collection; fulfill honestly and conscientiously their grain collection obligations to the Soviet authorities; and strengthen collective farms.

CHAIRMAN OF THE SOVNARKOM OF THE UKRAINIAN
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC - V. CHUBAR'

SECRETARY OF THE TSK KP(b)U - S. KOSIOR

December 6, 1932.

True copy

RTSKhDNI, fond 17, op. 26, d. 55, ll. 71-72.

DOCUMENT 183 *Report of December 7, 1932—with a cover letter by Stalin—regarding sabotage of grain collection in the Ukrainian Orekhovskii raion of the Dnepropetrovsk oblast'*

SECRET

TO ALL MEMBERS AND CANDIDATE MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND CENTRAL CONTROL COMMISSION, TO ALL SECRETARIES OF OBLAST' COMMITTEES, KRAI COMMITTEES, NATIONAL DISTRICT CENTRAL COMMITTEES, TO ALL SECRETARIES OF RAION COMMITTEES AND TO ALL CHAIRMEN OF RAION EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES, TO ALL PARTY MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT OF AGRICULTURE OF THE USSR

Investigatory materials concerning the sabotage of grain collection in Orekhov raion of Ukraine, sent to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) by Comrade Redens, the chairman of the GPU of Ukraine, are being distributed for your information. Since these materials appear to be characteristic for a significant number of raions of the Soviet Union, in my opinion, special note should be given to them. The materials show once again that the organizers of sabotage are, in the majority of cases, "Communists," i.e., people who carry party membership cards in their pockets, but who long ago degenerated and in fact broke away from the party. These are the very deceivers of the party and swindlers who cleverly carry out pro-*kulak* policies under the guise of their "agreement" with the general line of the party.

Here is what Lenin had to say about such swindlers and deceivers:

Workers and peasants, laborers and exploited people! The land, the banks, the factories, the plants have become the property of the entire nation! Take responsibility yourselves to keep track and monitor the production and distribution of goods. This is the only road to the victory of socialism, the guarantee of its victory, the guarantee of victory over all forms of exploitation, over poverty and want! For Russia has enough grain, iron, lumber, wool, cotton, and linen for everyone, provided that labor and goods are properly distributed, that nationwide business-like, practical oversight of distribution is established, that not only in politics but in everyday economic life the enemies of the people are defeated: the wealthy, their spongers, then the swindlers, the parasites, and the hooligans.

No mercy for these enemies of the people, the enemies of socialism, the enemies of working people! War not on life, but to the death against the wealthy and their spongers, the bourgeois intelligentsia. War against the swindlers, the parasites, and the hooligans.

The wealthy and the swindlers—they are two sides of the same coin, the two main categories of parasites nurtured by capitalism, the main enemies of socialism. The entire population must place these enemies under special surveillance. We must deal with them without mercy for the slightest infraction of socialist rules and laws. Any weakness, any vacillation, any sentimentality in this regard would be the greatest crime against socialism.

(Lenin, vol. XXII, p. 164, "How to organize competition").

Since an enemy with a party membership card in his pocket should be punished more severely than an enemy without a card, people like Golovin (former secretary of Orekhov raion committee), Palamarchuk (former chairman of a *raion* executive committee), Lutsenko, Ordcl'ian, Prigoda, and others ought to be arrested immediately and rewarded according to their merits, i.e., give them each from five to ten years of imprisonment.

J. Stalin
Secretary of the Central Committee,
All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)
[TSK VKP(b)]

December 7, 1932
No. P4731

UKRAINIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC
CHAIRMAN
OF THE STATE POLITICAL DIRECTORATE [GPU]

December 3, 1932
No. 1282/SP

City of Kharkov
Telephones: GPU Switchboard

TO THE SECRET DEPARTMENT
OF THE TSK VKP(b)

I am forwarding a copy of the materials of the investigation of the case of resistance to grain requisitions in *Orekhov raion*.

Prigoda, the former chairman of the *Raion* Collective Farm Union, has been arrested in connection with this case.

Redens

TO THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE TSK
OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY (BOLSHEVIK) OF UKRAINE [KP(b)U]
Comrade KOSIOR

In *Orekhov raion* of Dnepropetrovsk *oblast'* the GPU is conducting an investigation of resistance to grain requisitions by the boards of a number of collective farms.

This investigation has revealed that top *raion* officials, in the persons of the secretary of the *Raion* Party Committee Golovin, the chairman of the *Raion* Executive Committee Palamarchuk, the chairman of the *Raion* Collective Farm Union Prigoda, the manager of the *Raion* Land Office Lutsenko, the chairman of the Control

Commission Ordell'ian, and others, have issued instructions to rural party organizations and collective farms directing them not to fulfill the *raion* grain requisition quotas.

For reference purposes I am forwarding a copy of the transcripts of the testimony of the party member Masliuk, the chairman of the *Avangard* Commune, the party member Kostenko, the chairman of the *Svoboda* Commune, the party member Dikii, the manager of the Machine-Tractor Station [MTS], Moroz, the manager of the *raion* office of the Union of Collective Swine Farms, and Budiak, a planner and consultant at the *Raion* Executive Committee.

Although the top *raion* officials were dismissed by the Dnepropetrovsk Regional Committee of the KP(b)U, I deem it necessary, because of the facts which have come to light, to conduct an investigation for the purpose of holding the guilty parties accountable.

Chairman of the GPU
of the Ukrainian SSR
S. Redens

Copy

TRANSCRIPT OF AN INTERROGATION

On November 21, 1932, the following individual, interrogated as a witness, Citizen Masliuk, Gavriil Amvrosievich by name, born 1899, native of the village of Basan', Chubarevskii *raion*, from a family of poor peasants, citizen of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, elementary education, Ukrainian, married, middle-rank political officer in the military, occupation farmer, chairman of the *Avangard* Collective Farm, Novo-Karlovs'kii Rural Soviet, Orekhov *raion*, no record of conviction or arrest, party member since 1925, party card No. 0787758, resident of the *Avangard* Commune, Novo-Karlovs'kii Rural Soviet, Orekhov *raion*, gave the following testimony:

" . . . The *raion* commission assigned the *Avangard* Commune a quota of 10,981 centners in mid-August of this year.

After we received the quota, we called a meeting of the party bureau which decided that, even though the commune's quota was high, we had to meet it.

Several days later the former secretary of the *Raion* Party Committee, Golovin, came to the commune with a copy of the bureau and commune's resolution, called a meeting of the bureau, and raised the issue of the grain requisition quota, after telling us: "You should admit your mistake in saying that the quota was unrealistic, you should accept the quota no matter how high it is, and then you should only meet it 30%. It's for us to say how unrealistic the quota is. Do you really believe that we at the *raion* don't know that the quota is unrealistic? But for the time being, you have to act as if you've accepted it."

At this point the bureau meeting was adjourned.

In my opinion, the secretary of the *Raion* Party Committee gave us these instructions in order to be able to tell the *Oblast'* Party Committee that everyone accepted the quota as it was and that everything is going well in the *raion*.

Some time afterwards Palamarchuk, the chairman of the *Raion* Executive Committee, also visited the commune. I asked him to reduce our quota, and in reply he gave me the following instructions:

" . . . Ship out as much seed grain as you can for the collective farms in Orekhov *raion*, and the amount will be deducted from your cereal quota, and then we'll reduce the commune's cereal quota by the same amount. In other words, the seed grain you ship will be counted twice, once by deducting the grain shipped as seed grain from your quota, and the second time by counting the same grain as cereal."

I refused to carry out these instructions because I thought they were wrong.

In late October this year I was with Kostenko, chairman of the *Svoboda* Commune, in the office of Prigoda, chairman of the *Raion* Collective Farm Union, and we were discussing grain requisitions. I said that the

quota was high and that it would be hard to meet because we had already set stocks aside, and then Prigoda responded by saying the following to Kostenko and me:

"You've got to cover all your bases and set aside a stock of seed grain, an emergency stock, and all the other stocks, because if you don't, we'll put you on trial."

"But as far as the quota goes, you can wait, because Golovin, Palamarchuk, and Lutsenko (the former manager of the *Raion* Land Office) went to the *Oblast'* Executive Committee and asked them to reduce the quota, and they'll probably go along."

These instructions had the effect of making the communes and the cooperatives less enthusiastic about meeting their quotas.

The top *raion* officials were following this policy long before that time. They started with the spring planting and sent one commission after another through the *raion* to determine the yields and varieties to be planted for the purpose of reducing the quota. For some collective farms, such as the *Kolos* Cooperative, they wrote off 160 hectares worth of wheat as lost, even though in reality the cooperative harvested about 300 centners of grain from this land. As a result, the cooperative has met all its quotas in full and has lots of surplus that it doesn't need.

I was bothered by this and brought it up to Palamarchuk, chairman of the *Raion* Executive Committee and the representative of the *Raion* Party Committee, at a plenary session of the rural Soviet, but nothing was ever done about it. They even got the quota reduced, at a time when the *Kolos* cooperative could have easily met its original quota.

When the quota was reduced, I brought it to the attention of Kovalenko, the manager of the *raion* supply office, and asked him not to reduce the cooperative's quota and instead give the reduction to another cooperative which was truly incapable of meeting its quota, but nothing was ever done about it, and the *Kolos* Cooperative was given a 130-centner reduction.

Prigoda was in the army with the chairman of the *Kolos* cooperative. Obviously, this played a major role in determining the grain requisition quotas.

In corroboration of all the above, I could cite the fact that our commune, the *Avangard*, only met its quota by 60% when all of the officials mentioned above were in power, while after these *raion* party and government officials were dismissed, we met our quota 100% in two and a half days and harvested an extra 500 poods to boot.

I've given all the testimony I can. This transcript is a true record of my testimony, in witness thereof I affix my signature.

Masliuk

Interrogators: Kaluzhskii, Gaponov

Copy

TRANSCRIPT OF AN INTERROGATION

On November 22, the following individual, interrogated as a witness, Citizen Dikii, Luka Ilarionovich by name, 42 years of age, a native of the village of Chaikovshchina, Lubensk *uezd*, Poltava *guberniia*, Oritskaia *volost'*, from a family of poor peasants, property consisting of one house, a citizen of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, with an elementary education, Ukrainian, married, exempt from military service, occupation agricultural machinery operator, currently employed as manager of the Machine-Tractor Station [MTS] in the town of Orekhov, no record of conviction, party member since 1928, member of the Soviet Retail Workers' Union, resident of the city of Orekhov, gave the following testimony:

"The following individuals, namely Burkivskii, the manager of the grain procurement office, Prigoda, the

chairman of the *Raion* Collective Farm Union, Lutsenko, the manager of the *raion* land office, and Ordell'ian, the chairman of the Control Commission, traveled around the *raion* as members of a commission (I don't know who appointed it) to determine crop yields and wrote a report of their findings.

I happened to be in the village of Zherebets and, without knowing what was going on, was present at the rural Soviet office when Prigoda himself picked up samples from the fields (spikes of green wheat cut from the fields) and, sitting right there in the rural Soviet office, determined the yields from these samples.

Zhuravskii, an agronomist employed by the *Raion* Collective Farm Union, whom they had taken around the *raion* as the expert, did the least talking of anyone.

Prigoda determined that 100% of the winter wheat crop, the *ornautka* [?] wheat, the barley, and the oats were lost, even though the wheat was still completely green and hadn't even blossomed yet and it would have been absolutely impossible to determine the yield at that time.

A report was written, and two or three days later Prigoda issued a directive ordering that all the winter wheat crop certified as lost was to be mowed for hay.

Nevertheless, only a small part of the crop was mowed, and the rest remained, because most of the collective farmers refused to mow it for hay.

As soon as the *raion* received its annual grain requisition quota, Palamarchuk, the *Raion* Executive Committee chairman, showed up at the *Raion* Collective Farm Union building and huddled with Prigoda in his office. They asked me, a member of the board of the union, manager of an agricultural production department, and a party member, to leave the room.

After talking for two hours, Palamarchuk left and Prigoda called me in along with all the agronomists on the staff and told us:

"Boys, you've got to put together some figures on the yields and a cereal and fodder budget report, because we as the collective farm system have to stand up for the collective farms, and what kind of damn bosses would we be if we didn't stand up for the collective farms?"

Afterwards, Prigoda said the following to me when we were alone:

"Palamarchuk came and told me that it wouldn't be good for him as a member of the commission to talk about how unrealistic the quotas were and that we, as the collective farm system, would have to speak up on behalf of the collective farms and have some sort of cereal and animal feed budget report to back us up, which he's already worked out with Lutsenko, manager of the land office. He already knows about it."

Now we were supposed to put together a report on how much feed we needed for the cattle, the pigs, and the livestock operation which would overstate the number of head of livestock at the livestock departments indicated in the livestock breeding development plan for the *raion*.

The staff of the *Raion* Collective Farm Union spent three days working on the cereal grain and animal feed budget report.

DOCUMENT 184 *Resolution of the Odessa Obkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, December 31, 1932, confirming the expulsion of fifty Party members for sabotaging grain collection and confining them to a labor camp and exiling five hundred families for organizing the sabotage*

Top Secret

SPECIAL FILE

Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine. Odessa *Oblast'* Committee

No. B-22/25-[op].

Central Committee of the All-Union Communist
Party (Bolshevik) [TSK VKP(b)], Central
Committee of the Communist Party
(Bolshevik) of Ukraine [TSK KP(b)U],

December 31, 1932

To Comrades Leplevskii, Konik, Kaptсан.

Excerpt from Minutes No. 22 of a December 29, 1932, meeting of the *Oblast'* Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine [*Obkom KP(b)U*].

In accordance with its decision of December 27, the *Obkom* resolves:

1. To confirm the attached list of 50 party members expelled for sabotaging state grain purchases and plundering grain, and to publish the news of their exile to a concentration camp in the *oblast'* and regional press. (The list is attached).

The decision to expel them from the party is to be published in the name of the *Oblast'* Control Committee [*oblast' K.K.*].

The resolution to exile them and to imprison them in a concentration camp is to be published, with the above list, in the name of the *Oblast'* Executive Committee [*Oblispolkom*], along with the following justification:

"The *Oblispolkom* resolves:

For sabotaging grain collection and plundering state and *kolkhoz* grain, for the direct betrayal of the interests of the party and the working class, the former members of the Odessa *Oblast'* Party Organization listed below are hereby expelled from the *KP(b)U*, and they shall be imprisoned in concentration camps for various terms. . . ."

2. To publish simultaneously in the *oblast'* and *raion* press, in the name of the *Oblispolkom*, a confirmed resolution by the Council of People's Commissars of Ukraine [*SNK USSR*] to exile 500 families from Odessa *Oblast'* for organizing the sabotage and disruption of grain requisitions.

The City Party Committee and the *Raion* Party Committee [*Raiparkom*] are ordered to publish this decision in the *raion* press, along with a list of the heads of those families in that *raion* no later than January 1, 1933.

Comrade Kaptсан is charged with editing the layout of the resolution on this subject and distributing the galleys for final review by Comrades Maiorov, Liubchenko, and Leplevskii.

3. To propose that Comrade Kaptсан dedicate the lead article in *Chernomorskaia Kommuna* to the *Obkom* decision to imprison the 50 expelled party members in a concentration camp and to exile 500 families from Odessa *oblast'*; to publish the lists in separate issues of the newspaper in two lead articles.

Comrades Maiorov, Liubchenko, and Leplevskii are to be apprised of these lead articles.

4. To require the *oblast'* and *raion* press to place the resolution of the *Obkom* on exiling the "50" and the "500" on the front page of the newspaper.

5. To give the Head of the *oblast'* department of the Ukrainian News Agency [*RATAU*] responsibility for timely communication of these resolutions and the lead articles in *Chernomorskaia kommuna* to *raion* newspapers.

LIST

of members and candidate members of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine expelled for sabotaging state grain requisitions and slated for exile.

1. Grushchanskii, A. I.	Pervomaiskii raion
2. Dmitriuk, S. P.	Pervomaiskii raion
3. TSegel'nichenko, A. F.	Pervomaiskii raion
4. Dorosh, M. M.	Pervomaiskii raion
5. Kliment'ev, A. I.	Nikolaevskii raion
6. Dziurin, G. N.	Nikolaevskii raion
7. Rusulov, S. G.	N.-Mirgorodskii raion
8. Prisiazhniuk, E. A.	Frunzevskii raion
9. Mirza-Zmeul, P. I.	Frunzevskii raion
10. Valetarskii, M. A.	Frunzevskii raion
11. Shepel', P. K.	Frunzevskii raion
12. Krivda, G. I.	Frunzevskii raion
13. Popushoi, V. K.	Frunzevskii raion
14. Pokhilo, G. S.	Frunzevskii raion
15. Shepel', P. A.	Blagoevskii raion
16. Gafner, I. I.	Ochakovskii raion
17. Groshev, I. A.	Snegurevskii raion
18. Rudenko, N.	Khersonskii raion
19. Shevchenko, A. E.	Khersonskii raion
20. Kolesnichenko, I.	Liubashevskii raion
21. Lysenko, I. N.	Novo-Ukrain. raion
22. Belokon', I. K.	Novo-Ukrain. raion
23. Efremov, P. P.	N.-Bugs'kii raion
24. Prestinskii, N. T.	Arbuzinskii raion
25. Kolesnichenko, S. T.	Arbuzinskii raion
26. Garbuz, K. A.	Arbuzinskii raion
27. Isakov, K. A.	Arbuzinskii raion
28. Bondar, L. IA.	Arbuzinskii raion
29. Matros, E. I.	Gressulovskii raion
30. Shevchenko, F. R.	Khmelevskoi raion
31. Nedoroda, G. M.	Dobrovelichk. raion
32. Serdiuk, A. S.	Bashtanskii raion
33. Burlachenko, P. I.	N.-Odesskii raion
34. Ivanov, K. T.	Ol'shanskii raion
35. Ivanov, G. T.	Ol'shanskii raion
36. Samoscuk, E. I.	Voznesenskii raion
37. Zasl'skii, L. D.	Voznesenskii raion
38. Merlianov, L. T.	Voznesenskii raion
39. Marchenko, A. P.	Vradievskii raion
40. Kalina, P. IA.	Znamenskii raion
41. Kolesnikov, A. F.	Znamenskii raion
42. Iurchenko, F. T.	Znamenskii raion
43. Braiko, I.	Znamenskii raion
44. Shestokryl, F. G.	Znamenskii raion
45. Polishchuk, N. M.	Zinov'evskii raion
46. Dobrovolskii, I. M.	Zinov'evskii raion
47. Masan, M. N.	Zinov'evskii raion

48. Skirda, S. Z.
49. Ozer'ian, I. S.
50. [Khdelon?], G. [I].

Zinov'evskii raion
Odessa
Odessa

True copy

RTSKhIDNI, fond 17, op. 42, d. 51, ll. 237, 237ob.

DOCUMENT 185 *Excerpt from a speech by S. V. Kosior, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, ca. January 12, 1933, concerning the Ukrainian rural economy*

IV

THE RESULTS OF "THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN IN FOUR YEARS"
IN AGRICULTURE

Now let us turn to the results of "the five-year plan in four years" in agriculture.

The five-year plan in agriculture means the five-year collectivization plan. So on what assumptions did the party proceed with carrying out collectivization?

The party proceeded on the assumption that strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat and building a socialist society would require, in addition to industrialization, a transition from small-scale individual peasant farms to large collective farms equipped with tractors and modern agricultural machinery as the only firm foundation for Soviet power in the countryside.

The party also proceeded on the assumption that without collectivization, it would be impossible to lead our country onto the highway of constructing the economic foundations of socialism and free millions and millions of working peasants from destitution and ignorance.

Lenin said:

"Small farming will never solve the problem of poverty."

(Lenin, 3rd ed., Vol. XXIV, p. 540)

Lenin said that:

"If we continue to rely on small farms, even if they are operated by free citizens on free land, we will inevitably perish."

(Lenin, 3rd ed., Vol. XX, p. 417)

Lenin said:

"Only by means of common, cooperative, and communal labor will we be able to extricate ourselves from the impasse to which the imperialist war led us."

(Lenin, 3rd ed., Vol. XXIV, p. 537)

Lenin said:

"We must move towards common cultivation of large model farms; for otherwise it will be impossible for us to escape the ruin and the outright desperate situation which Russia finds herself in now."

(Lenin, 3rd ed., Vol. XX, p. 418).

On this basis, Lenin arrived at the following basic conclusion:

“Only if we succeed in providing genuine proof of the advantages of social, collective, communal, cooperative cultivation of the land to the peasants and only if we succeed in helping the peasantry by means of communal cooperative farming will the working class, which now holds political power in its hands, be able to provide genuine proof of its soundness to the peasantry and bring the millions and millions of peasants over to the side of the working class once and for all.”

(Lenin, 3rd ed., Vol. XXIV, p. 579–580).

The party has based its agricultural collectivization program and its five-year plan for agriculture on these Leninist principles.

This meant that the goal of the five-year plan for agriculture was to consolidate scattered, small individual peasant farms, bereft of the opportunity to use tractors and modern agricultural machinery, into large collective farms equipped with all the latest implements of modern agriculture and establish model state farms or *sovkhozes* on vacant land.

The goal of the five-year plan for agriculture was to transform the Soviet Union from a backward country of small peasant farms into a major agricultural power organized on the basis of collective labor and designed to produce the maximum possible amount of marketable surplus.

So what has the party accomplished in carrying out the five-year plan in four years in the field of agriculture? Has it succeeded in carrying out this program or has it failed?

Over the last three years the party has succeeded in organizing more than 200,000 collective farms and 5,000 state farms engaged in growing grain and raising livestock and, at the same time, in the last four years has increased the area of land under cultivation by 21 million hectares.

The party has succeeded to the extent that collective farms now include more than 60 percent of all peasant farms and 70 percent of all the land under cultivation by peasants, which means that the original five-year plan target was exceeded by a factor of three.

The party has succeeded to the extent that, instead of the 500 to 600 million poods of marketable surplus grain supplied at the time when individual farming predominated, the party can now procure up to 1,200 to 1,400 million poods of grain every year.

The party has succeeded to the extent that the *kulaks* as a class have been crushed, and, although the process is still incomplete, the working peasants have been liberated from the *kulak* yoke and exploitation, and Soviet power in the countryside is now undergirded by a firm economic foundation—the foundation of collective farming.

The party has succeeded to the extent that the Soviet Union has already been transformed from a country of small peasant farms into the country with the largest-scale agriculture in the world.

Such are the fruits of the “five-year plan in four years” in the area of agriculture.

Now judge for yourselves: after all of these accomplishments, what is the bourgeois press’s babbling about the “collapse” of collectivization and the “failure” of the five-year plan in agriculture worth?

And what about agriculture in the capitalist countries which are now undergoing a brutal agricultural crisis?

Everyone is aware of the official statistics.

The area under cultivation in the major grain-producing countries has decreased 8 to 10 percent. The acreage planted in cotton in the United States has declined 15 percent, acreage planted in sugar beets has decreased 22 to 30 percent in Germany and Czechoslovakia, and flax acreage has declined 25 to 30 percent in Lithuania and Latvia.

According to the American Department of Agriculture, the gross agricultural output of the United States

fell from 11 billion dollars in 1929 to 5 billion dollars in 1932, i.e., by more than 50 percent. The gross output of grain fell from 1,288 billion dollars in 1929 to 391 million dollars in 1932, i.e., by more than 68 percent. With respect to cotton there was also a decline from 1,389 billion dollars in 1929 to 397 million dollars in 1932, or more than 70 percent.

Don't all these figures prove the advantages of the Soviet system of agriculture over the capitalist system? Don't these facts show that collective farms are a more viable form of farming than individual and capitalist farms?

Some people say that collective farms and state farms are not completely profitable, that they swallow up resources, that there's no sense in establishing such farms, and that it would be better to break them up and only keep the most profitable operations. But only people who have no understanding of economics could talk like that. A few years ago, more than half of our textile mills were unprofitable. Some of our comrades were in favor of closing these plants. So what would have happened to us if we'd listened to them? We would have committed a heinous crime against our country and against the working class if we had ravaged our industry just as it was getting on its feet. But what did we do at the time? We waited a little more than a year, and then the entire textile industry became profitable. And what about our auto plant in Gorky? Wasn't it unprofitable at one time? So would you have ordered it shut down? Or what about our steel industry, which was also unprofitable at one time? Should we have shut it down, comrades? If we looked at profitability the way they wanted us to, we should have developed only a few of the most profitable industries, such as the confectionery industry, the flour industry, the perfume industry, the knitwear industry, the toy industry, and so on. Obviously, I'm not opposed to the development of these industries. They should be developed because the general public needs them. But, first of all, they could not be developed without the equipment and fuel supplied by heavy industry. Secondly it would be impossible to base our industrialization on them. And that's the cold hard fact of the matter, comrades.

We cannot look at profitability from a hustler's point of view, from the standpoint of this minute. Profitability must be viewed from the standpoint of the national economy over several years. Only this outlook could be termed truly Leninist and truly Marxist. And we must stick to this point of view not just for industry but to an even greater extent for collective and state farms. Just think about it: over the last three years we have established more than 200,000 collective farms and about 5,000 state farms; i.e., we have created completely new major enterprises which are just as important to agriculture as plants and factories are to industry. Just name a single country which has been able to create not 205,000 major enterprises but, let's say, 25,000 such enterprises, in just three years. You wouldn't be able to, because such a country has never existed. But we have managed to establish 205,000 new enterprises in agriculture. And, as it turns out, there are people in this world who demand that these enterprises start making a profit immediately, and if they don't, then they believe that they should be broken up and disbanded. Isn't it obvious that the laurels of Herostratos** wouldn't give these more than strange individuals any sleep?

In discussing the unprofitability of collective farms and state farms, I have absolutely no intention of saying that all of them are unprofitable. It's not that way at all! Everyone knows that even now there are a large number of highly profitable collective farms and state farms. We have thousands of collective farms and dozens of state farms which are earning a good profit even now. These farms are the pride of the party and Soviet power. Of course, collective farms and state farms aren't exactly alike everywhere you go. There are old farms, new farms, and very young farms. There are weak farms which have not completely gelled as economic entities. They are going through approximately the same phase in their organizational development as our plants and factories did in 1920 and 1921. We understand that the majority of them cannot yet be profitable. But there can be absolutely no doubt that in two or three years they will become profitable, just as our plants and factories did after 1921. Refusing them assistance and support on the grounds that not all of them are profitable at this very minute would mean committing a heinous crime against the working class and the peasantry. Only enemies of the people and counter-revolutionaries could suggest that collective and state farms are unnecessary.

In carrying out the five-year plan for agriculture, the party has carried out collectivization at a rapid

**Herostratos, a tailor in the ancient city of Ephesus, burned a sacred temple in order to win fame.

pace. Was the party right in doing so? Yes, the party was absolutely right, even though we did get carried away a bit. In carrying out the policy of liquidating the *kulaks* as a class and exterminating nests of *kulaks*, the party could not stop halfway but had to take everything to its logical conclusion. [break in the text]

So what sort of situation did we have in Ukraine by the end of the first five-year plan? I must say that, despite the difficulties and mistakes of last year in the area of grain procurement and despite the difficulties that exist now, it seems to me that there is absolutely no doubt that Ukrainian agriculture has grown and gotten much stronger than it was at the beginning of the five-year plan period or the first year. But despite the hesitation of the past year, and the hesitation among individual farmers was even greater, despite all this hesitation, we undoubtedly have very large areas under cultivation, much larger than was the case at the beginning of the period when we had individual farms.

We have greatly expanded and are maintaining our acreage planted in industrial crops. We have substantially increased and are firmly maintaining the winter wheat acreage which constitutes the foundation of grain production in Ukraine. And we have done so despite the very severe weather conditions of the last two years. Obviously, we as Bolsheviks cannot use this as an excuse, but in the past weather conditions have had a very dramatic and severe impact on individual farmers, and if, for example, we had faced this year's weather conditions with most of our farms in individual hands, we would have suffered innumerable disasters. We would not have been able to manage even half of what we did this year with respect to planting without collective farms accounting for 75% of Ukraine's farms. In Ukraine we have collective farms which are already strong, farms which are getting stronger, and farms which are developing, and this allowed us to maintain Ukrainian agriculture at a certain level despite last year's difficult conditions. With respect to the production of marketable surplus by Ukrainian agriculture, we have 50 to 100% more than we did at the beginning of comprehensive collectivization. This is what allowed us to increase grain procurement so substantially in past years, and all the mistakes of the past year, even the problems with the grain procurement drive of this year, cannot for one minute obscure the fact that the strength and performance of agriculture is now much greater and more solid than it was at the beginning of collectivization and the beginning of the five-year plan.

Obviously, we cannot deny that local officials, including us, have committed a great many practical errors, which have led a great many members of the opposition, including individuals who are secretly and openly in the opposition—right-wingers and left-wingers—to attempt to characterize them, either publicly or in private, as the results of an incorrect policy. This is a despicable deception which must be clearly exposed for what it is. If we have had difficulties on the grain procurement front, they can only be the result of shortcomings of our day-to-day leadership in the field, and nothing more. Every time we have reflected on our problems and looked at ourselves carefully and attentively to determine why things have gone wrong, we have been forced to admit time and time again that the party's policy is the correct one, that the Central Committee's instructions have been the right ones, and that the cause of our problems is our failure to absorb them completely and our misunderstanding of and inability to accomplish what the Central Committee has asked of us.

None of this in any way implies that we should retreat, as Zinoviev has suggested, but instead tells us that we should be bolder in attacking our own inability to lead, our own shortcomings, and the individuals who have taken advantage of these shortcomings, namely the *kulaks*, who have managed to slither in through certain cracks in our collective farms.

Of course, running the collective farms is a very difficult job. In Ukraine alone there are more than 25,000. And we must say that Comrade Stalin was absolutely right when he said that we've been afflicted by a kind of dizziness with success. In a large number of areas and a large number of collective farms, our inaction, inertia, and complacency have allowed the *kulaks* and other anti-Soviet elements to start showing themselves in the collective farms, while some collective farms have even fallen under the outright control of the *kulaks*.

All of this suggests that we should go on the offensive and work harder to improve the performance of our party organizations. This is the only conclusion that a real Bolshevik could draw on the basis of the shortcomings in his own work.

Obviously we might run into situations where certain employees simply aren't capable of handling their

jobs and will have to be replaced. In cases where certain party organizations can't handle the job, the Central Committee will help. The party has made incredible strides in the area of collectivization. These accomplishments have made agriculture the area where we have managed to establish a firm socialist foundation that will allow us to develop agriculture even further and raise agricultural productivity to unheard-of heights. We haven't learned how to pull all the levers, but as we do, and the lessons of the past will teach us a great deal, we will be able to genuinely tap all the vast potential of our collective agriculture.

I have already discussed the effort to meet the grain procurement targets. While individual farms once produced 500 to 600 million poods of marketable surplus grain, now the collective farms are providing 1,200 to 1,400 million poods. But is Ukraine producing more or less grain than it did during the period of individual farming or at the beginning of collectivization? I must say that, without a doubt, Ukraine is producing more grain now than it ever did then. But if despite the greater volume of grain, we're having a hard time collecting it, it is the result of a number of other factors. And the most important factor is that in a large number of areas and regions, we have been asleep and allowed hostile elements to infiltrate the collective farms, allowed our party organizations to become clogged with filth, and have allowed counterrevolutionary nationalist elements to become active. These elements have taken advantage of the opportunities presented by our Ukrainian national republic, have infiltrated our agencies, machine and tractor stations, our collective farms, and so forth, and have even managed to plant their own cells in some places.

In order to eliminate this factor, we are now engaged in a fierce assault on these elements to reveal, expose, destroy, and neutralize them.

RTSKhIDNI, fond 17, op. 2, d. 514, v. 1, ll. 10, 11, 65.

DOCUMENT 186 *Decision of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, January 17, 1933, to request permission to deport kulak families from Kharkov oblast'*

Proletarians of All Countries, Unite!

TOP SECRET

COMMUNIST PARTY /BOLSHEVIK/ OF UKRAINE CENTRAL COMMITTEE [TSK KP(b)U]

Special file

No. PB-98/3

To the CENTRAL COMMITTEE of the ALL-UNION
COMMUNIST PARTY/BOLSHEVIK/ Organizational
Instructor Comrade Kol'tsov

January 17, 1933

Excerpt from minutes No. 98 of a meeting of the Central Committee Politburo from
January 3, 1933

Concerning the Intensification of Repression in Kharkov Oblast'

1. Petition the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party to approve:

- a) The deportation to the North of 400 families of malicious elements and *kulaks* from Kharkov *oblast'*.
- b) The deportation to the North of 40 Communists expelled from the party.

SECRETARY OF THE TSK KP(b)U.- [signed] S. KOSIOR

Source: ?

DOCUMENT 187 *Supplement to minutes of the Ukrainian Party Kiev oblast' bureau, February 22, 1933, instructing that the famine be alleviated and that "all who have become completely disabled because of emaciation must be put back on their feet" by March 5*

To be returned

Top Secret

Note no. 82

Supplement to minutes no. 87
of the meeting of the Kiev
Oblast' Bureau of the
Communist Party (Bolsheviks)
of Ukraine

February 22, 1933

SPECIAL FOLDER

On the elimination of food shortages in the collective farms, centers of acute malnutrition, and cases of famine.

I. Approve the measures taken by the Secretariat and the party element of the *OIK* [*Oblast'* Executive Committee].

II. Require all *RPKs* [*Raion* Party Committees] to eliminate rapidly extreme exhaustion among collective and individual farmers resulting from severe malnutrition. By March 5 all cases of swelling must be eliminated and all who have become completely disabled because of emaciation must be put back on their feet.

For this purpose:

1. In 48 hours take all—both children and adults—who are swollen or unable to walk because of malnutrition to facilities specially designated and adapted for this purpose. Make food available to them for as long as it is necessary to rid them of their unhealthy condition. Under no circumstances are they to be allowed to stay at home in such a state.
2. In the villages affected, make the serving of hot breakfasts mandatory in schools, bringing in all the emaciated children of preschool age as well, and set up special food service stations for them.
3. Because of the many cases of acute malnutrition among collective farmers who have earned many labor-days—the result of abuses in the distribution of collective farm products or because of large family size—consider it necessary to use collective farm funds to help such families. The eligibility of these people is determined case by case by the administration of the collective farm.
4. Persons who were in conditions of severe malnutrition and have been made fit to work are to be offered jobs on the collective farms, state farms, and timber industries, providing them with appropriate advance pay.
5. Require the *Raion* Party Committees to make special funds available for the goals outlined.
6. Order the *Raion* Party Committees to submit a report to the *Oblast'* Committee on:
 - a) the number of villages that will receive such relief;
 - b) the number of people in need of relief;
 - c) the existence of resources—drawn from *raion* and the collective farms funds—that will be needed and could be allotted for this purpose from Feb. 25 through Apr. 1.

7. The *Oblast'* Committee categorically insists that all cases of extreme emaciation and swelling be eliminated by March 5.

8. As to the existing cases of squandering collective farm resources—especially in the form of continued public food service in the collective farms, and placing these resources in the hands of so-called permanent collective farm staff—the *Oblast'* Committee warns that expropriation of any collective farm resources not provided for by existing directives and not reported to the *Oblast'* Committee by the *Raion* Committee will be interpreted as actions directed against socialist property and will be punished most severely according to the law.

9. Require the *Raion* Party Committees to use the sale of grain, which was approved by the Kiev *oblast'*, to improve the food situation, developing spontaneous activities and initiatives of collective farms and collective farmers.

10. In view of the continued attempts by our enemies to use these facts against the creation of collective farms, the *Raion* Party Committees are to conduct systematic clarification work bringing to light the real causes of the existing famine (abuses in the collective farms, laziness, decline in labor discipline, etc.).

11. Organize special commissions in the *raions* for direct management of the relief efforts under the chairmanship of the chairman of the *Raion* Executive Committee, consisting of the director of the *Raion* Office of GPU, the Women's Organizations Committee, *Raion* Department of Health, a representative of the *Raion* Committee of the Communist Youth League, and the "Friends of Children" Society.

Secretary of the *Oblast'* Committee of the KP(b)U
[signed] DEMChENKO

37- 60-b-on.[illegible]

Copy 90 [Seal]

RTSRhIDNI, fond 17, op. 42, d. 82, ll. 82, 83.

DOCUMENT 188 ***Plans by the Odessa Oblast' Party Committee, August 7, 1933, for distributing August bread rations according to occupation***

TOP SECRET

The Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine. Odessa *Oblast'* Committee

No. S-29/67-op. TSK VKP(b) [Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)], TSK KP(b)U [Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine]; to Comrades Borisov, Klinovskii, Shul'kin, Klochko, Nizovskii; Pervomaiskii *Raion* Party Committee:

August 7, 1933

SPECIAL FOLDER

Extract from Minutes No. 29 of the August 4, 1933, meeting of the SECRETARIAT of the *Oblast'* Committee of the KP(b)U.

On the plan to supply bread for the month of August.

1. Approve the plan introduced by the *Oblast'* Supplying Agency [*Oblsnab*] to supply bread throughout the *oblast'* in August.

2. Approve supply of the following quotas of bread for the month of August:

for the first list: to workers 800 grams

to white collar workers and dependents 400 "

for the second list: to workers 600 "

to white collar workers and dependents 300 "

to major enterprises:

in Zinov'evsk — *The Red Star*

in Kherson — *im. Petrovskogo*" and *Oboznyi*

to workers 700 gr. per person.

for the third list: to workers 500 grams

to white collar workers 300 "

to dependents of blue and white collar workers . 200 "

3. Approve for the workers of Odessa and Nikolaev an issue of 50% of the bread quota in wheat flour and 50% in rye flour.

Suggest to the *oblast'* grain procurement agency to ensure timely issuing of the indicated assortment of flour.

4. Having thoroughly checked and eliminated all the "dead souls," advise the city and *oblast'* party committees of Odessa, Nikolaev, Kherson, Zinov'evsk, and Pervomaisk to abide strictly by the approved norms and quotas.

Advise *Oblsnab* to establish strict operational control of the actual consumption of bread in accordance with the approved norms, quotas, and plans.

SECRETARY of the OBLAST' COMMITTEE of the KP(b)U
/BRYCHKIN/

Plan for the central supply of Odessa *oblast'* with bread in August 1933

NAME OF CITY	LIST	GROUP	QUOTA	DAILY BREAD NORM	
A) ODESSA	First	Workers	21,587	800	The leading enterprises from the 2nd list in Odessa: IAnv., Dzhut, Lenina, Starost., Krasina, Dzerzhinskii, Iodnyi, and the Electric Power Station will receive the same quotas as those on the 1st list.
		White-collar workers and dependents	24,830	400	
	First: ORS IAnv. z-da i Dzhutov	Workers	7,805	800	
		White-collar workers and dependents	7,068	400	
	Second	Workers	79,267	600	
		White-collar workers and dependents	80,814	300	
	Third	Workers	33,571	500	
		White-collar workers	11,899	300	
		Dependents	40,528	200	
B) NIKOLAEV	First	Workers	6,125	800	
		White-collar workers and dependents	7,840	400	
	Second	Workers	12,591	600	
		White-collar workers and dependents	11,002	300	
	Third	Workers	8,509	500	
		White-collar workers and dependents	588	300	

NAME OF CITY	LIST	GROUP	QUOTA	DAILY BREAD NORM
C) ZINOV'EVSK	First	Workers	941	800
		White-collar workers and dependents	1,521	400
	<i>Red Star</i>	Workers	8,880	700
		White-collar workers and dependents	12,685	300
	Second	Workers	8,372	600
		White-collar workers and dependents	11,320	300

II. In order to supply the cities according to the above indicated contingents and quotas, approve the following plan of flour distribution for the month of August (in tons)

city Odessa	—	2,778.6 tons	
Nikolaev	—	1,125.6 "	(including 498.3 tons for Marti and 142.5 tons for "61" worker supply sections [ORS])
Zinov'evsk	—	487 "	
Kherson	—	494.8 "	
Pervomaisk	—	93.7 "	
Voznesensk	—	15 "	

For the craftsmen and the leading small manufacturing shops of the cities, employing [illegible] workers and having 3,000 dependents, appropriate 45.3 tons, in accordance with the agreement reached with the *oblast'* industrial council. In all, for the individual supply of the cities, 5,040 tons.

III. Plan for the distribution of flour for public food service:

a) Public food service for city enterprises	—	386.2 tons
b) Public food service for ORS	—	88 tons
Including for ORS Marti and "61"	—	63 tons
ORS Dzhutova and IAnv.	—	18 tons

RTSKhIDNI, fond 17, op. 42, d. 83, ll. 41-43.

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edited by Diane P. Koenker and Ronald D. Bachman

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Opposite the title page is a photograph of Stalin's daughter Svetlana seated on Beria's lap, taken in 1930, when Beria enjoyed Stalin's patronage. From the Central Archive of Cinema and Photographic Documents. Sec p. 346. [Cropped.]

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