Pan-Africanist Federalism

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Abstract
Economic development in Africa is constrained in part by
the absence of sufficiently large political units that could
permit the efficient flow of commerce. In this paper, we
review the constraints to broader political integration in
Africa. We find that the traditional nation-state, which
Europeans transplanted to Africa during the colonial era, has
worked poorly if at all in the post-colonial period. Efforts to
transcend traditional political boundaries in the form of
regional groupings and political federations such as
ECOWAS and SADCC also have not worked as well as
many had hoped. In our view, what is missing is a political
mechanism that can establish legitimacy to transnational
African political systems. In our view, Pan- Africanism is
the solution to this problem, and the challenge to Africans is
how to craft successful models for its adoption.
Africa's Particular Need for Integration

William Zartman noted in 1973 that "In a sense, Africa's search for a definition of unity...has been the dominant theme of intra-African relations..."\(^1\) Current global developments reinforce the need to continue this search. One of these relates to the world trend toward economies of scale, clearly exemplified in the European drive toward economic unification in 1992; the push for a North American Common Market linking Canada, the U.S.A. and Mexico;\(^2\) the formation in March 1991 of the Southern Cone Common Market comprising Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay and committed to eliminating all tariffs on trade among the membership by January 1995;\(^3\) the declaration of intent on the part of Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and Dominica to create a single new state in 1992;\(^4\) and the April 1991 call in East Asia for an economic cooperation sphere with China and Japan at its core.\(^5\)

That the search for unity in Africa has so far proved abortive, reflects, to a point, the general historical proposition that "the more parochial nationalist forces have almost always won out over the more broadly 'integrating' supernational forces."\(^6\) But,

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\(^2\) See *The New York Times*, 4-7-91, p.6; 4-14-91, Section 4, p. 9.


\(^6\) Rupert Emerson, "Pan-Africanism," *International Organization*, Vol. XVI, No. 2, Spring 1962, p. 290. As Bernard Lewis notes, in spite of the widespread resort to Pan-Arab appeals, actions run in exactly the opposite direction--"the primacy of state interests, with each individual Arab country pursuing its own concerns and policies, with little regard for the others." Similarly with Spanish America. After the ending of colonial rule, the English-speaking North American colonies were able to band together and form the United States. For their part, the Spanish-speaking South American colonies "failed to do the same. The missed opportunity has not returned, and by now the states of Spanish America, in spite of their common heritage, have become different nations" (Bernard Lewis, "Who'll Win, Who'll Lose in the Gulf," *The Wall Street Journal*, February 20, 1991).
emphatically, this is so only "to a point." The realities in Africa are so extremely harrowing as to dictate a need for integration "more than any other continent..."\(^7\)

What are these dismal realities? For one thing, there is the matter of the extremely small size of African countries. As Hazlewood noted in 1967,

Some indeed, cover a large area, but even in this respect many are extremely small. However, superficial area is not a very significant determinant of economic size; population is more important. Twenty-three of the forty or so countries of Africa have populations of 4 million or less. Some are smaller still, such as Gabon, with 400,000 and Gambia with 300,000 people. A crude comparison with other underdeveloped regions is enlightening. The average size of a country in Africa is 271,000 square miles, for Asia it is 448,000 square miles, and for South America it is 528,000 square miles. On average, the countries of Africa have a population of 6 million, compared with 11 million in South America and 43 million in Asia.\(^8\)

The smallness of numbers is accompanied by extremely low levels of income, "so that the market for manufacturers is obviously extremely small in most markets."\(^9\) As Legum drives home the same point,

What chance is there of the continent producing real economic and industrial growth, or of developing a proper security system, when the great majority of new African states is no larger in population size than single important city in a major industrial country?...The conditions produced by this degree of balkanization guarantee permanent poverty and insecurity.\(^10\)

A second element in Africa's bleak portraiture is the artificiality of its nation-states. The "depth and breadth of an exclusive attachment to the new states" is, as Emerson noted

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\(^9\) *Ibid*.

in 1962, "inevitably open to question" under conditions where the Bakongo, for example, had ended up being wrenchingly split into "French Congo", "Belgian Congo", and "Portuguese Angola".11 As Emerson added,

The present consolidation of African states within the former colonial frontiers runs counter to much of what had been both predicted and desired during the colonial era. It was widely assumed that as soon as Africans came to freedom they would sweep aside the arbitrary boundaries imposed by the imperialists which cut across tribes and overrode the dictates of geography and economics. The continent had been partitioned to meet colonial convenience, but it would now be reshaped to realize its 'natural' contours and return to its natural essence.12

These elements of smallness and unnaturalness fed a third ingredient in the deficiency inventory - illegitimacy, the inherent inability to fulfill basic functional imperatives. It goes without saying that a political system so crippled by structural disabilities that it cannot fulfill fundamental functional needs tends not to succeed at generating citizen loyalty and support. Thus, Herz viewed the eventual replacement of many a nation-state by a larger entity by postulating that "throughout history, that unit which affords protection and security to human beings has tended to become the basic political unit."13

Illegitimacy borne of incapacity is precisely the scourge that engulfed European states after World War II and which then pushed these states toward the solution of transcendence and integration. As Haas elaborates, "... in 1950 Europeans saw their national situations in very gloomy terms... The trauma of the war and the reconstruction period seemed to make a mockery of the proud national feelings of the pre-war period in the Europe of the Six. ..."14 The nation-state in Europe "seemed unable to guarantee economic welfare, military security, or the enjoyment of democracy and human rights."15 The national situation in each Western European country "was such as to make people look for solutions to their problems in a framework larger than the discredited

12 Ibid., p. 276.
15 Ibid., p. 321.
nation-state."\(^\text{16}\) This amounted, in effect, to a search for policy alternatives which would guarantee "security and welfare, peace and plenty..."\(^\text{17}\)

If the presently-constituted nation-state in Africa, plagued by the deficiency trilogy of smallness, unnaturalness and illegitimacy, is not the appropriate unit or vehicle of development, then what is? The answer turns on a choice between two "natural" communities or political entities - between "the smaller and the most typical expression of African community," the ethnicity, at one extreme, and the whole of Black Africa at the other.\(^\text{18}\) Upon further assessment, it emerges readily that the "ethnic community" option is, in effect, a non-choice. While the effective units of community in Africa are the ethnicities, to open the door to African ethnic self-determination "would be to move toward a balkanization which would verge on anarchy, if it did not wholly achieve it."\(^\text{19}\) Needless to say, the road to viability, modernization, and legitimation in Africa cannot be the avenue of further fractionation of political units.

If the only rational and logical political foundation for Africa is the necessity for a "continental" community of Africans, how might this be achieved? What is the appropriate theory of integration for Africa? Our thesis is that the creation of an all-African political community is, above all, possible only when there is an ideological commitment on the part of the African leaderships to Pan-Africanism, whose essence is the dignificatory reclamation of Africa and Africans as a primary value, and when such a commitment is linked to a federalist, as against a functional, strategy.\(^\text{20}\)

The unsuitability of the functionalist school for Africa hinges on several factors. They are: (a) the stark differences in the conditions of Western Europe, where the functionalist strategy has achieved remarkable results, and the conditions obtaining in Africa; (b) the poor showing of functionalist regional groupings in Africa over the years; and c) the fundamental flaws of African nation-states as presently constituted. These factors necessitate that African states cease to exist, be resurrected and metamorphosed through federalist engineering, rather than being retained as legitimate, wholesome entities and actors in evolving integration processes, as functionalism assumes and enjoins.

\(^{16}\) Ibid.
\(^{17}\) Ibid., pp. 317-318.
\(^{19}\) Ibid., p. 279.
\(^{20}\) Ibid.
The Unsuitability of European Functionalism for Africa

The story of the European Economic Community began in 1950 when the then French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, proposed the formation of a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The ECSC treaty was signed in 1951 and the high authority of the community actually began operations in 1952. In March 1957, six Western countries signed the Treaty of Rome, thereby launching a community that, it was envisioned, would usher in the prospect of European economic and political union. The treaty was "a master example" of a step-by-step or gradualist strategy. Its underlying assumption was that "the steady and irreversible progress of economic integration" would go on linking the destinies of the member countries more and more closely.21

At a Paris Summit Conference of the European Community governments in December 1974, a decision was made to create a "European Council" to enable the nine states to coordinate their foreign policies and to attempt to speak with one voice in world forums.22 This was followed by the launching of the European Monetary System (EMS) on March 13, 1979, backed by a huge central pool of about $30 billion. The calculation was that the EMS would add momentum to the goal of a full economic and monetary union across Europe.

In June 1979, following direct European elections, a European Parliament materialized, giving rise to expectations, soon to be fulfilled, that political parties would increasingly tend to align with their "natural allies" in other states,23 and that the links between the trade unions of the European Community would be strengthened to match the formidable power of the multinational corporations.24 These developments, deemed close "to voiding the power of the national state in all realms other than defense, education, and foreign policy,"25 were hailed emphatically as a triumph of the functional logic "which may lead, more or less automatically from a common market to political

25 E. B. Haas, "The Uniting of Europe and the Uniting of Latin America," p. 324.
unification." Ideology, including the "weak sentiment" of Europeanism, was considered unimportant, "except as a background condition."27

The politics of the European Community then occurred in a "post-ideological" period marked by "the style of industrial bargaining": economic agreements and customs unions increased trade and transactions so much that the increased flows across borders created problems which proved difficult to solve by separate state machinery; a supranational bureaucracy then had to be created to deal with these problems; industrial groups, particularly labor and business, then organized on a supranational level to put pressure on the new bureaucracy, which itself acted as a pressure group for further integration. Along these lines of gradualism, loyalties followed economic interests and became focused on the new center, pushing toward a new political union.29

The key structural features of this European functionalism deserve note. These relate to shared experience of industrial and institutional development, a "pervasive homogeneity" among the countries of Western Europe in regard to a pluralistic social structure, the bureaucratization of decision-making, the affiliation of people in all walks of life with voluntary groups which represent their interest in public policy-making, and roughly similar political parties that seek to represent these interests in parliament. As Haas elaborates,

... with few exceptions, every national party can easily point to its counterpart in the other countries, ally with it, meet with it, and seek to make common policy. The same is true of the major economic and social interest groups... The picture may be more accurately summed up under the phrase "symmetrical heterogeneity": each country is fragmented along the lines of pluralism; but each group or class has its counterpart in the neighboring

26 Ibid., p. 325.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid., p. 18.
country. In other words, no country is internally homogeneous, but the lines of cleavage and interest are regionally homogeneous... 30

In a word, "converging economic goals," embedded in the bureaucratic, pluralistic, and industrial life of modern Europe, "provided the crucial impetus"; the economic technician, the planner, the innovating industrialist, and trade unionist "advanced the movement..." 31

Precisely because such specific predisposing conditions account for functionalism's advance in Europe, it would be the peak of illogic to expect any fruitful application of it in an environment where such preconditions do not exist. Well did Haas warn, in this connection, that "the attempt to apply categories of analysis developed in the European context to other regions must be treated with caution, since the findings on Europe fall short of "being a finished theory of integration at the global level..." 32 While the European survey makes clear that "economic tasks, flowing from an industrial environment with a pluralistic society, yield the greatest amount of integration," other regional experiences "do not clearly support this conclusion." 33 It is necessary then to "guard against the fallacy that any nonpolitical program yields greater integrative results than would a concerted political effort to call into life a... political community." 34 Indeed, "the fact of underdevelopment and the prevalence of monoculture may turn out to be environmental factors favorable to integration, though they were hostile to it in Europe," in that "social and economic underdevelopment can create major regional ideological affinities. ..." 35

Emphatically, processes which yield optimal progress toward the end of political community at the European level simply cannot be reproduced in other contexts because the necessary preconditions exist to a much lesser degree... Further, other regions with sharply varying environmental factors are unlikely to imitate successfully the European example. However, it is by no means clear that slightly different functional pursuits, responding to a different set of converging interests, may not also yield integration. The Soviet and Latin American examples suggest that this may be the case. But it is also true

30 E. B. Haas, "The Uniting of Europe and the Uniting of Latin America," p. 320.
31 Ibid., p. 322.
33 Ibid., p. 389.
34 Ibid.
that if regional integration continues to go forward in these areas, it will obey impulses peculiar to them, and thus fail to demonstrate any universal "law of integration" deduced from the European example.36

Returning to the theme in 1970 by way of a delineation of a number of empirical generalizations, Haas discounted any notion of a productive application of incrementalism to Africa on the grounds that "bargaining with reciprocal benefits, especially where payoffs have to be deferred, is all but impossible because of the limits on resources"; that "the absence of pluralism makes the formation of voluntary groups on a regional basis very difficult"; and, furthermore, that countries "which are poorly integrated internally" make poor partners in functional processes.37 In effect, in discussing movements towards regional integration, "a clear distinction has to be made" between developing and already developed regions.38

The African Case

The formation of a preferential trading area is the radical and necessary step in a functionalist strategy.39 The conventional theory further holds that a customs union will be beneficial if it is "trade creating" - that is, if the removal of tariffs on intra-union trade will tend to increase trade between the countries forming the union. A customs union will be harmful if, on balance, it is "trade diverting." Trade creation is likely to be predominant in unions between countries where a "small proportion of local expenditure is on external trade, and where a high proportion of that external trade takes place between the countries which are to form the union.40

When the characteristics of African countries are examined against these criteria for a beneficial customs union, the formation of a customs union is "irrelevant, if not positively harmful".41 African countries may be competitive in the sense that many of them produce the same range of primary products, but their existing economic structures are hardly potentially complementary. The removal of barriers between them would not have any

36 Ibid., p. 389.
40 Ibid., pp. 5-6.
41 Ibid., p. 6.
great redistributive effect on the pattern of production within the union, replacing high-cost domestic production by lower-cost supplies from other members of the union.

The generally low level of industrialization rules out major adjustments of this kind. In addition, external trade is not small in relation to domestic trade. On the contrary, exports and imports are both large in relation to the national income in the monetary sector of most countries. Finally, only a small proportion of the external trade of the countries of Africa is with other African countries.\textsuperscript{42}

While it is generally true that there is little manufacturing in the less developed countries and that they are all very dependent on foreign trade and this mainly with the developed industrial countries, these characteristics "are found in an extreme form in Africa."\textsuperscript{43} The main reason for the low level of trade between the countries of Africa is not so much the existence of tariffs as the fact that the economic structures of virtually all of them are directed to the export of primary products and the import of manufactured goods. In effect, the import requirements of an African country "cannot to any large extent" be satisfied by the other countries of Africa.\textsuperscript{44} The volume and range of industrial production in Africa "is so limited that free trade in itself is not likely to make a great deal of difference."\textsuperscript{45}

Given that the industrial map is relatively empty in Africa, "the task is not so much freeing trade in what is produced, as building up, on a joint basis, new industry."\textsuperscript{46} But a shift from seeing the importance of integration not in terms of the more or less efficient utilization of existing resources it may bring about, but on the basis of the stimulus it can give to economic growth by way of a large market that boosts the development of manufacturing industries, entails a necessary and corresponding strategic shift from functionalism to federalism. As Hazlewood explains, the main difficulty about a common market created to provide stimulus to the creation of new creative capacity, particularly in manufacturing industry, is "the tendency of the market mechanism to work in a disequalizing manner."\textsuperscript{47}

\begin{flushright}
42 \textit{Ibid.}
43 \textit{Ibid.}
44 \textit{Ibid.}, p. 10.
46 \textit{Ibid.}
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The difficulty with laissez-faire unions in which market forces are allowed freely to operate within a tariff-free market area, is that the benefits are likely to be unequally distributed between the associated states. Some countries may even lose from integration, although the area taken as a whole clearly benefits. The losers will not long continue voluntarily to adhere to such a union, and even states which are only relative losers, gaining less than others, may come to believe that they would be absolute gainers from separation.48

What, then, are the ways in which an economic union can be regulated to make it acceptable to all members? As Hazlewood instructs,

The simplest form of regulation is the payment of fiscal compensation for the inequitable operation of the market. Within a unitary state, particularly if the tax system is progressive, there will almost inevitably be an automatic fiscal transfer to the benefit of the less economically favored areas. In the rich areas central tax revenues will tend to exceed, and in the poor areas to fall short of, the level of expenditure, so that the rich areas subsidize the poor.49

Much the same effect is likely to arise in a federation by way of a redistribution in favor of the poorer states. As in a unitary state, "there will tend to be automatic fiscal compensations for the disequalizing effects of the market."50 By contrast, in an economic union in which there is no political association and hence no common system of public finance, such an automatic fiscal redistribution will be lacking. Indeed, for the weaker countries "such a union gives the worst of both worlds."51

The way out of this thorny problem is a "regulated economic union," the essence of which is the introduction of measures to correct the inequalities which develop within a laissez-faire union. The difficulty with this regulated integration is that the process of regulation requires even further surrender by the associated states of their autonomy in the field of economic policy. As it turns out, therefore, the difficulties of economic and

48 Ibid.
49 Ibid., pp. 16-17.
50 Ibid., p. 17.
51 Ibid.
political integration are fundamentally the same. They both require a surrender of political autonomy.\textsuperscript{52}

Even the most flexible of common markets demand the creation of some sort of supranational authority. Despite the narrower range of issues in an economic union, "the depth of agreement and common feelings required for anything but the most limited economic association are such that, if they were present, a political union would be as practicable as a purely economic union."\textsuperscript{53}

The point that is being made from all this is that in Africa the creation of a common market is necessarily linked to the establishment of a political federation. It is in point that in Europe, too, to the extent that functionalism has shown progress, it has been tied to the aspiration of political union and has demonstrated a will to surrender authority to supranational structures. It is significant that the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which tried to harmonize European trade without trying to forge new political institutions, quickly lost ground to the EEC which is driven toward the European superstate - "the idea of a federated Europe" characterized by a common currency, a common political agenda, a common European bank, and a common "super-parliament."\textsuperscript{54} As Bradbury puts it, "For the Euro-dreamers, the single market of 1992 is just one small step toward the United States of Europe."\textsuperscript{55}

Even though Western Europe's chosen path to development in the post-war era has been economic functionalism, to the Europeans this approach does not assume any fundamental opposition to political integration. On the contrary, as we have indicated, it assumes that cumulative agreements in the economic sphere will, in time, as and when the force of logic of the European situation requires it, set the stage for the leap into political integration. Indeed, there are already, in regard to the expectation of economic unification of the Community countries in 1992, gleeful predictions "that an all-powerful European president" would emerge and hold his or her own against the United States, the Soviet Union, and Japan.\textsuperscript{56}

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\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., p. 14.
\textsuperscript{53} Arthur Hazlewood, ed., \textit{African Integration and Disintegration}, p. 24.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.
\end{flushleft}
The problem in Africa is that, even though the various states lack genuine attributes of sovereignty, they refuse to give up the shadow of it that they hold in their mini-states in order to be able to share the substance of it in the context of a federated Africa. The deep-seated, almost compulsive, revulsion that pervades the African leaderships on the issue of the surrender of their countries' petty sovereignties in the cause of political integration also makes the surrender of authority to supranational economic institutions virtually impossible. With hardly any exceptions, African economic functional organizations disavow any interest in political integration. To the last one of them, they have made a habit of declaring their opposition to "any political union or any supranational organization."⁵⁷

Let us summarize these points. In contradistinction to Europe, the African situation is characterized by a lack of similar structures with similar interests to push the countries toward agreement on significant development issues. Furthermore, all the indications suggest that it will take an eternity for such structural homogeneities to develop across Africa to the extent that they exist in contemporary Europe. The economic structures of African countries do not lend themselves to customs unions whose central purpose is to achieve a more efficient utilization of existing resources. The customs union, or common market type, that has developmental relevance to African conditions is the kind that is geared to providing structural impetus toward generating new, hitherto nonexistent, creative capacity in manufacturing industry. Of necessity, this kind of customs union has to be coupled with aspiration toward political integration. The problem is that African states are, as a rule, disdainful of political integration or anything to do with supranationality. This means that, protestations notwithstanding, there is really little, if any, genuine commitment to achieve economic integration. In any case, in the absence of post-colonial integrative reorganization of both economic and political structures, merely economic functional endeavors are destined, not only to failure, but also to be exercises in colonial or neocolonial engineering.

The Failure of Regional Functional Groupings in Africa

As of mid-1983, Africa had thirty-five regional functional groupings. The bulk of them, in Grundy's words, were "insignificant and practically useless."\(^\text{58}\) Those organizations created prior to independence by the colonial regimes "were designed to facilitate colonial administration, to reduce the costs of colonial rule, to deflect black nationalism, or to further the interests and demands of the settlers."\(^\text{59}\) In the post-colonial era, the regional organizations that have come into existence, particularly in francophone West Africa, have been distinguished by their decidedly neocolonial character. Their one constant "has been that France has been able to manipulate these organizations to help France coordinate its own regional activities."\(^\text{60}\) They reflect "France's determination to remain the dominant European power in West Africa."\(^\text{61}\)

Consider the career, orientation, and growth of the Entente states. Comprising the Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, and Dahomey, it was set up in 1958 to, among other things, implement a "total customs union."\(^\text{62}\) From the first it proclaimed itself opposed to any idea of a federal assembly or federal government.\(^\text{63}\) In 1960 it initiated, and submerged itself in, a larger organization of twelve newly "independent" French-speaking African countries that became known variously as the Brazzaville Group or the Organisation de Coopération Africaine et Malgache (OCAM). Among its functionalist objectives were "the establishment of a joint development program, a development bank, the formulation of common investment codes, and the coordination of relations with the European Common Market."\(^\text{64}\) Writing in 1962, Kloman observed that the group was "motivated primarily by a sense of belonging to a French-speaking community. Their cultural and spiritual fountainhead is Paris."\(^\text{65}\) To which Emerson added:

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59 Ibid., p. 109.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
63 Ibid., p. 125.
65 Ibid., p. 396.
It is a plausible speculation that a large share of such coordination as they have achieved between themselves has been the product of activities which have taken place in Paris rather than in one or another African capital.\textsuperscript{66}

In English-speaking Africa, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was established in 1975 as the basis of the largest customs union in Africa linking all the West African states. Its declared objective was to achieve economic integration among the member states by creating an integrated market of over 150 million people and the economies of scale necessary to support large scale industrial production, and to facilitate the free flow of the factors of production, including the movement of people within the community. In a 1985 appraisal, Grundy dismissed it as an organization "rich in proposals, short on implementation... ECOWAS has seemed to have earned a reputation for the flamboyant lifestyle of its secretariat rather than for practical accomplishments."\textsuperscript{67} Four years later, the prognosis was hardly more auspicious. At an African Leadership Forum Conference in Brussels in April 1989, the view emerged unequivocally that ECOWAS "had yet to make good on its objectives of economic integration. As a result, intra-ECOWAS trade remains small."\textsuperscript{68} And in the thinking of the Conference, "the most surprising" of the reasons why economic integration in ECOWAS "has proceeded so slowly," as against "the gathering momentum of progress toward economic integration among the 12 members of the European Economic Community," was "the lack of political will in the region."\textsuperscript{69}

A similar situation is found in the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) comprising Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Created in April 1980, its stated goal was to foster functional cooperation "along a broad range of economic and infrastructural issues," and of "divorcing" black Southern African economic life "from the pervasive wealth and infrastructural centrality of South Africa."\textsuperscript{70} In spite of the wisdom of hindsight regarding the tribulations of regional functionalism elsewhere in Africa, the presence of a truly powerful enemy state represented by Apartheid South Africa, and SADCC's own declared intent to redesign the economic map of the region, it chose to operate by

\textsuperscript{66} R. Emerson, "Pan-Africanism," p. 286.
\textsuperscript{69} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 1 and 6.
\textsuperscript{70} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 113.
emphasizing coordination and unanimity at the expense of supranational integration. Its article of faith is that collective interests "are not to be pushed at the expense of the sensibilities of individual members."\textsuperscript{71} Well did Anglin observe that "the much-heralded 'flexibility' attributed to SADCC is a euphemism for leaving each member free to pursue its own national interests."\textsuperscript{72}

Almost as a matter of course, SADCC has also "been largely dependent on Western sources of funding...," making it one more functional organization in Africa characterized by "a form of dependent development still closely linked to foreign capitalist governments and institutions."\textsuperscript{73} To no one's surprise, the development of a common market has, to date, been discountenanced on the grounds that, if one were launched, "the more advanced areas could improve disproportionately to the rest of the region."\textsuperscript{74} So it is that, ten years after its establishment, the exchange of goods between member states constituted less than five percent of their total trade.\textsuperscript{75} As one analyst has rightly remarked, the founders of the organization "could be forgiven for the caution with which they celebrated a decade of existence."\textsuperscript{76}

As against these dismal tales, the story of the East African High Commission, later renamed the East African Common Services Organization (EACSO), shows that even a functionalist structure, rehabilitated in the independence era away from its original colonial moorings, can make appreciable progress provided that it becomes linked to an aspiration toward political unity. It began in the period between the two world wars under the advocacy of various bodies of British colonial opinion. However, beginning from the 1960s, purposeful African leaders in the region took on its championship and moved toward recasting its purposes. The years of experience with the EACSO had bred in these leaders "a realization of the shortcomings of the common market and of the need for these links to be strengthened if they were not to snap of their own accord."\textsuperscript{77} This they sought to do by linking the EACSO to a political structure, The Pan-African

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., pp. 113-114.
\textsuperscript{73} K. Grundy, "The Impact of Region on Contemporary African Politics," pp . 113, 122 .
\textsuperscript{74} \textit{African Link}, Vol. 1, No. 1, March/April 1991, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{75} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{76} \textit{Ibid}., p. 7.
Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa (PAFMECA), whose objective was the political integration of the region. As Oscar Kambona put it in 1960, PAFMECA was "the political side of our movement toward federation, just as the EACSO is the economic side."

Functionalism in East Africa made significant strides as long as it retained its coupling with the aspiration toward political integration. Its achievements included a common services organization cutting across all the three countries, a common currency, a common market, and a number of shared administrative machineries. From 1963, when functionalism and the aspiration toward political integration became disjoined - with some of the leaders now proclaiming that functional cooperation was a less ambitious, but a more realistic way of promoting regional integration - problems of emergent national orientation and unequal distribution of benefits took over and wrecked the cooperative structures.

The University of East Africa, acclaimed as probably the first truly supranational university to be created since the Middle Ages, broke up in 1970. Between 1976 and 1977, the East African Airways also broke up. As disintegration proceeded apace, the inevitable concomitant of inter-nation feuding took over the regional scene in the form of a diplomatic and near military confrontation between Tanzania and Uganda in 1971, and in a 1976 crisis between Kenya and Uganda over the latter's territorial claims on the former. In an appropriate lament of 1976, Nyerere noted that

... Economic cooperation without a firm political base must inevitably be inadequate in scope, and be shaken by all the political winds that blow in, or between, any of the partner nations... It is therefore no accident that there are now fewer things done on an East African basis than there were in 1963, and even than there were in 1976... A political union, however loose at the beginning, always tends toward greater union; an economic union, however strong at the beginning, tends toward disintegration if it is not followed by political union...

The East African experience thus offers not one, but two, vital lessons. It demonstrates not only that a functionalist structure sanitized from its colonial taint can make substantial strides providing that it is paired with a strong urge toward political integration, but also that, even when functionalism is fueled by such a commitment to political integration, its gains and progress are totally reversible.
The Tendency Toward Reversals of Functionalist Progress

The European experience, even more so than the East African, portrays the reversibility of functionalist achievements, cluttered as it is with moments of promise when it seemed that a breakthrough to the harmonization of contending national interests was imminent, only to be quickly succeeded by times of futility and delusion. Until 1965 the nation-state seemed to be truly in full retreat in Europe in all but a few policy realms. The Community was geared to pass into its third transitional shape on January 1, 1966 whereby "positive decisions in the Council of Ministers could be made by majority vote, the powers of the Commission "would increase finally and irrevocably," and "progress toward even more politically sensitive economic decisions...would become automatic."\(^78\)

1965 marked a major turning point. French president de Gaulle, asserting that only the existing European states "forged through long centuries by endless exertion..."\(^79\) had "the right to give orders and the power to be obeyed,"\(^80\) reversed by a single stroke of "anti-functional high politics" a continental trend which had been gathering momentum since 1948.\(^81\) Instead of the next stage of a majority vote carrying decisions in the Council of Ministers, the Commission, thanks to de Gaulle, was now compelled to adhere indefinitely to a unanimous voting formula, all of which demonstrated that the Common Market trend was far less "inevitable" than had been thought.\(^82\) By 1975 Haas was agonizingly admitting his profound disenchantment with the integration enterprise in Western Europe, saying that there were grounds for disputing the validity of the assumption of incremental behavior in routine decision-making in functionalist regional organizations.\(^83\)

De Gaulle showed that pragmatic interest politics is its own worst enemy...
Pragmatic interests, simply because they are pragmatic and not reinforced with deep ideological or philosophical commitment, are ephemeral.\(^84\) Just

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\(^78\) Cited in *Daily News* (Dar es Salaam), April 30, 1976
\(^79\) E. B. Haas, "The Uniting of Europe and the Uniting of Latin America," p. 326.
\(^81\) Ibid., pp. 194-5.
\(^82\) E. B. Haas, "The Uniting of Europe and the Uniting of Latin America," pp. 316, 325.
\(^83\) Ibid., p. 316.
because they are weakly held they can be readily scrapped. And a political process which is built and projected from pragmatic interests, therefore, is bound to be a frail process, susceptible to reversal. And so integration can once more develop into disintegration.\textsuperscript{85}

Integrative decisions based on high politics and basic commitment are undoubtedly more durable than decisions based on converging pragmatic expectations. A process of integration spurred by the vision, the energy and force of a Bismarck, a Cavour or a Disraeli, is clearly more productive of permanence than an indirect process fed by the slow fuel of economic expectations.\textsuperscript{86}

In 1977, with the Community lacking even the skeleton of a common policy for energy and for the aircraft and transport industries, John Palmer added a word to the deepening pessimism:

Twenty years on, it is not difficult to mock the ambitions and aspirations of the signatories of the Treaty of Rome. Few people today believe that the community - although it has grown uneasily from six to nine member states - is on the way to economic and political union... The voice of national interest, far from being stilled, is louder than ever, even in the heart of the community's decisionmaking institutions. There is, all too often, not even an elementary sense of common market interest and common purpose. National government Ministers play the community game for narrow national advantage... Far from membership producing an increasing convergence of national economies, the opposite has been the case in recent years. An ominous gulf is opening up between the minority of strong, competitive and relatively prosperous economies (above all West Germany) and the rest... The process of economic and industrial integration has, in short, come to a halt.\textsuperscript{87}

\textsuperscript{85} E. B. Haas, "The Uniting of Europe and the Uniting of Latin America," pp. 327-8.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., p. 328.
From the beginning, as Schnapp has established, "an external principle of resistance, opposition and/or competition was required for the idea of Europe to take root."\textsuperscript{88} In the early 1980s, as governments and companies across Europe teamed up on a large and fast-growing number of projects "aimed at making Europe a more formidable competitor for the United States and Japan,"\textsuperscript{89} Bradbury would exult that "the European train really has left the station, and it's gathering speed fast."\textsuperscript{90} Even so, interspersed with this heady dream of "an open, unencumbered economic space similar to the United States"\textsuperscript{91} was the reality of Mrs. Thatcher's paranoia about Europe, based on her view that the financial relationship between Britain and the Common Market partners had become "politically indefensible," a position fed by her apprehension that a federal Europe would lead to the reimposition of socialism on Britain.\textsuperscript{92}

Thatcher's resignation in November 1990 was greeted with expressions of hope across Europe that her departure would "put an end to divisions on such a vital issue as

And yet, barely three months later, instead of speeding moves toward the economic and political unity of the region, Alan Riding would note that

Mrs. Thatcher's departure appears to have had the reverse effect... Put simply, while she was in office, her 11 European colleagues invariably closed ranks against her. But now, with Prime Minister John Major adopting a more conciliatory approach toward Europe, sharp differences between other European capitals are surfacing... Most significant are new tensions between France and Germany, the two countries that long served as the backbone of the community and that only recently were leading the drive for creation of a single regional currency, a European central bank, and common foreign and defense policies...France has complained that Bonn is slowly moving toward economic and monetary union, while Germany is unhappy over French opposition to its plan to strengthen the Strasbourg-based European Parliament.94

Given these orientational gyrations, there is as much chance as there is not that an integrated European market will become a reality by December 3 1992. And should such an achievement eventuate, it will need to be backed up swiftly with political integration if it is not to unravel at its seams. It is an indication as to how uphill this proposition is that, already, significant differences have come into place over what is meant by "political union," with Germany, Italy, and Spain "talking vaguely about a federal Europe, France insisting that little new power should be given to the European Commission and European Parliament, and smaller countries alarmed about being outvoted by their larger partners."95

All this helps to spell a central difference between the African and Western European situations. Africa's struggle is for survival and basic human self-respect which cannot come in any other way than a political decision to unite, whereas the Western Europeans' struggle is geared to achieving parity with Japan, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. so as to reinforce a self-respect that already exists. The European cause then lacks the ingredient of desperate urgency and so can conveniently be pursued along functionalist,

95 Ibid.
incremental, nonideological, nonphilosophical, pragmatic lines, with all the possibilities of reversal of the integration process that this entails.

The Fundamental Flaws of Today’s African Nation-States

The inappropriateness of the functionalist approach for Africa is reinforced by fundamental flaws in Africa's nation-states which render any arrangements that leave them more or less intact a non-solution. They are, by and large, neither states nor nations, but essentially damaged goods whose repair requires a political reorganization that would expunge their dangerous, anti-development liabilities. They are not states because they are woefully deficient in the vital ingredients of a state: they are not equal to developmentally functional responsibilities and they are pathetically unequal to the average state in other continents in power measurements. In Emerson's apposite characterization, they have an "insubstantiality about them which distinguishes them from their fellows around the globe."96

And they are not nations either, but mere geographical expressions - merely distinctive appellations to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of one country from those who do not.97 That is the essence of the conglomerations of ethnicities created by colonial regimes which thrived on the techniques of divide and rule. The scourge of ethnic "strangers" compelled to relate as, at best, reluctant neighbors relentlessly stalks Africa.

In Kenya, as Norman Miller notes, "the weight of ethnic solidarity is reflected in the fact that the initial question a Kenyan asks another upon first meeting is not 'How are you?' but 'What tribe are you from?'"98 Then there is the case of the Nigerian Civil War, in which about one million people perished, and which, as Watts notes, "not only produced some of the worst ethnic bloodletting but also revealed the intractability of creating a national identity within the arbitrary boundaries left by colonial powers."99

There is little chance of a successful mobilization of any such people, so far from being a nation, so lacking a sense of belonging together, behind developmental goals. The solution lies in the submergence of these countries in a larger transcendent entity which will afford new, encompassing social environments within which new social currents and dispensations will develop at the behest of great cross-continental migrations that, over time, will dissipate old, virulent animosities and tensions. At the very least, as Emerson has noted,

the threat of contingent anarchy contained in the fact that Africa's ethnic structure only accidentally coincides with state frontiers might be greatly eased if larger unions of states could be brought into being, thus making possible arrangements by which ethnicities that straddle boundaries within the union could reestablish some measure of unity.

The typical African state is further irredeemably flawed by its ingredient of a colonial institutional legacy of a military organization whose central mission was, and remains, not an instrument of foreign policy, but the accoutrement of internal repression of real or imagined oppositions. In the post-colonial era, these militaries, through praetorianism, have managed to acquire and lavish the bulk of national budgets on themselves, even as skewed colonial recruitment patterns have enabled minority elements in national populations who nonetheless constitute the majority of the armed forces to seize power in many a hapless country and to rule in the interest of an ethnic minority. On top of this, these institutions have remained faithful to their colonial élan and orientation, defining and implementing policies that emphatically favor the former colonial power at the expense of the African countries concerned.

Emphatically, any schema that assumes the intactness of the present nation-states as key actors in an evolving process of a developmentally geared economic cooperation, as functionalism does, is a non-solution. A real solution revolves around the zero-assumption in Pan-Africanist thought that proclaims the necessity of creating for a now powerless race of people a Nation that does not now exist. Within such an encompassing entity, the present "nation-states," purged of their development-blocking,paralysis-inducing characteristics, will become mere administrative units in a viable and powerful federal system.

Pan-Africanism. Dignification. and Federalism

With the world teetering on the threshold of the twenty-first century the African world stands at a critical crossroads: the continuation of the drift of the last several decades into what might well be total disintegration, or a firm and purposeful turn onto a path of reorganization and restructuring toward survival and consolidation. The state of the Africans is as pathetic and bleak as it ever has been since Europe unleashed its assaults on Africa and its people some 500 years ago on the imperialistic premise that the whole fabric of "white civilization" rested on Africa's subjugation, enslavement, and disunity. In the words of Michael Watts,

The African world, it seems, has fallen apart. In 1989, 450 million Africans inhabiting a landmass three times the size of the United States collectively accounted for a total economic product of U.S.$150 billion, roughly equal to that of Belgium. Life in Africa, concluded the *Economist* (March 4, 1989, p. 15), is "nasty, brutish and short ... and likely to remain so. At its 1990 Spring meetings, the IMF struggled with the vexing problem of "what to do with Africa," of the real possibility that Africa might simply disappear from view.

Aside from the dire economic straits Africa is in, Africans as a people have long been stigmatized by the convenient assumption of the "slave owner and white ruler" that "white represented the superior beings endowed with a high and advanced civilization, whereas black stood for the properly servile inferiors who had not progressed beyond the primitive stages of mankind." As it was at the onset of the European incursion, and as it remains, the central source of the undoing of Africa and its children has been the absence of a credible anchor of a powerful African Nation, a racial power base serving as the embodiment of African history, the repository of African traditions and values, the custodian of the interests and security of every member of the race, the fortress of countervailing strength against anti-African designs and machinations anywhere. This is the stuff of Pan-Africanist thought, the core of the ideology of Pan-African nationalism.

The contribution of Pan-Africanist thought to integration theory centers on dignification - the impulsion to transform desperate, disgraceful realities and to

rehabilitate a scorned and derided humanity. It is a cardinal tenet of the ideology of Pan-Africanism that "all African peoples, wherever they may be, are one...and belong to the African Nation."105 As Emerson explicates the point,

No elaborate exposition of the centuries of the slave trade, slavery, and colonialism is needed to point the moral of the African belief that they have been collectively mistreated and that their common identity has been forged in the flames of their common suffering. If all hands have been against them in the past, it is all the more necessary for them now to join forces to ensure that their weakness does not again invite disaster.

Linked to this, Pan-Africanism asserts the indivisibility of African dignity and destiny, by which is meant that as long as one African person remained in bondage anywhere in the world at the hands of any of the other races, so long would all Africans remain a demoted human category.106 As Chinweizu has noted, it does not matter how much the personal achievements of an individual black person shines and dazzles; "no amount of personal wealth, athletic skill or intellectual achievements" allows an individual black person to escape the contempt reserved for racial groups that have lost ground and become less powerful than the others.107 In Garvey's words, "No African... shall be truly respected until the race as a whole has emancipated itself, through self-achievement and progress, from universal prejudice."108

A related ingredient of Pan-Africanism is the acknowledgment that today's objective realities of the African are not deserving of respect and will remain so until the realities of racial powerlessness are transformed. Nowhere is this impotency more dramatically manifested than in the whimsical and relentless killings of Blacks--the tendency on the part of the police and others in the African-subjugated world to make a sport of the slaughter of Africans, from Australia through South Africa to the United States. As Garvey put the matter rhetorically, "Do they lynch Englishmen, Frenchmen, Germans, or Japanese? And why? Because these people are represented by great governments, mighty nations and empires, strongly organized. Yes, and ever ready to shed the last

drop of blood and spend the last penny in the national treasury to protect the honor and integrity of a citizen outraged anywhere."\textsuperscript{109} In the last analysis, as Garvey again noted, "A race without authority and power is a race without respect."\textsuperscript{110} To which Chinweizu adds: "Those who allow themselves to be weak have no dignity to claim... Those who want dignity must pay for it in the proper currency - power."\textsuperscript{111}

If the fundamental problem in the black world is the absence of a massive, centralized political entity of redeeming psyche-boosting might and accomplishments, then the fundamental solution is to create one through the reawakening and consolidation of Africa, the ancestral home of all black people. Such resuscitation entails the political unification of black Africa's multiplicity of artificial, nonviable states into a Union of African States. Accordingly, in the face of the established and deepening power of Europeans and their extensions around the world over the last couple of hundreds of years, and of the resurgence of Asians this latter part of the twentieth century, Pan-Africanism calls upon "all people of...African parentage" to join in a crusade to rehabilitate the race by establishing a "central nation" for it in Africa--a nation, as Garvey elaborated, "strong enough to lend protection" to the members of the race "scattered all over the world, and to compel the respect of the nations and races of the earth."\textsuperscript{112} Nkrumah reinforces the point: "It must be understood that liberation movements in Africa, the struggle for Black Power in America or in any other part of the world, can only find consummation in the political unification of Africa, the home of the black man and people of African descent throughout the world."\textsuperscript{113}

What we have demonstrated in this paper is the irrelevance of the functionalist schema in the African situation. There is a clear and definite basis among Africans for a strong ideological commitment to political integration. This potentiality can be nursed into reality by a federalist campaign, but strangulated to death by economic functionalism. The federalist approach seeks integration through the vehicle of a political

\textsuperscript{111} Chinweizu, \textit{The West and the Rest of Us}, p. 399.
movement powered by political will and dignificatory force toward a redeeming new order. It proclaims the necessity for formally extinguishing the "sovereignties" of politically deficient "nation-states" by means of a dramatic constitutional act. Unlike functionalism, which, more often than not, is fatally flawed by preoccupation with economic calculus of losses and gains on the part of diverse, contending parties, federalism dwells on values of rebirth, reempowerment and re-dignification that all participants in the federalist cause can share equally. Its locomotive is an ideological commitment to "manifest destiny, the summons of history, the call to greatness triumphant over humiliation, impotence and disgrace in human-national terms.

The American experience, drawing out as it does the special congruity of dignificatory motivation, impulsion borne of desperate urgency, and a federalist matrix characterized by creative impatience and relentless commitment to immediatism, provides a perfect analogy of the integration model under prescription in this essay. There is no question that a motif of dignitalism and a large dose of motivation impelled by desperation featured in eighteenth century Pan-Americanism. Alexander Hamilton well depicted the insupportable realities of economic and military disabilities that enshrouded the American states:

Do we owe debts to foreigners...contracted in a time of imminent peril for the preservation of our political existence? These remain without any proper or satisfactory provision for their discharge. Have we valuable territories and important posts in the possession of a foreign power which, by express stipulations, ought long since to have been surrendered? These are still retained, to the prejudice of our interests, not less than of our rights. Are we in a condition to resent or to repel the aggression? We have neither troops, nor treasury, nor government. ... Are we entitled by nature and compact to a free participation in the navigation of the Mississippi? Spain excludes us from it. Is public credit an indispensable resource in time of public danger? We seem to have abandoned its cause as desperate and irretrievable. Is commerce of importance to national wealth? Ours is at the lowest point of declension. Is respectability in the eyes of foreign powers a safeguard against foreign encroachments? The imbecility of our government even forbids them to treat with us.\footnote{Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist, Everyman's Library, J. M. Dent and Sons, 1961, p. 68.}

\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 381}
\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 381}
The dignification element in Pan-Americanism relates to the derogation of the social credentials of the immigrants from Europe who originally populated the American colonies, and of the colonies themselves, as the "emunctories" or "sinks" to drain away "England's filth--the new home for "those who could not live honestly in the old"; the "spit out of the very mouth" of Europe,\(^{117}\) all of which prompted Alexander Hamilton, among others, to sound the clarion call to political integration in order to cut arrogant Europe to size and teach it humility.\(^{118}\)

Even so, the dignificatory ethos of Pan-Americanism and Pan-Africanism can be linked only in terms of an affinity, not a sameness. This is because the degradation of the American colonies and its people in the 17th and 18th centuries was not of the same intensity and order as the devaluation of Africa and its people beginning in the 15th century. "Americans" constituted but a geographic slice of a Caucasian race, which in much of the rest of the world, particularly in their natural habitat of Europe, lived in appreciable prestige. The Africans, on the other hand, were universally "debased by servitude," with many of them, in Madison's words, "degraded from the human rank, and classed with those irrational animals which fall under the legal denomination of property."\(^ {119}\)

Today's realities of neocolonial peonage in most of Africa, and of downright servitude in places like South Africa, attest that these conditions have not substantially changed. The logical inference from this is that the dignificatory impulse has much greater relevance and cogency in contemporary Africa than it did in the America of the 18th century. If in this America of yore the march to political integration was prosecuted as a crusade in rapid and immediate transformation and not as a gradualist- incrementalist proposition, it is difficult to see how Africa, engulfed in economic cataclysms and racial indignities, can afford to move at a slower pace. And all it would take to propel such a


\(^{118}\) *The Federalist*, pp. 53-54.

necessarily swift political movement toward a Union of African States is a commitment to Pan-Africanism as a primary value.